black hat USA 2021

August 4-5, 2021 BRIEFINGS

Zerologon from Zero to Domain Admin by Exploiting a Crypto Bug

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About me

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Security protocols are three line programs that people still manage to get wrong - Roger Needham

Transport security broken by MitM => bad

Authentication bypass by anyone => very bad





[MS-NRPC]:

Netlogon Remote Protocol

ComputeNetlogonCredential(Input, Sk, Output)

> SET IV = 0CALL AesEncrypt (Input, Sk, IV, Output)

AesEncrypt is the AES-128 encryption algorithm in 8-bit CFB mode with a zero initialization vector [FIPS197].

- 1. Each time a client sends a new request, it records the current time stamp (expressed as the number of seconds since 00:00:00 on January 1, 1970 (UTC)) in the **TimeStamp** field of the NETLOGON AUTHENTICATOR structure, as specified in section 2.2.1.1.5. The client also adds the value of this time stamp to the stored Netlogon client **credential** and encrypts the result with the **session key**, using the Netlogon credential computation algorithm described in section 3.1.4.4. The result of this computation is stored in the **Credential** field of the **NETLOGON AUTHENTICATOR** structure and is then sent to the server.
- Encrypt the *ClearNewPassword* parameter using the negotiated encryption algorithm (determined by bits C, O, or W, respectively, in the **NegotiateFlags** member of the **ServerSessionInfo** table entry for *PrimaryName*) and the **session key** established as the **encryption key**.
- Pass a valid client Netlogon **authenticator** as the *Authenticator* parameter.

RequireSignOrSeal: Indicates whether the client SHOULD <86> continue session-key negotiation when the server did not specify support for Secure **RPC** as described in the negotiable option Y of section 3.1.4.2.







CPO Magazine

Joint FBI and CISA Alert Warns of Hackers Exploiting VPN Vulnerability and Zerologon Bug To Comprom...

The Zerologon vulnerability allows hackers to compromise a Windows Server domain controller through privilege escalation to gain access to ...

3 days ago



Emergency Directive 20-04

Original Release Date: September 18, 2020

Applies to: All Federal Executive Branch Departments and Agencies, Except for the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence

FROM:	Christopher C. Krebs Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure S Department of Homeland Security		
CC:	Russell T. Vought Director, Office of Management and Budge		
SUBJECT:	Mitigate Netlogon Elevation of Privilege 2020 Patch Tuesday		

www.computing.co.uk

Iranian APT group actively exploiting ZeroLogon vulnerability

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an advisory last month, directing all federal agencies to "apply the Windows Server ... 3 weeks ago

5



U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Office of the Director Washington, DC 20528

Security Agency

get

Vulnerability from August






The Netlogon Remote Protocol

- Computer-to-DC and DC-to-DC RPC protocol
- Maintaining (cross-)domain relationships \bullet
- Pre-Windows 2000 domain replication
- Facilitates domain authentication (primarily NTLM)
- Machine account password reset
- Unique cryptographic authentication and transport security protocol





NTLM and Netlogon








Prior work: abusing Netlogon for NTLM relay

- NTLM session key used for NTLM relay mitigations such as SMB signing and EPA
- CVE-2015-005 (Core Security): steal key by passing intercepted challenge + response not directed at attacker machine
- Mitigation: match computer name in NTLM handshake with Netlogon client ullet
- CVE-2019-1019 (Preempt): bypass this by removing name from NTLM_CHALLENGE





Netlogon authentication handshake



Shared secret: *MD4(client password)*

Session key: *KDF*(*shared secret, client*) challenge, server challenge)

Client proof of identity: *encrypt(session key,* client challenge)

Encryption algorithms and "Secure RPC" negotiated with unauthenticated flags





Post-handshake authentication w/o Secure RPC

[in, string, unique]	Flags (] LOGONSRV_HANDLE LogonServer,] wchar t * ComputerName, OGON AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
[in] NETLOGON_LOGO [in,switch_is(Logo [in] NETLOGON_VAL [out,switch_is(Val	LIDATION ValidationInformation, horitative,
<pre>typedef struct _NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR { NETLOGON_CREDENTIAL Credential; DWORD Timestamp; } NETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR, *PNETLOGON_AUTHENTICATOR;</pre>	<pre>SET TimeNow = current time; SET ClientAuthenticator.Timestamp = TimeNow SET ClientStoredCredential = ClientStoredCred CALL ComputeNetlogonCredential(ClientStoredCred Session-Key, ClientAuthenticat)</pre>



w; :redential + TimeNow; dCredential, ator.Credential);



Shouldn't this be encrypted?

61 17:15:57,722188986	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC_NE	238 NetrServerReqChallenge request,
63 17:15:57,722480602	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	90 NetrServerReqChallenge response
64 17:15:57,722679163	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC_NE	298 NetrServerAuthenticate3 request
66 17:15:57,723342609	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	98 NetrServerAuthenticate3 response
70 17:15:57,724070985	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC_NE	334 NetrLogonDummyRoutine1 request
72 17:15:57,724398210	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	174 NetrLogonDummyRoutine1 response
73 17:15:57,726726557	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC_NE	1038 NetrLogonGetDomainInfo request
75 17:15:57,727280558	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	1038 NetrLogonGetDomainInfo response
139 17:16:03,499551376	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC_NE	1070 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request
141 17:16:03,500046149	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	206 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response
201 17:16:17,029404612	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC NE	1134 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request
203 17:16:17,030326670	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	206 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response
272 17:16:48,972157148	10.0.0.98	10.0.0.42	RPC_NE	1122 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request[Long frame
277 17:16:48,974356080	10.0.0.42	10.0.0.98	RPC_NE	214 NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response[Long fram

▶ Frame 272: 1122 bytes on wire (8976 bits), 1122 bytes captured (8976 bits) on interface 0

> Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_e6:e5:59 (08:00:27:e6:e5:59), Dst: PcsCompu_eb:ae:00 (08:00:27:eb:ae:00)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.98, Dst: 10.0.0.42

- > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49851, Dst Port: 445, Seq: 1464, Ack: 1675, Len: 1068
- NetBIOS Session Service
- SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
- Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 952, Call: 2, Ctx: 1, [Resp: #277]
- Microsoft Network Logon, NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags
 Operation: NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags (45)
 - [Response in frame: 277]
- Server Handle
- Referent ID: 0x0000000000020000
- Max Count: 33
- Offset: 0
- Actual Count: 33
- Handle: \\WIN-NNRRFC2665S.kerbtest.local
- Computer Name
- AUTHENTICATOR: credential
- AUTHENTICATOR: return_authenticator

Level: 6


- LEVEL: LogonLevel
- Validation Level: 6
- Extra Flags: 0x00000000








CVE-2019-1424: MitM to privileged RCE



- 1. Drop TCP connection
- 2. Fallback to SMB transport **without** Secure RPC
- 3. NTLM admin login with any password
- 4. Alter response; leave authenticator
- 5. PSExec => RCE

CVSS score: 8.1 Patched November 2019







Idea: impersonating a client

- 1. Bypass handshake authentication
- 2. Downgrade attack to disable Secure RPC
- 3. Spoof an authenticator
- 4. Do something evil with a Netlogon call
- 5. ???
- 6. Profit?





Step 1: bypass handshake authentication

If **AES** support is negotiated between the client and the server, the Netlogon **credentials** are computed using the AES-128 encryption algorithm in 8-bit CFB mode with a zero initialization vector.


ComputeNetlogonCredential(Input, Sk, Output)

```
SET IV = 0
CALL AesEncrypt (Input, Sk, IV, Output)
```


- Input: attacker-controlled "challenge"
- Sk: unknown session key
- **Output: can this be guessed?** •



AES-CFB8 encryption (normal operation)



AES-CFB8 encryption (all-zero IV and plaintext)





Step 2: downgrade attack

Client-side: force AES crypto and "Secure RPC"

- If RejectMD5Servers is set to FALSE and the NegotiateFlags parameter bit flag W is not set, the . client retries to establish the session with the MD5/DES algorithm.
- If RejectMD5Servers is set to TRUE, the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

If RequireStrongKey is set to TRUE, and the server did not specify bit O in the NegotiateFlags output parameter as specified in section 3.1.4.2, the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

If RequireSignOrSeal is set to TRUE, and the server did not specify bit Y in the *NegotiateFlags* output parameter as specified in section 3.1.4.2, the client MUST fail session-key negotiation.

Client-side: verify server flags

- 11. The client calls the NetrLogonGetCapabilities method (section 3.4.5.2.10).
- 12. The server SHOULD \leq 71 \geq return the negotiated flags for the current exchange.
- 13. The client SHOULD <72> compare the received ServerCapabilities (section 3.5.4.4.10) with the negotiated NegotiateFlags (section 3.5.4.4.2), and if there is a difference, the session key negotiation is aborted.

Server-side: force AES

If RejectDES is set to TRUE and neither flag O nor flag W is specified by the client, the server MUST fail the session-key negotiation and return STATUS DOWNGRADE DETECTED.

If RejectMD5Clients is set to TRUE and flag W is not specified by the client, the server MUST fail the session-key negotiation and return STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED.

No protection: missing Secure RPC flag from client





Step 3: authenticator spoofing

Algorithm

SET TimeNow = current time; SET ClientAuthenticator.Timestamp = TimeNow; SET ClientStoredCredential = ClientStoredCredential + TimeNow; CALL ComputeNetlogonCredential(ClientStoredCredential, Session-Key, ClientAuthenticator.Credential);

Initial ClientStoredCredential = handshake credential = 0 So what if we pretend it's January 1st, 1970?






Step 4: this looks interesting...

The **NetrServerPasswordSet2** method SHOULD<u><173></u> allow the client to set a new clear text password for an account used by the **domain controller** for setting up the **secure channel** from the client. A **domain member** SHOULD<174> use this function to periodically change its machine account password. A **PDC** uses this function to periodically change the trust password for all directly trusted domains.

```
NTSTATUS NetrServerPasswordSet2(
  [in, unique, string] LOGONSRV HANDLE PrimaryName,
  [in, string] wchar t* AccountName,
  [in] NETLOGON SECURE CHANNEL TYPE SecureChannelType,
  [in, string] wchar_t* ComputerName,
  [in] PNETLOGON AUTHENTICATOR Authenticator,
  [out] PNETLOGON AUTHENTICATOR ReturnAuthenticator,
  [in] PNL TRUST PASSWORD ClearNewPassword
);
```





Step 4: so we need to encrypt a password?

domains. The **NL_TRUST_PASSWORD** structure is encrypted using the negotiated encryption algorithm before it is sent over the wire.

```
typedef struct NL TRUST PASSWORD {
  WCHAR Buffer[256];
  ULONG Length;
} NL TRUST PASSWORD,
 *PNL TRUST PASSWORD;
```

Buffer: Array of **Unicode** characters that is treated as a byte buffer containing the password, as follows:


For a computer account password, the buffer has the following format:

Random Data	Password
of size (512 – Length) bytes	of size Length bytes





Can this actually work?








What if we set the DC machine password to "?

ttervoort:~/temp-offline/rd/downgrade2\$ python netlogon_bypass.py WIN-NNRRFC2665S 10.0.0.42 WARNING: DO NOT use during a production pentest. This script will change the DC machine pass Performing authentication attempts...

Credentials spoofed. Now attempting password reset. Empty password set for WIN-NNRRFC2665S. Updated DC machine password to "letmein" (NTLM: becedb42ec3c5c7f965255338be4453c) Now running secretsdump... Impacket v0.9.20-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied [*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash) [*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets Administrator: 500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b605e9b5bf6a608263a9253b679d3fb3::: Guest: 501: aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0: : : krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:79187e1bb54f059a7412d1ceb0243439::: DefaultAccount: 503: aad3h435h51404eeaad3h435h51404ee: 31d6cfe0d16ae031h73c50d7e0c080c0:..







The patch

- Released August 2020
- Blocks handshake credential when first 5 bytes are identical
- Server-side enforcement of Secure RPC for trust, DC and Windows accounts •
- Since February 2021: all clients must use Secure RPC, unless allowlisted
- Allowing legacy client without Secure RPC support: Zerologon-style attack unlikely, but • still vulnerable to MitM.





Is Netlogon safe now?

- Well... I haven't found another practical exploit, but:
- Security properties of authentication protocol still dubious.
- Netlogon "Secure RPC" does not authenticate DCE/RPC metadata (including Opnum). •
- Very strange replay protection.
- What if legacy ciphers (based on 2DES and RC4) are enabled? •
- Complexity: implementation bugs? •
- How much more critical infrastructure depends on obscure legacy cryptography?





AD cryptography: a can of worms?

encrypt sign

4,522 results for "encrypt sign" in OpenSpecs

or view all results on Microsoft Docs

[MC-DPL4CS]: Sending Encrypted/Signed Data

/openspecs/windows_protocols/mc-dpl4cs/3af80897-751e-4994-8724-b8dc050ca28c When a higher-level entity requires to send encrypted or signed data, then the DirectPlay client MUST encrypt or sign the data using the

[MS-STANXICAL]: [RFC6047] Section 3 Security Considerations

/openspecs/exchange_standards/ms-stanxical/d9a2c31c-3f49-4c4b-bcd6-3be094dd7149 V0300: The specification states that implementations can provide a means for users to disable signing and encrypting.

[MS-STANOICAL]: [RFC6047] Section 3 Security Considerations

/openspecs/exchange_standards/ms-stanoical/132edeff-e82d-4a84-bf20-0363057f69c8 V0349: The specification states that implementations MAY provide a means for users to disable signing and encrypting.

[MS-SMB2]: Encrypting the Message





