


## FIRST CONTACT:

New vulnerabilities in contactless payments

# TO GOOD

To be true?





# NEO BANKS


The big banking boom



# **SORT FACTS FROM FICTION**

“I could accidently pay for someone  
else’s shopping”

---



**WE TAKE SECURITY**

~~At face value~~



# HAS FRAUD REDUCED?

“Contactless payments have resulted in a fraud reduction”

---



## Low fraud rates

While the use of contactless cards has increased rapidly, Visa's contactless fraud rate in Europe has declined by 40% between 2017 and 2018.<sup>[2]</sup> Specifically in the UK, a report by UK Finance found that fraud on

---


[1] Visa's Zero Liability Policy does not apply to Visa corporate or Visa purchasing card or account transactions. For specific restrictions, limitations and other details, please consult your card issuer.

[2] Visa in Europe data

[3] UK Finance, "2018 half year fraud update," Sept. 2018, Page 12, <https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-half-year-fraud-update-FINAL.pdf>

Contactless fraud covers fraud on payments made by both contactless cards and mobile devices. Fraud on contactless cards and devices remains low with £8.4 million of losses during the first half of 2018, compared to spending of £31.9 billion over the same period.

Contactless fraud covers fraud on payments made by both contactless cards and mobile devices. Fraud on contactless cards and devices remains low with £8.4 million of losses during the first half of 2018, compared to spending of £31.9 billion over the same period.



UK  
FINANCE






Data quietly released this week shows the instances of thefts relating to contactless cards doubled in just 10 months last year, according to **Action Fraud**, the national reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime.

Up from 1,440 cases worth £711,000 over the same period in 2017 to around 2,740 cases worth almost £1.8m in 2018, the average amount stolen last year was more than £650. One case investigated by police reported a £400,000 loss after a card was used multiple times.

The 2018 cases, recorded between April 2017 and January 2018, represent more than half of all the reports of contactless-related fraud investigated by the City of London Police alone, which runs Action Fraud, since 2013.


# Sharks and Tigers




# CONTACTLESS, A MODERN FORM OF PAYMENT?






1979



1996



2005





# NFC is(n't) different



- NFC includes legacy modes (magstripe) that CHIP didn't.
- NFC uses the same key and same areas of memory on the CHIP as CHIP inserted.

# ARE PAYMENTS STANDARDISED?







# EMV KERNELS

**VISA**




**VISA**






# FORMAT OF COMMUNICATION




TLV = Tag Length Value


# 1. Reading The PPSE




## 2. Card responds with AID




### 3. Terminal selects AID



# 4. Card provides PDOL





# 5. Terminal sends requested data




# 6. Card provides Application Cryptogram

ATC  
Track2 Equiv  
**CTQ**

Online Pin?  
Signature?  
CDCVM?




# 7. Terminal conducts risk analysis






# WHAT SECURITY MEASURES ARE IMPLEMENTED IN A TRANSACTION?




# RISK ANALYSIS

- Card authentication
- Transaction authorisation (cryptogram)
- Cardholder verification (CVM)
  - Tap & Go limits
    - regulated by country
    - set up on the terminal
    - are not mandatory



# HOW "SOFT LIMITS" ARE IMPLEMENTED

**VISA**



# HOW “HARD LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED

UK VISA cards will ask to insert the chip if CVM is required

**VISA**



# HOW “SOFT LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED

3 different types of limits  
on the terminal



# HOW “HARD LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED



# VISA HAS A **VULNERABILITY**



C.2 Cryptogram Version Number 17('11')

Table C-1: Data Elements included in Cryptogram Version Number 17

Tag	Data Element
'9F02'	Amount, Authorized
'9F37'	Unpredictable Number
'9F36'	Application Transaction Counter (ATC)
'9F10'	Issuer Application Data (IAD) Byte 5

# WHERE IS THE VULNERABILITY?

No currency/date

! No CTQ/TTQ




C.2 Cryptogram Version Number 17('11')

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'9F02'	Amount, Authorized
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


# 5. Terminal sends requested data




Declines Transaction


# 6. Card ~~provides Application Cryptogram~~




# 5. Terminal sends requested data



# 6. Card provides Application Cryptogram



# 7. Terminal conducts risk analysis




# CDCVM – CONSUMER DEVICE CVM

- Introduced with Apple Pay
- Represents the idea of CVM
- Fingerprint or PIN
- Much higher than Tap & Go limits (£5,500)



# 6. Card provides Application Cryptogram



2. Change CTQ  
"CDCVIM Performed"  
value  
from 0 to 1


ATC  
Track2 Equiv  
CTQ

CDCVIM=1

1. Change TTQ "CVM Required"  
value from 1 to 0

Currency  
Amount  
UN  
TTQ


CVM REQUIRED=0







Acquirer












UK  
FINANCE

**VALUE - £95,000,000**

**VOLUME - 434,991**

# HOW MANY ARE AFFECTED?



**All VISA cards  
all cryptograms  
are affected**

**12 VISA cards  
UK, EU, US, Asia**


**Only 2 banks  
blocked £31  
transactions\***

\* can be bypassed



**Min - £31  
Max - £100**

**Tested in multiple places**


# Raspberry Pi



PN532



# MITM PROXY FOR STEALTH



<https://github.com/jmarroyo/ApduSenderContactLess>

<https://github.com/dimalinux/SwipeYours>

# WHY IS ONLY VISA AFFECTED?



9f02 amount

5f2a currency

9f37 UN

**82 AIP**

9f36 ATC

CVR (part of 9f10)



9f03 amount, other

95 TVR

9f1a terminal country



9a date

9c type


9f27 CID









# ALL BRANDS HAVE A **VULNERABILITY**



VISA



What if this is predictable?



# VISA





**ATC**


Track2 Equiv  
CTQ

ATC

increments  
with each  
transaction



**VISA**



Book II


162p

**ATC**

The counter results in uniqueness to the cryptogram allowing transactions replayed and cloned cards to be identified


# VISA

Currency £  
Amount 10  
UN **AAAAAAAA**




ATC  
Track2 Equiv 

Currency £  
Amount 10  
UN **AAAAAAAA**




ATC  
Track2 Equiv

Currency £  
Amount 10  
UN **AAAAAAAA**



ATC  
Track2 Equiv

VISA



Block ATC jumping  
Block equal ATC





Allow ATC jumping  
Allow equal ATC



UN

00 A Δ 00 A Δ  
00 A Δ 00 A B  
00 A B 00 A B  
00 A C 00 A C  
00 A ...




Tag 24:	A0000000031010
Tag 5A:	
Tag 5F34:	01
Tag 9F26:	FD4E04DB0FC91EE5
Tag 9F02:	000000001112
Tag 9F03:	000000000000
Tag 9F1A:	0643
Tag 5F2A:	0643
Tag 9A:	190725
Tag 9C:	00
Tag 9F37:	00AA00AA

Verifone


VX 520

# STEAL A CARD OR A TRANSACTION?






UN  
00 A D 00 A D  
00 A D 00 A B  
00 A D 00 A B  
00 A C 00 \* C  
00 \* ...



# HOW MANY ARE AFFECTED?



**It's not a  
VISA/MC issue**

**21 MC  
10 VISA cards\***

\* UK, EU, US, Asia

**11 MC  
7 VISA  
allow replay**

**Max delay - 11d  
Max replays - 12**

# SCA for contactless


Two-factor authentication

Insert card and use PIN

Should be made occasionally

Cumulative limits (£150)

Issuing bank is in charge



# How to bypass SCA cumulative limits


Change the type of transaction

Contactless becomes EMV




Pretend to be a phone

With CDCVM flag

Be a phone




# WHAT ABOUT CONSUMER DEVICES?





# GPAY HAS A **VULNERABILITY** FOR VISA



CTQ "CDCVMM  
Performed" value is  
always **1** for  
consumer devices



ATC  
Track2 Equiv  
**CTQ**

CDCVMM=**1**

1. Change TTQ "CVM Required"  
value from **1** to **0**

Currency  
Amount  
UN  
TTQ


CVM REQUIRED=~~1~~**0**



Acquirer



# CONCLUSIONS



# U.S. ALSO AFFECTED



**\$50.00 – No CVM**

**\$10,000.00 - CDCVM**

# THE GOOD NEWS



Safe inside



# BLAME GAME



Hot potato  
"ouch"



# IN CONCLUSION



Three vulnerabilities

Visa will not issue a fix

Google will not issue a fix


Contactless, less secure than CHIP

Not all card brands are the same

Contactless fraud is real

Someone has to pay...who will it be?





## NEXT STEPS

- AmEx
- WeChat
- Secure Elements
- HCE

Illustrations (mostly)

## PAYMENT RESOURCES

securingpayments.com  
leigh-annegalloway.com

Whitepaper available here

## CONTACT

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