

Who Left Open the Cookie Jar? A Comprehensive Evaluation of Third-Party Cookie Policies

Tom Van Goethem, Gertjan Franken, Wouter Joosen


28 March 2019



When the web was designed, security was a high priority.

Do you trust your
browser?

Lines of code for Firefox



Source: https://www.openhub.net/p/firefox/analyses/latest/languages_summary

How many different
features do modern
browsers support?

A horizontal bar chart with a dark brown background. It features four bars, each representing a browser version and its count. The bars are colored as follows: Chrome 72 (blue), Firefox 65 (orange), Safari 12 (grey), and Edge 18 (dark blue). Each bar has a lighter shade of its respective color at the end, suggesting a gradient or a shadow effect.

Browser	Version	Count
Chrome	72	343
Firefox	65	325
Safari	12	292
Edge	18	263

Chrome 72: 343

Firefox 65: 325

Safari 12: 292

Edge 18: 263

CSS

- ::first-letter CSS pseudo-element selector
- ::placeholder CSS pseudo-element
- ::selection CSS pseudo-element
- :dir() CSS pseudo-class
- :has() CSS relational pseudo-class
- :in-range and :out-of-range CSS pseudo-classes
- :matches() CSS pseudo-class
- :placeholder-shown CSS pseudo-class
- @font-face Web fonts
- Blending of HTML/SVG elements
- calc() as CSS unit value
- Case-insensitive CSS attribute selectors
- ch (character) unit
- 2.1 selectors
- ::marker pseudo-element
- :read-only and :read-write selectors
- all property

HTML5

- accept attribute for file input
- Attributes for form submission
- Audio element
- Audio Tracks
- Autofocus attribute
- Canvas (basic support)
- Canvas blend modes
- classList (DOMTokenList)
- Color input type
- contenteditable attribute (basic support)
- Custom Elements (V1)
- Custom protocol handling
- Datalist element
- dataset & data-* attributes
- Date and time input types
- Details & Summary elements
- Dialog element

SVG


- Inline SVG in HTML5
- SVG (basic support)
- SVG effects for HTML
- SVG favicons
- SVG filters
- SVG fragment identifiers
- SVG in CSS backgrounds
- SVG in HTML img element
- SVG SMIL animation
- SVG fonts
- **All SVG features**

JS API

- AbortController & AbortSignal
- Accelerometer

Do you trust your
browser?






Overview



Cookies & SOP 101



Cross-site attacks
and tracking



Third-party cookie
policies




Comprehensive
evaluation





Conclusion

Cookie inclusion





HTTP cookies [1]

- › Implicit inclusion
- › Authentication / identification
- › Same-Origin Policy



[1] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265, DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011.

Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous



Cross-site attacks



Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)



victim




cute-kittens.com



doggo-bank.com

- › Authenticated state-changing request



```

```


Cross-site Request Forgery



› OWASP Top 10

2010
5th place



2013
8th place



2017
dropped

› Why?

- › Framework-integrated server-side defenses
- › Awareness

How Windows could have



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How science can fight insider threats

The risk to OT networks is real, and it's dangerous for business leaders to ignore

66% UK SMBs believe they are being aggressively targeted by fraudsters

Phishing attacks becoming more targeted, phishers




Zeljka Zorz, Managing Editor
October 3, 2018

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Popular TP-Link wireless home router open to remote hijacking

By concatenating a known improper authentication flaw with a newly discovered CSRF vulnerability, remote unauthenticated control over TP-Link TL-WR841N routers is possible worldwide



- How science can fight insider threats
- How to make the CFO your best cybersecurity friend
- Safeguarding hybrid-cloud infrastructures through identity privilege management
- Why you should take an operational approach to risk management

Cross-site Request Forgery

- › Why is this still a problem?
 - › Defense (e.g. random token in request parameters) needs to be applied ubiquitously
 - › Insecure by default
- › How to move on from here?
 - › SameSite cookies -> secure by default (if enforced correctly by the browser)

CROSS-SITE ATTACKS

A scene from the movie Toy Story featuring Woody and Buzz Lightyear. Woody is on the left, looking concerned with his hand on Buzz's shoulder. Buzz is on the right, sitting in his green and purple space suit and gesturing with his right hand. The background is a simple room with a door and some yellow stars on the wall.

CROSS-SITE ATTACKS EVERYWHERE


Cross-site attacks everywhere

- › **HEIST** (HTTP Encrypted Information can be Stolen through TCP-windows)
- › Cache API abuse
- › Quota management API abuse
- › Storage API abuse
- › Cross-site size exposing
- › Cross-site search
- › Cross-site script inclusion / JSON hijacking
- › Cross-site timing attacks



Third-party tracking

Third-party Tracking



Tracking the Trackers

Zhonghao Yu

Sam Macbeth

Konark Modi

“95% of the pages visited contain 3rd party requests to potential trackers
78% attempt to transfer unsafe data”


Pornhub Bypasses Ad Blockers With WebSockets



BugReplay

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Nov 1, 2016 · 4 min read



Third-party cookie policies

Cookie policies for privacy

› Built-in browser options

- ›› Block third-party cookies
- ›› Firefox Tracking Protection
- ›› Opera Ad Blocker
- ›› Safari Intelligent Tracking Prevention

› Extensions

- ›› Ad blocking
- ›› Privacy protection

Client-side defense mechanisms

Same-site cookie ^[1]

In-depth defense against cross-site attacks

- › Cookie with extra attribute 'SameSite'
 - › SameSite=strict → NO CROSS-SITE REQUESTS!
 - › SameSite=lax → exceptions: top-level GET, prerender

- › Adoption by websites is rather slow
 - › Interesting blog: Dropbox's use case ^[2]

[1] West, M., Goodwin, M. Same-site cookies. Internet- Draft draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site-00, IETF Secretariat, June 2016.

[2] <https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2017/03/preventing-cross-site-attacks-using-same-site-cookies/>

Use of same-site cookies

against cross-site attacks




doggo-bank.com

victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



```
Set-Cookie: auth=ekSd2lksq090pQDs; SameSite=strict
```

Why evaluate third-party cookie policies?

- › Browsers are known to exhibit inconsistent behavior
 - ›› Interference from different standards
 - ›› Unintended side-effects by code modification
- › Saturated market of extensions
 - ›› No clear quantification of quality

Automated evaluation of effectiveness



Comprehensive evaluation


Black box approach

- › Browsers consist of millions of lines of code
 - ›› Source code not always available
- › Many extensions



Framework

Design










Initiating cross-site requests

- › AppCache API
 - ›› Caching cross-site pages
- › HTML-tags
 - ›› `<script>`, ``, `<link>`, etc.
- › Headers
 - ›› Link, CSP headers
- › Redirects
- › JavaScript
 - ›› Fetch, EventSource API, etc.
- › PDF JS
 - ›› `sendForm()`
- › ServiceWorker API

Overview

› Browsers

- › Chrome  SameSite
- › Opera  SameSite
- › Firefox  SameSite
- › Safari  SameSite
- › Edge  SameSite
- › Tor Browser 
- › Cliqz 

› Extensions

› Ad blocking (31)



› Tracking protection (15)



	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 11	○ [†]	◐	○	●	○	◐	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [†]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [†]	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Cliqz 1.17*	◐	●	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
Tor Browser 7	○	◐	◐	●	○	◐	N/A

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

* Secure cookies were omitted in all requests.

[†] Safari does not permit cross-domain caching over https (only over http). 35

[‡] Safari 10.1.2

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	☹	☹	☹	●	●	☹	☹
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	☹	☹	☹	●	●	☹	☹
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	☹	☹	☹	●	○	☹	☹
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 11	○ [†]	☹	○	●	○	☹	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [‡]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [‡]	●	☹	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	☹	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	☹	●	○	●	N/A
Cluz 1.17*	☹	●	☹	●	○	☹	☹
- Block third-party cookies	☹	☹	☹	●	○	☹	☹
Tor Browser 7	○	☹	☹	●	○	☹	N/A

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‡ Safari 10.1.2

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 10	○ [†]	◐	○	●	○	◐	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [†]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [†]	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Clash 1.17*	◐	●	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
Tor Browser 7	○	◐	◐	●	○	◐	N/A

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	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	€	€	€	●	●	€	€
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	€	€	€	●	●	€	€
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	€	€	€	●	○	€	€
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 11	○ [†]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [‡]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [‡]	●	€	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	€	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	€	●	○	●	N/A
Claz 1.17*	€	●	€	●	○	€	€
- Block third-party cookies	€	€	€	●	○	€	€
Tor Browser 7	○	€	€	●	○	€	N/A

●: request with cookies

●: request without cookies

○: no request

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Extensions

Tested in Chrome, Firefox, Opera and Edge

- › No extension managed to block all third-party cookies to blacklisted domains
- › Insufficient API
 - ›› PDF JS for Chromium, but also Firefox favicon (HTML tags)
- › Unclear API
 - ›› No clear distinction for browser background requests
- › Common mistakes
 - ›› Insufficient permissions to intercept certain requests

PDFium design flaw

Chrome and Opera



Plugin / Extension



DomainB



Unclear WebExtension API

AppCache API

```
<html manifest='/manifest.appcache'>
```

```
CACHE MANIFEST
```

```
# ...
```

```
CACHE:
```

```
https://tracker.com/report/?leak=appcache-cache
```

```
-1
```

```
chrome.tabs.TAB_ID_NONE
```

Since Chrome 46.

An ID that represents the absence of a browser tab.

`tabs.TAB_ID_NONE`

A special ID value given to tabs that are not browser tabs (for example, tabs in devtools windows).



Affected browsers:



Unclear WebExtension API

ServiceWorker API

› Firefox

- ›› Assign tab id of tab that initiated ServiceWorker
- ›› Blocked by all extensions



Affected browsers:



Common mistakes by extension developers

- › Requesting insufficient permissions
- › Catch: WebSockets use `ws://` and `wss://`
- › Solution: use “<all_urls>”

Extension manifest

```
{  
  "name": "My extension",  
  ...  
  "permissions": [  
    "webRequest",  
    "http://*/*",  
    "https://*/*"   
  ],  
  ...  
}
```

Same-site cookie policy

- › Chrome and Opera: prerender functionality
 - ›› Both lax and strict included in cross-site request
- › Edge
 - ›› Lax bypasses: WebSocket API, <embed>, <object>
 - ›› Strict bypasses: WebSocket API, redirects
- › Firefox and Safari: no bugs detected

Evaluation of the framework

Completeness and novelty

- › Distributed crawler setup
 - ›› Interception of headless Chrome network traffic (using linux network namespaces)
 - ›› Analysis of intercepted HTTP requests
- › Alexa Top 10,000 websites
 - ›› Up to 20 pages on each website
 - ›› 160,059 pages visited



Conclusion

Conclusion

Initial findings

- › Built-in browser policies can be bypassed
 - ›› Same-site cookie, third-party cookie policies
 - ›› Advanced options (e.g. Opera AdBlocker, Firefox Tracking Protection)
- › All adblocking and privacy extensions can be bypassed
 - ›› Due to extension API provided by browsers
 - ›› Due to common mistakes by extension developers

Future work

What about other policies?

- › Expansion of framework

- ›› Policy-wise → private browsing mode, security (e.g. CSP)

- ›› Platform-wise → mobile browsers

- › Goal: tool for comprehensive, automated analysis of security and privacy policy implementations

Illustration of importance

The prerender bug (same-site cookie policy bypass)

- › Originally reported for Chrome **57**
- › Present in: **58 59 60 61**
- › Fixed in: **62 63 64 65**
- › Reintroduced in: **66 67 68 69 70 71**

- › Shows importance of a comprehensive evaluation of implemented policies

Key takeaways

- › Virtually every built-in third-party cookie policy, and every adblocking and privacy extension can be bypassed
- › The current state of browser policy testing is inadequate
- › Browser evaluation results available at WhoLeftOpenTheCookieJar.com

The logo for DistriNet features the word "DistriNet" in a white, sans-serif font. The letter "i" has a blue arrow pointing downwards from its top. The letter "N" is white, and the letter "e" is composed of three horizontal blue bars. The "t" is white.

Thank you!

WhoLeftOpenTheCookieJar.com

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[@gjfr_](https://twitter.com/gjfr_)

[@wlotcj](https://twitter.com/wlotcj)