



BECOMING A DARK KNIGHT

ADVERSARY EMULATION DEMONSTRATION FOR ATT&CK EVALUATIONS

Cat Self

Principal Adversary Emulation Engineer

Kate Esprit

Senior Cyber Threat Intelligence Analyst



CAT SELF


- ▶ Artist
- ▶ Military Intelligence Veteran
- ▶ Dev, Red Teamer, Threat Hunter @ Target
- ▶ Now Principal Adversary Engineer & Lead macOS & Linux **ATT&CK** @MITRE



KATE ESPRIT

- ▶ Embedded Intel Analyst @ Meta
- ▶ Latin America SME
- ▶ Cyber Blogger @ Phishing for Answers
- ▶ Senior CTI Analyst @ MITRE

EMULATION VS. SIMULATION



Source: Alpha Coders ([Alpha Coders](#))


WHAT IS MITRE ATT&CK?

- ▶ A knowledge base of adversary behavior
- ▶ Based on real-world observations
- ▶ Free, open, and globally accessible
- ▶ A common language
- ▶ Community-driven

WHAT IS ATT&CK EVALUATIONS?

- ▶ Based on MITRE ATT&CK®
- ▶ Detections/Protections products OR Managed Services-focused
- ▶ **Empower** end-users, our community
- ▶ **Provide Transparency** around the true capabilities
- ▶ **Drive** the cybersecurity vendor community forward for baseline offerings

BECOMING A DARK KNIGHT



WHAT MAKES A GOOD VILLAIN?

First, **establish** the end goals of the emulation.

Next, **determine** your villains...

- ▶ Is there sufficient, recent CTI reporting?
- ▶ Are the TTPs relevant to the emulation objectives?
- ▶ Is there enough variety of TTPs to create multiple emulation plans?
- ▶ What is unique about this villain?

OUR VILLAIN: BLIND EAGLE (AKA APT-C-36)

Key considerations

- ▶ Based in Latin America - **Targets:** Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Spain
- ▶ “Straightforward” but highly relevant TTPs
- ▶ Dev feasibility

TTPs of interest

- ▶ Domain fronting
- ▶ Process hollowing
- ▶ Abuse of legitimate Windows utilities



Source: Digital Arts by Albertbs ([Artmajeur](#))

EVALUATING CTI REPORTS


EXPLICIT: "THE GOOD"

- ▶ Code/scripts
- ▶ C2 communication analysis
- ▶ Other artifacts (file paths, registry keys, etc.)


IMPLICIT: "THE GREAT"

- ▶ Lateral Movement
- ▶ Adversary actions on objectives
- ▶ Environment details

EXAMPLE REPORTS – EXPLICIT EVIDENCE



EXAMPLE REPORTS – IMPLICIT EVIDENCE



```

xClient.Core.Commands
└─ CommandHandler @020000DA
   └─ Base Type and Interfaces
      └─ Derived Types
         .ctor() : void @0600063C
         CaptionVIEW() : void @06000615
         CarpChrome() : string @06000629
         cIE() : void @06000626
         CloseShell() : void @0600063B
         cmd(string, string) : void @06000624
         cmd2(string, string) : void @06000625
         CopyDirectory(DirectoryInfo, DirectoryInfo) : void @06000627
         CreateShortcut(string, string, string, string) : void @06000628
    
```

[Check Point Research \(5 Jan 2023\)](#)

Some extra features added to Quasar by this group are a function named "ActivarRDP" (activate RDP) and two more to activate and deactivate the system Proxy:

[Check Point Research \(5 Jan 2023\)](#)

```

ic static void ActivarRDP()
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp").SetValue("UserAuthentication", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa").SetValue("LimitBlankPasswordUse", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server").SetValue("fSingleSessionPerUser", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp").SetValue("SecurityLayer", 0, RegistryValueKind.DWord);
Registry.LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\sethc.exe").SetValue("Debugger", "C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe",
    
```

CTI DELIVERABLES

Emulation Plan

- Step-by-step plan with cited research

Software Flow Diagram

- Technical Diagram used by devs & Infrastructure team

Attacker Lifecycle Diagram

- Provide pivot points for development team

EMULATION PLAN

Steps	User Story	Software/Infrastructure	Key Reporting
1 – Initial Compromise	Blind Eagle gains an initial foothold into the victim’s system via spearphishing.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Browser-based Outlook instance Adobe Acrobat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BlackBerry (2023) Check Point (2023) QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center (2019)
2- Establish Foothold	The user clicks a link in the PDF, is redirected to a malicious site, and downloads AsyncRAT.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) WinRAR wscript.exe 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SCILabs (2022) BlackBerry (2023) Check Point (2023) Lab52 (2023)
3 – C2 Communication	AsyncRAT communicates with the C2 over port 1523 via RSA cryptography.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) C2 server 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lab52 (2020) GitHub – AsyncRAT SCILabs (2022) BlackBerry (2023) Lab52 (2023)
4 – Privilege Escalation	The attackers use AsyncRAT to create a Windows registry key and temporary .bat file.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Threat Mon (2023) DCiber (2022) BlackBerry (2023) SCILabs (2022)
5 – Actions on Objectives	Blind Eagle steals browser cookies and intercepts access to online banking portals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) Chrome Browser 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DCiber (2023) Check Point (2023) QiAnXin Threat Intelligence Center (2019)

Cat [@coolestcatiknow](#)

Kate [@phish4answers](#)



SOFTWARE FLOW

Big Bad World

Company Network



Blind Eagle C2 Server

What's happening under this monitor?

1



Windows 10 Workstation
User Privileges: Non-admin
Initial Access: Spearphishing



2

Software: AsyncRAT
Defense Evasion: Double File Extensions
Persistence: notepad.lnk & VBS Script

3

Software: AsyncRAT
C2: Encrypted Channel via Non-Standard Port
Encryption: RSA (SHA512)

4

Software: AsyncRAT
Persistence: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder
Defense Evasion: Indicator Removal: File Deletion

5

Software: AsyncRAT
Credential Access: Browser cookie theft

ATTACKER LIFECYCLE

MAINTAIN PRESENCE

MOVE LATERALLY

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005]
Boot/Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder [T1547.001]

INITIAL COMPROMISE

ESTABLISH FOOTHOLD

PRIV ESC

INTERNAL RECON

COMPLETE MISSION


Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment [T1566.001]
Phishing: Spearphishing Link [T1566.002]

User Execution: Malicious Link [T1204.001]
User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002]
Visual Basic [T1059.005]
PowerShell [T1059.001]
Windows CLI [T1059.003]

Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers [T1555.003]

Financial theft
Espionage

BECOMING A DARK KNIGHT



IN THE BEGINNING...

- ▶ Programing language used
- ▶ Operating System
- ▶ Level of technical difficultly
- ▶ Timeline to develop....timeline to debug
- ▶ What does "done" look like?
- ▶ Building the team




TRANSLATION FROM TEXT TO DEV REQUIREMENTS


Steps	User Story	Software/Infrastructure	What involves other teams?
1 – Initial Compromise	Blind Eagle gains an initial foothold into the victim’s system via spearphishing.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Browser-based Outlook instance • Adobe Acrobat 	<p>What involves other teams?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Detective mode: Look for gaps in the user story ▶ Infrastructure requirements (i.e. email server) ▶ Utilities (licenses needed) ▶ Software dependencies
2- Establish Foothold	The user clicks a link in the PDF is redirected to a malicious site, and downloads AsyncRAT.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) • WinRAR • wscript.exe 	
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TRANSLATE CTI TO JIRA – A MALWARE DEVELOPERS GUIDE TO...



BREAKING DOWN EACH STEP AKA RABBIT HOLE PROCESS



EXAMPLE: BLIND EAGLE PROCESS HOLLOWING

Our lil Jira Story

PROCESS HOLLOWING

Actively read the reports:

Outline - Compare - Repeat

<p>Step 2 - Infection</p>	<p>Once the user manually executes the VBScript, a series of automatic actions will occur. Specifically, the infection chain executes the following process tree:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> WScript.exe > powershell.exe powershell.exe > Conhost.exe powershell.exe > Conhost.exe > RegSvcs.exe <p>The final payload masquerades as powershell.exe . Next, the adversary will use</p>	<p>System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvcs/Regasm (T1218.009)</p> <p>Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005)</p> <p>Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001)</p> <p>Process Injection: Process Hollowing (T1055.012)</p> <p>Proxy: Domain Fronting (T1090.004)</p> <p>Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AsyncRAT (version 0.5.7B) Powershell Visual Basic Windows Script Host (wscript.exe) Windows .NET Services Installation Tool (RegSvcs.exe) Fsociety.dll (or equivalent) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BlackBerry - Feb 2023 DCiber - Jun 2022 - "Analizando AsyncRAT distribuído na Colômbia" Lab52 - Mar 2023 - "APT-C-36: from NjRAT to LimeRAT" EcuCERT - 2022 - "Campaña de Amenaza Avanzada Persistente APT-C-36 podría estar presente en Ecuador" GitHub - AsyncRAT
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EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING - UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNIQUE

General Understanding



MITRE | ATT&CK

TECHNIQUES

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Process Injection > Process Hollowing

Process Injection: Process Hollowing

Other sub-techniques of Process Injection (12)

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Process hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its

A Common Method

Step 1:- Create a new target process in suspended state by passing `Create_Suspended` value in `dwCreationFlags` of `CreateProcess` Windows API.


Step 2 :- Once the process is created in suspended state, use `ZwCreateSection` function to create a new section in the process's address space.

Step 3 :- We need to locate the base address of the process by querying the target process using `ZwQuerySystemInformation` to find the address of the process environment block. Then use `ReadProcessMemory` function to read the contents of the environment block.

used `ReadProcessMemory` function is used

[3xpl01tc0d3r Process Injection - Part II](#)

EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING – WHAT THE RABBIT HOLE LOOKS LIKE



NYAN CAT
NYAN-x-CAT


Pinned

- AsyncRAT-C-Sharp** (Public)
Open-Source Remote Administration Tool For Windows C# (RAT)
C# 1.8k stars, 666 forks
- Lime-Crypter**
Simple obfuscation tool
C# 401 stars
- LimeUSB-Csharp** (Public)
Malware USB Spread | Example C#
C# 146 stars
- Lime-Downloa**
- Disable-Window** (Public)

Fsociety.dll referenced as Process Hollowing (BlackBerry, Lab52)

	02/12/22	05/12/22	23/01/23	02/02/23	20/02/23	23/02/23
Stage 1	WSF	-	-	DOCX	.UUE	-
Stage 2	VBS Diagram from lab52 Report					
Stage 3	Fiber.dll					KZUTPv.dll
Stage 4	Rump...s (Fsociety.dll)					AGWNqj.dll
Stage 5	NjRAT				AsyncRAT	LimeRAT

EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING – FINDING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES



- ▶ Fsocociety.dll referenced as Process Hollowing (BlackBerry, Lab52)

	02/12/22	05/12/22	23/01/23	02/02/23	20/02/23
Stage 1	WSF	-	DOCX	.JUE	
Stage 2	VBS				
Stage 3	Fiber.dll				
Stage 4	Rump.xls (Fsocociety.dll)				
Stage 5	NjRAT			AsyncRAT	

V
Dashboard
Browse
Scan Endpoints
Create Pulse
Submit Sample
API Integration
All Search OTX


FILEHASH - SHA256
03b7d19202f596fe4dc556b7da818f0f76195912e29d728b14863dda7... Add to Pulse

has_pdb This executable has a PDB path Low


Decompiled Code

```

1047 namespace Fsocociety
1048 {
1049     // Token: 0x0200000A RID: 10
1050     public class Tools
1051     {
1052         // Token: 0x0600002A RID: 42
1053         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1054         // Starts process
1055         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet = CharSet.Unicode, EntryPoint = "CreateProcess")]
1056         private static extern bool CreateProcess_API(string applicationName, string commandLine, IntPtr processAttributes, IntPtr
threadAttributes, bool inheritHandles, uint creationFlags, IntPtr environment, string currentDirectory, ref Tools.STARTUP_INFORM
startupInfo, ref Tools.PROCESS_INFORMATION processInformation);
1057
1058         // Token: 0x0600002B RID: 43
1059         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1060         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "GetThreadContext")]
1061         private static extern bool GetThreadContext_API(IntPtr thread, int[] context);
1062
1063         // Token: 0x0600002C RID: 44
1064         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1065         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "Wow64GetThreadContext")]
1066         private static extern bool Wow64GetThreadContext_API(IntPtr thread, int[] context);
1067
1068         // Token: 0x0600002D RID: 45
1069         [SuppressUnmanagedCodeSecurity]
1070         [DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "SetThreadContext")]
1071         private static extern bool SetThreadContext_API(IntPtr thread, int[] context);
            
```



EXAMPLE: PROCESS HOLLOWING - FOLLOWING THE THREAD



Pinned

- AsyncRAT-C-Sharp** Public
Open-Source Remote Administration Tool For Windows C# (RAT)
C# 1.8k 666
- Lime-Crypter** Public
C# 401 194

master Lime-Crypter / Lime-Crypter / Resources / Stub.cs

Code Blame 371 lines (343 loc) 10 KB

```

227 private static bool handleRun(string path, byte[] data, bool protect)
}
private static bool HandleRun(string path, byte[] data, bool protect)
{
    int readWrite = 0;
    string quotedPath = "#cmd";
  
```


The `HandleRun` method name is circled in purple.

```

// Token: 0x06000075 RID: 53 RVA: 0x00002444 File
private static bool HandleRun(object path, object
{
    int num = 1;
    int num2 = num;
checked
{
    bool result;
  
```

The `HandleRun` method name is circled in cyan.

Decompiled Code




COMMUNITY (ONE COMMON METHOD)

- ▶ Use ZwQueryInformationProcess function
- ▶ Read the process base address (peb) from the struct of the target process
- ▶ Unmap -> remap their payload
- ▶ Stomp on the code of the current running process (aka no unmapping)

VILLAIN

- ▶ Uses the ReadProcessMemory function
- ▶ + getThreadContext - array containing the ebx base pointer
- ▶ + 8 == base address of the victim process
- ▶ Unmap -> remap their payload
- ▶ Kindly removes the current running code.



EMULATING PERSISTENCE

- ▶ Fun fact: Blind Eagle never loads the Async RAT to disk.
- ▶ Since Async RAT is never downloaded to disk, the “installed” service loads the legitimate RegSvcs.exe

```
AsyncRAT Ports: 1543
AsyncRAT Hosts: asy1543.duckdns.org
AsyncRAT Version: 0.5.7B
AsyncRAT Install: false
AsyncRAT MTX: AsyncRAT_MTX_6SI80kPnk
AsyncRAT Anti: false
AsyncRAT Pastebin: null
AsyncRAT BDOS: false
AsyncRAT Group: New25
```

[BlackBerry \(27 Feb 2023\)](#)

No schedule task or registry entry

EMULATING PERSISTENCE

BlackBerry (27 Feb 2023)

```

e first stage loader into C:\Windows\Temp using PowerShell
Exists("C:\\Windows\\Temp\\OneDrive.vbs")

Process
StartInfo = new ProcessStartInfo
WindowStyle = ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden,
FileName = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
t();
  
```

```

object objectValue2 = RuntimeHelpers.GetObjectValue(NewLateBinding
{
  "Startup"
, null, null, null));
object objectValue3 = RuntimeHelpers.GetObjectValue(NewLateBinding
{
  Operators.ConcatenateObject(objectValue2, "\\notepad.lnk")
}, null, null, null));
NewLateBinding.LateSet(objectValue2, null, "Location", new ob
{
  "notepad.exe, 0"
}, null, null);
NewLateBinding.LateSet(objectValue3, null, "TargetPath", new obje
{
  "C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.e
}, null, null);
NewLateBinding.LateSet(objectValue2, null, "WorkingDirectory",
  
```

Fiber.dll
Notepad.Ink
Fiber.dll

User interaction. You must make some click
 Blue color file system activity
 Orange color network activity
 Purple color behavior/process activity
 Red color registry activity

Key:
 HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MRR
 Value: C:\Users\<user>\V

Disclaimer: Using our code as an example because their code is .net style obfuscated...AKA 2k lines of case statements



ADDRESSING GAPS IN REPORTING

ATT&CK EVALUATIONS	Common practices
Is the proposed alternative represented in ATT&CK?	Pull a sample and analyze from VXUnderground
Review other campaigns from the same villain?	Pull a sample and analyze from Alien Vault
Open-source frameworks used by villain?	Pull a sample and analyze from Twitter
CTI team gets final say	Pull a sample and analyze from MalwareBazaar

ATTACKER LIFECYCLE

MAINTAIN PRESENCE

MOVE Laterally

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005]
Boot/Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder [T1547.001]



INITIAL COMPROMISE

ESTABLISH Foothold

PRIV ESC

INTERNAL RECON

COMPLETE MISSION

Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment [T1566.001]
Phishing: Spearphishing Link [T1566.002]

User Execution: Malicious Link [T1204.001]
User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002]
Visual Basic [T1059.005]
PowerShell [T1059.001]
Windows CLI [T1059.003]

Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers [T1555.003]

Financial theft
Espionage



LESSONS LEARNED

- ▶ Early collaboration across the teams when developing the emulation plan
- ▶ Prototype range - for testing the scenario from end2end
- ▶ Creating tests provides quicker trouble shooting
- ▶ Robust logging capabilities - especially when working in memory

RED DEV DELIVERABLES



Emulation Plan


- Operator & Setting up Env Instructions
- Commands to run the Emulation Plan
- Embedded References: CTI & Coding references

Source Code

- Organized for scale & repeatability
- In-line MITRE ATT&CK documentation inside source code for **Blue-team**

BECOMING A DARK KNIGHT





KEY TAKEAWAYS

- ▶ Provide transparency into our emulation development process
- ▶ Provide our solution for CTI & Red Development collaboration
- ▶ Lower the bar of entry to learning how to build emulation plans
- ▶ Public Release: Blind Eagle scenario coming soon!

Q&A

THIS PRESENTATION IS BROUGHT TO YOU BY...

Thank you!

Ashwin
Radhakrishnan
Molly & Justin



Thank you!

Cory
Goodspeed

MANAGED SERVICES

ATT&CK
EVALUATIONS

CFP Closes 18 August 2023