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MANDALAY BAY / LAS VEGAS

Two-Factor Authentication, Usable or Not?

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 #BHUSA / @BLACKHATEVENTS

Two-Factor Options

SMS

OTP apps


Tokens

OTP & SMS Apps Interrupt Login



OTP Apps Data Sharing


- Data for your Boss



A Physical Token to Control Account Access



Yubico Security Keys



Usability and Acceptability

Checklists for 2FA: Stajano

- Stajano proposed five core attributes for the token:
 - Secure
 - Memoryless
 - Scalable
 - Loss resistant
 - Theft resistant
- Security key does introduce a physical burden, but it is lightweight, and is physically effortless

Usability Checklist: Molich & Nielson



- Simple, natural dialogues
- Speaks the user's language
- Minimizes the memory load
- Be consistent
- Provide Feedback
- Clearly Mark exits
- Provide shortcuts
- Good error messages

R. Molich and J. Nielsen. Improving a human-computer dialogue. Communications of the ACM, 33(3):338–348, 1990.

Lang et al. refer to the use of a security key as “**brainless**”, which seems to indicate a belief that there are no halt points in security key adoption



From Stories to Science

Methods for Usability Evaluations


Cognitive Walkthrough

Facilitated Brainstorming

Focus Group

Method: Cognitive Walkthrough

- The designer pretends to be a user
 - Are the correct options visible and available?
 - What is required of the user to find the options?
 - How are the options associated with the goal?
 - Are the correct actions clear?
 - Do the correct actions illustrate progress towards the goal?
 - Are there stop points?
- Generate success and failure cases



Method: Facilitated Brainstorming

- Can include designers and users
- Pretend to be user
- Use and refine

Method: Focus Group

- Not the designers!
- Concerns of designers
- Test technology
- Refine experimental protocol
- Source for survey questions



Lost and Confused




Two Phases

Phase-I

Phase-II

Identical Experimental Protocol

Phase 1




Pre-survey Expertise, Demographics, Experience

Have you ever (select all that apply)

- ☐ Designed a website
- ☐ Registered a domain name
- ☐ Used SSH
- ☐ Configured a firewall
- ☐ Created a database
- ☐ Installed a computer program
- ☐ Written a computer program
- ☐ None of the above

- I often ask others for help with the computer.
- Do you know any computer programming languages?
- Have you ever suffered data loss for any reason? (ex. Hacking, data corruption, hard drive failure.)

Instructions




Method: Think Aloud Protocol

- Task analysis
 - Ask what they are doing
 - Identify stop points
 - Mitigate & continue
- Ideally matches your cognitive walk-through
 - Never actually will



Method: Interviews



- Open discussion
- Question and answer
- Closed: pre-determined questions
- Open: questions arise during interview

Reasons for the interview

Participant perceptions of key utility

Ensure that we would not harm the participants by locking them out of their accounts

Ensure that they had the contact information of the team and a specific researcher before they left

Offer them the security keys as a token of appreciation for their participation

Follow-up Survey

No one responded or showed any sign of using the Yubico security keys

Many discarded the security keys after the survey

They discussed they do not find any value by using the keys to secure their accounts

Participant Choices

- Participants dropped keys into handy “free stuff” bin
- None reported continuing use after the study

Participant Evaluation

“No, my password is secure enough and alerts are active.”

“Why is it still asking for a password?”

“...use it out of curiosity, [as it] might not be practical.”

“Well... I don't really understand the point of the key if I still need to enter my username and password.”

“Probably not [on] gmail is not important. Would have used for work”.

“For my use, No, it is inconvenient to use. The reason is that I don't have any sensitive information.”

Transcription

Think aloud results
Interview questions

Qualitative coding

Three independent coders
Create ***Code Book*** from identified themes
Set of themes or codes to represent all notable data

Qualitative clustering

Halt Point:
participants could not move forward without help
Confusion Point:
slowed or stopped, expressed desire for help
Value perception:
statements about the perceived utility

Results

Discussion: return to transcripts as needed for nuance
Analysis: coding allows quantitative as well as qualitative
Recommendations

Analysis

Recommendations



YUBIKEY 4

USB; strong crypto and touch-to-sign, plus One-Time Password, PIV-compatible smart card, and FIDO U2F. [Read more](#)



YUBIKEY NEO

USB and NFC (for Android mobile); One-Time Password, PIV-compatible smart card, and FIDO U2F. [Read more](#)



YUBIKEY 4 NANO

Same features as YubiKey 4, its bigger brother, but designed to fit inside the USB



FIDO U2F SECURITY KEY

USB; FIDO U2F. [Read more](#)

Phase-1 security key comparisons

Phase-I Setup Instructions

Gmail and Google App x




web.archive.org/web/20160319142602/https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/for-individuals/gmail-for-individuals

Apps For quick access, place your bookmarks here on the bookmarks bar. [Import bookmarks now...](#)

yubico

WHY YUBICO PRODUCTS SOLUTIONS STORE CUSTOMERS COMPANY SUPPORT

EMAIL AND GOOGLE APPS FOR INDIVIDUALS





Millions of us rely on our Google Account for access to Gmail, Google Apps, YouTube, Google+, Blogger, and more. We all want our accounts and data to be safe, but traditional login just isn't secure enough in today's world — malware and other attacks steal passwords and hack accounts every day.

Fortunately, you can secure your Google Account easily with Yubico's U2F-compliant YubiKeys. YubiKeys provide an additional secret beyond your password when you access your Google Account. The extra layer of protection is called a second factor or **2-Step Verification**. Even if your username and password (first factor) is stolen, hackers cannot get into your account without having possession of your Security Key (second factor). The only way someone could get in to your account would be to have both your password and your physical key — not very likely!

A stolen Security Key is useless without the account username and password. If a key is lost, a new key can be added to a Google Account and the lost key deleted. You can rest assured your account is secure when it's protected by a YubiKey.

GOOGLE FOR WORK
GOOGLE FOR EDUCATION
GMAIL AND GOOGLE APPS
GITHUB
DASHLANE
DOCKER
DROPBOX
IDENTITY & ACCESS MGMT
PASSWORD MANAGEMENT
SALESFORCE
ENTERPRISE PARTNERS
WHITE PAPERS

[Buy YubiKey 4](#)

[Buy YubiKey 4 Nano](#)

Finding instructions

Demo versus reality

Device identification

Biometric versus touch







Confirmation of operation

Communicate the benefit

Communicating the risks

Phase-I Recommendations

Phase- II security key comparisons

YUBIKEY 4	YUBIKEY 4 NANO	YUBIKEY 4C	YUBIKEY 4C NANO	YUBIKEY NEO	FIDO U2F SECURITY KEY
 <p>Buy Now</p> <p>\$40 per key</p>	 <p>Buy Now</p> <p>\$50 per key</p>	 <p>Buy Now</p> <p>\$50 per key</p>	 <p>Buy Now</p> <p>\$60 per key</p>	 <p>Buy Now</p> <p>\$50 per key</p>	 <p>Buy Now</p> <p>\$18 per key</p>
USB authentication key, including strong crypto and touch-to-sign, plus One-Time-Password, smart card, and FIDO U2F; four form factors Learn more about the YubiKey 4 series				Combines USB and NFC for mobile communication, enables One-Time Password, smart card, and FIDO U2F authentication	USB authentication key that works instantly with any service that supports FIDO U2F



REQUIREMENTS

- Latest version of Google Chrome browser (or at least version 38)
- A U2F Security Key, YubiKey 4, YubiKey 4 Nano, YubiKey NEO, or other Yubico U2F-enabled YubiKey
- One finger (the YubiKey button is a **capacitive sensor**, not a biometric)
- A Google Account (such as Gmail, Google Apps, YouTube, Google Plus, Blogger, Adwords)

Phase-II Instructions

1

Enter username and password in the login field of any app that supports FIDO U2F.

2

Insert the Security Key in a USB port with the **gold side up**.

3

Touch the gold button on the Security Key to generate the secure login credentials.


User Approval and Device Use

Results

Halt Points

Halt Points


Halt Points	Yubico Phase 1	Google Phase 1	Yubico Phase 2	Google Phase 2
Demo Incorrect	72.7%	0%	0%	0%
Incorrect Settings	72.7%	20%	19.04%	14.29%
Instruction	36.4%	20%	4.76%	0%
Form Factor	9%	10%	4.76%	0%
Biometric	9%	0%	0%	0%
Pressing Button	9%	0%	0%	7.14%



Confusion Points

Confusion Points

Confusion Points	Yubico Phase 1	Google Phase 1	Yubico Phase 2	Google Phase 2
Demo Incorrect	9%	0%	0%	0%
Incorrect Settings	18.2%	0%	4.76%	0%
Instruction	9%	20%	23.8%	71.43%
Form Factor	9%	0%	23.8%	7.14%
Biometric	9%	0%	0%	0%
Pressing Button	9%	10%	23.8%	28.57%



Kruskal-Wallis Test

Kruskal-Wallis Test

Halt Points	Phase-I Y vs. G	Phase-II Y vs. G	Yubico I vs. II	Google I vs. II
Demo Incorrect	0.0008	-	0.0033	-
Incorrect Settings	0.0183	-	0.0033	-
Instruction	-	-	0.0213	0.0988
Form Factor	-	-	-	-
Biometric	-	-	0.1671	-
Pressing Button	-	0.2037	0.1671	-

Finding instructions

Demo versus reality

Correctly identifying the device

Biometric versus touch

Confirmation of operation

Communicate the Intrinsic Benefit

Communicating the risk

Recommendations- Phase-II

Recommendations- Phase-II

Finding instructions

Demo versus reality

Correctly identifying the device

Biometric versus touch

Confirmation of installation

Communicate the intrinsic benefit

Communicating the risks

Risk Communication




Future Research & Call To Action

A photograph of a Marlboro cigarette pack with a health warning. The pack is white with the brand name 'Marlboro' in large, bold, black letters. Below the brand name, the words 'Smoking kills' are printed in a large, bold, black font. At the bottom of the pack, there is a small black box containing white text: '10 mg Tar', '0.9 mg Nicotine', '10 mg Tar', and '0.9 mg Nicotine'. The pack is partially open, showing the cigarettes inside. A semi-transparent white circle is overlaid on the left side of the image, containing the text 'Risk Communication for Actual Humans'.

Risk Communication for Actual Humans


Design for Humans Requires Designing for Humans

Smoking is a factor which contributes to lung cancer. Most cancers that start in lung, known as primary lung cancers, are carcinomas that derive from epithelial cells. Depending on the type of tumor, so-called paraneoplastic phenomena may initially attract attention to the disease. In lung cancer, these phenomena may include Lambert-Eaton myasthenic syndrome (muscle weakness due to auto-antibodies), hypercalcemia, or syndrome of inappropriate antidiuretic hormone (SIADH). Tumors in the top (apex) of the lung, known as Pancoast tumors, may invade the local part of the sympathetic nervous system, leading to changed sweating patterns and eye muscle problems (a combination known as Horner's syndrome) as well as muscle weakness in the hands due to invasion of the brachial plexus.




Summarize, Simplify Risks

Use Mental Models






Clear, Urgent Communication




Multiple CPU Hardwares Information Disclosure Vulnerability: CVE-2017-5753

Visceral Risk
Communication



Password Behavior



Visceral Risk Communication



Takeaways

- Providing the technology is not enough
- We cannot predict; Watch in-action
- Communicate why
- Risk communication for motivation
- Periodic positive feedback
- Qualitative studies can be quantified



You have selected
Security Key



[Back to step 1: select a different Yubikey](#)

Select an application

You will be directed to the selected application's site to see the instruction. You can see the full list of services [here](#).



The Google logo in its multi-colored font.

The Facebook logo in white text on a blue rectangular background.

The Dropbox logo, consisting of a blue square icon and the word "Dropbox" in blue.

The Salesforce logo, featuring a blue cloud shape with the word "salesforce" in white.

The Dashlane logo, featuring a blue silhouette of a person jumping and the word "dashlane" in blue.

The Keeper Security logo, featuring a yellow padlock icon and the word "keeper" in black.

The GitHub logo, featuring the Octocat mascot and the word "GitHub" in black.

The GitLab logo, featuring an orange fox head icon and the word "GitLab" in black.

The PushCoin logo, featuring a black circular icon and the word "PushCoin" in black.

The Bitbucket logo, featuring a blue bucket icon and the word "Bitbucket" in blue.





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