



# Securing Apps in the Open-By-Default Cloud

Winston Howes and Michael Wozniak

# Who are we?



Michael Wozniak  
Infrastructure Security




Winston Howes  
Application Security



# Welcome to the Cloud



# Welcome to the Cloud



EC2



EKS



App Engine



GKE



GCE



# Open By Default

**WEBSITES & WEB APPS**

Project

**Host a Static Website**

Host your personal or simple marketing website on AWS.

**30 Minutes**

**WEBSITES & WEB APPS** **FREE TIER**

10-Minute Tutorial

**Launch a WordPress Website**

Get a website up and running with WordPress installed on an Amazon EC2 virtual machine.

**10 Minutes**

**WEBSITES & WEB APPS** **FREE TIER**

10-Minute Tutorial

**Register a Domain Name**

Register a new domain name and connect that it through the DNS to a virtual machine.

**10 Minutes**

“After deploying the application, you need to expose it to the Internet so that users can access it.”  
- GKE Quickstart

Deploy a Python Application on App Engine

Create a small App Engine application that displays a short message.

**Product:** Google App Engine  
**Average Time Required:** 30 min

[VIEW DOCUMENTATION](#)



# Constraints

- Networking
  - Not possible to have one large internal only network
  - Limited enforcement options provided by AWS/GCP
  - Services like App Engine must be exposed directly to the Internet
- Central Management
  - Lack of central CI/CD Pipeline
  - Wide variety of technologies



# Development Lifecycle

- It's unclear when security should review an app.





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**New app created**

You're on the  
internet 🎉

Hello 🌍



# Development Lifecycle

- It's unclear when security should review an app.




# Development Lifecycle

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# Considered Gating Approaches



1. Enabling Billing Post-Review
2. Implement AuthN & AuthZ controls on individual services
3. Firewalls
4. Google's Identity Aware Proxy



# Considered Gating Approaches



- ~~1. Enabling Billing Post Review~~
2. Implement AuthN & AuthZ controls on individual services
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4. Google's Identity Aware Proxy

**Restricts  
Feature  
Development**



# Considered Gating Approaches



- ~~1. Enabling Billing Post Review~~
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*Limited  
Scalability*



# Considered Gating Approaches




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*Limited  
Granularity*





# Considered Gating Approaches



- ~~1. Enabling Billing Post Review~~
- ~~2. Implement AuthN & AuthZ controls on individual services~~
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- ~~4. Google's Identity Aware Proxy~~

**Not Automatable**



# Goals

- **Flexibility:** Minimum opinions about development environments and cloud feature use\*
- **Scalability:** No need for developer instrumentation
- **Granularity:** By default all services are gated with granular authN and authZ
- **Automatability:** Reduce operational costs

\*if developers want high QPS or to receive user traffic, there will be necessary changes



# Laying the Groundwork: Primitives

1. Network Control
2. Service Inventory




# Laying the Groundwork: Primitives

Solution: Central service that enables billing and gives the security team network management access and inventories services




# Development Lifecycle

- It's unclear when security should review an app.




# Development Lifecycle

- It's unclear when security should review an app.



# UnManaged Services

1. New Services in Development
2. Internal Tools



Treated identically by Security



# UnManaged Services: Primitives


1. Firewall Manager
2. Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy






# Firewall Manager

1. Import every service from our central inventory
2. Set base level firewall rules on every service
  - a. App Engine: Only allow requests from our stateless proxy
  - b. Other: Only allow requests from our SSH proxy
3. Revert non-Security approved modifications to the firewall rules



# Firewall Manager Architecture



# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy

- Support multiple forms of AuthN
  - Service-to-service
  - User-to-service
- Easy integration
  - App Engine: zero setup
  - Other: config change to stateless proxy
- Easily offboard users
  - Periodic syncs with ACL source of truth
- Reliable




# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture

1. Configuration
2. Authentication and Authorization
3. Proxying Requests




# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: Configuration




# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: AuthN/Z

User tries to access service  
behind proxy



# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: AuthN/Z

Proxy can't authenticate the user. Redirects to Jump Point




Jump Point



# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: AuthN/Z


The Jump Point creates a ticket with the user's Identity and redirects the user to the Proxy






# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: AuthN/Z

User forwards the ticket to the proxy,  
which compares the identity against its  
ACLs and proxies the request




# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: AuthN/Z

User's request reaches service




# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: AuthN/Z

IAP + Jump Point can be  
generalized as a SSO provider



# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Architecture: Proxying



# Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy Challenges

1. Higher latency, particularly for App Engine
2. Double Billing - twice the egress




# Managed Services

Go On...



# Managed Services: Goals

1. Low Latency
2. Cheap
3. Granular Auth N/Z
4. Visibility



# Managed Services: Components


1. API Gateway
2. Service Mesh
3. Configuration Controller
4. Service Sidecar





# Managed Services: API Gateway


1. Envoy as a front-proxy
2. Single entry point for external traffic
3. Set of audited AuthN filters
4. Centrally managed



# Managed Services: Service Mesh



1. Centrally managed and visible routing
2. Envoy provides
  - a. Authentication
  - b. Encryption
  - c. Metrics
3. Not routable from Internet except via API Gateway





# Managed Services: Configuration Controller

1. Central component to manage routes
2. Routes need to be approved by owners
3. Authentication included automatically based on configuration state



# Managed Services: Service Sidecar


1. Envoy as a sidecar
2. Connects to CA to establish identity
3. Fetches config from central configuration service
4. Authenticates all incoming traffic
5. Exposes a port locally for service egress



# Managed Services: Challenges

1. Onboarding: configuration changes require approval
2. Noisy Neighbors: single account/VPC means that cloud quotas are shared by all services
3. Central Point of Failure

THINKING...





**What about the  
non-migrated services?**

# Introspection



# Introspection Library


- Easy to integrate
  - Single line of code
  - Supports all service frameworks
- Gathers security-critical information
  - Routes
  - Auth Controls (Filters, decorators, annotations, etc.)
  - Packages
  - Service Metadata
- Runs on instance startup
- Triggers high signal alerts





# Introspection Architecture

Provision Bucket for Service A



# Core Infrastructure

- **Firewall Manager:** Gate services by default
- **Stateless Proxy:** Allow authenticated access to services
- **API Gateway & Service Mesh:** Production environment to run services with controls
- **Introspection:** Understand service state

tl;dr



# Revisiting Goals

- **Flexibility:** Minimum opinions about development environments and cloud feature use\*
- **Scalability:** No need for developer instrumentation
- **Granularity:** By default all services are gated with granular authN and authZ
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# Order of Operations




# Step 1: Lay the Foundation

- Create a central hook that provides ways to make future changes
- Inventory all new services



# Step 2: Start Simple

- Gate services in development to just corporate IPs
- Build Firewall Manager



# Step 3: Add Granularity


- Transition from IP-based auth to service identities
- Build Stateless AuthN/Z Proxy
- As things transition to production perform manual review

**TIGHT!**



# Step 4: Understand Production

- Learn how your services change over time
- Build out an Introspection library






# Step 5: Provide Robust Controls in Production

- Build out a central gateway and service mesh
- Migrate existing services



# Lessons Learned





# Security is Engineering

**Gain a central hook into your  
fleet early**




# Visibility before enforcement




**Make your security posture  
something you can reason about  
- no black boxes**



**Offer other engineering  
teams a carrot**









Thank you