CLICKONCE AND YOU'RE IN:

When .appref-ms abuse is operating as intended



ClickOnce and you're in

- Speaker Introduction
- The End of the Golden Age
- Compendium of ClickOnce
- Aquaman, King of the Phish
- Sleeper Cells: C2 Management
- A Little Help for my Friends
- Closing Questions



SPEAKER INTRODUCTION



Speaker Introduction – @0xF4B0

- William Joseph Burke IV
- CISA Red Team Lead
 - Provide red team ops for whole federal sector
- 15 Years across intelligence & cyber fields
 - Military, Private, and Public sectors
- Linguistics, NetAdmin, SysAdmin, Operations
- Adjunct Graduate Professor, Marymount University
- OSCP, GXPN, GPEN, GCIH, GWAPT, eCPPT, CORIII, CNDA, CEH, Sec+, CISSP





THE END OF THE GOLDEN AGE



5

- Initial access via phishing used to be simple
 - Batch script Object Linking & Embedding (OLE) in Word documents
 - Basic scripts delivered via HTTP Application (HTA)
 - ...Pretty much everything Windows 7
- As time ticked through the hourglass, difficulty increased
 - Windows Defender / Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI)
 - Permitted filetypes for execution via OLE's are increasingly limited
 - Additional layers of barriers preventing entry
 - ...Pretty much everything Windows 10



- The resulting operational need:
 - Additional methods of code execution
 - Delivery as either an attachment, hyperlink, or OLE
- Capabilities needed to work in the following environments:
 - Native, fully patched Windows 10 with Defender enabled
 - Native, fully patched Windows 7 with third party anti-virus enabled
 - Cooperate with the Cobalt Strike Command & Control (C2) platform
- Focus of research was on delivery and execution of code





- So, where to begin? Let's take a journey...
- OLE delivery was the first item of interest
 - Inspired by .SettingContent-ms research by Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3)
 - Cross-referenced native Win 10 executable formats to the OLE blacklist
 - Research available executable formats for delivery potential
 - This resulted in a preliminary list which was narrowed down to:



These filetypes were individually researched for potential manipulation









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These filetypes were further researched for potential manipulation



A New Light Arises


While researching the extension formats, this caught my eye

What is an APPREF-MS file?



Application reference file used by ClickOnce, a Microsoft platform <u>used to deploy and run</u> remote Web applications; contains a local or remote link to an application; commonly used to enable links from the Windows Start Menu.

More Information










A New Light Arises

- No prior research on .appref-ms abuse was discovered
- ClickOnce is the application that runs the .appref-ms filetype
- Now, some great prior research on ClickOnce was discovered
 - Ryan Gandrud, NETSPI 2015
 - Justin Warner (@sixdub), 2015
 - @Bohops, 2018



- However, their research focused on a very different aspect
- Ultimately obtained execution while "operating as intended"




12

COMPENDIUM OF CLICKONCE



- Intended use of ClickOnce follows this type of path:
 - An application is developed in C# within Visual Studio
 - The application is published either to a share or remote server



Published as "Online only" or "Online or Offline" access (This becomes important later)




14

- The root folder of the published directory could contain:
 - publish.htm landing page for the application
 - application file Initiates web installation for the application
 - setup.exe, raw installer for the program
 - "Application Files" folder Stores the app version, manifest, & deploy files

PDFViewer					
Name:	PDFViewer				
Version:	4.0.0.3				
Publisher:	PDFViewer				
The following prerequisites are required:					
If these components are already installed, you can <u>launch</u> the application now. Otherwise, click the button below to install the prerequisites and run the application.					
Install					




- It's incredibly simple for the end user to install the program:
 - Launch the .application link through a web browser, execution is automated
 - Launch or install the application from the publish.htm page and run it



These methods will always install the latest version of the app



- Installation differs between "Online only" and "Online & Offline"
 - Established when the application is deployed
- Online Only: Drops files to temp directory and runs
- Online or Offline: "Installs" the program and runs.





And that's it! Simple way for a dev to get their app deployed



(So simple Google uses ClickOnce to install chrome via IE)



18

But what about .appref-ms?


- In both "Online only" and "Online or Offline" availability:
 - Files are dropped to the following directory -C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Apps\2.0\<Random String>
- In Online Only deployment the application is ran a single time
- In "Online or Offline" availability some additional work is done
 - Two major actions are performed as the "installation"
 - A registry key is added under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
 - An application reference file (!) is installed under the user's start menu



19

But what about .appref-ms?

The application reference (.appref-ms) file runs the application





- If the .appref-ms file is executed, it will:
 - Check the deployment site to see if there is an update
 - Will download any required or missing files and run the application
 - If the developer mandates the latest version, it will force an update
 - So if we send an .appref-ms file in an e-mail...



AQUAMAN, KING OF THE PHISH



- Pre-Deployment requirements
 - C# code that bypasses your defensive mechanism of choice upon execution
 - Code signing certificate (if deploying externally)
 - A method to clean up files / stop the IOC's below:
- Methods for removing the following should be in your C# code:
 - Reg Key:

HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\<key>


Directory & Files:

C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\<Application name>\<Application Files>

Example code is provided in the white paper




- With the code in place, it's time to deploy
- Publishing options sets your deployment configurations
 - For .appref-ms use, "available offline as well" <u>must</u> be selected
 - Any version number can be arbitrarily set





- The options section opens up some additional configurations
 - Here you can mandate when and how the application checks for updates
 - You can also specify a minimum required version
 - If the current version does not match the required minimum, it will force install





- Two ways to generate your own .appref-ms file:
 - Test on a host you own and copy the .appref-ms from the startup folder
 - A better option would be to create your own!
 - Saves time on continuous testing (Especially if using self-cleaning deployment)




- An .appref-ms file consists of the following in a single line
 - URL_to_App#<name>, Culture, Public Key Token, Processor Architecture
 - This information is in the "Assembly Identity" section of the .application file





- You can put the information into a text file as a single line
- The file <u>must</u> be saved with UTF-16 LE encoding
 - Shout out to Alex Feinberg's blog post from 2014
- Save as an .appref-ms file and it is ready to go!




At this point we are ready to move to delivery



26

- Lazy mode: It could be attached directly to an e-mail
 - the .appref-ms file isn't flagged as malicious once attached or on download









Totally innocuous OLE



1) Word document delivered




2) .appref-ms opened





3) Once install is clicked...




4) Gondor calls for aid! We've got beacons

external	internal 🔺	user	computer	note	pid	last
173.54.167.128	172.16.202.183	devtest	DESKTOP-9RCLIP6	DevTest2_Host	2384	9s



30






Lateral Movement Rundown

- Lateral movement could be obtained by combining .appref-ms deployment with other capabilities
- Example 1: If you can move files remotely you could push the appref-ms file to the remote user's startup folder
- Example 2: Run the application with psexec
 - Call the .application deployment link by invoking dfshim.dll with rundll32
 - Not appref-ms specific can also be used in online only deployments
- The user will still need to approve the initial installation
 - Social engineering still at play name your application accordingly
 - Once installed the user will no longer be prompted for execution or updates




SLEEPER CELLS: C2 MGMT
















= C2 has ceased to be, it is no more

----- = Periodic .appref-ms execution

= Update pushed to server







(Your average operator)
























- Operational requirements may necessitate "lifelines"
 - Compromised hosts in an environment that can be utilized as backdoors
- By using ClickOnce's update management capability, you can:
 - Have non-malicious code running on a remote host
 - Use an .appref-ms file to run on a schedule, startup, etc.
 - When it runs it will check for an update
 - If you lose access to your environment push a malicious update!
 - The next time it checks in, if updates are forced it will run your malicious code
 - Can also be used to create logic bombs Maybe a future talk?



C2 Management - Demo





40

A LITTLE HELP (FOR MY FRIENDS)



IOCs & Defensive actions

- Can be difficult to detect .appref-ms as it is "Living off the Land"
 - Blocking .appref-ms execution may or may not be an option
 - Activity within the AppData folder is not atypical
- Monitor registry key modification
 - Addition and potential deletion of keys in the Uninstall tree
- Train end users to report odd activity
 - Odd installation prompts
 - ClickOnce execution sequence
- Continued efforts on post-execution detection



BLACKHAT TAKEAWAYS



3 Takeaways:

• .appref-ms is a versatile addition to any offensive toolbelt

Tinker - Be curious about "outside the box" applicability

Defender awareness of .appref-ms malicious activity



CLOSING QUESTIONS?





CISA CYBER+INFRASTRUCTURE