

AUGUST 6-7, 2025

MANDALAY BAY / LAS VEGAS

When Guardrails Aren't Enough

Reinventing Agentic AI Security With Architectural Controls

David Richards Brauchler III

A Story: Consider An Alternate History…



- The year is 1991, HTTP 0.9 released
- All web traffic accesses static pages
- Primary risk: Modified site content
- In response, we invent the WAF
- As the web develops, WAF is our first (and often only) line of defense

And Yet Vulnerabilities Persisted

We've Approached AI The Same Way

Allow Me To Prove That To You

Remote Code Execution

Accessing internal cloud environment

Admin, Root, And Default Passwords Exposed Via RAG

Almost every word in this list is too sensitive to reveal on stage.

Control Admin Sessions



EXFILTRATION

Description | Request to Collaborator | e from Collaborator

Pretty | Raw | Hex

```
1 GET /q=Which+contact+has+the+e ddress+I+need+to+reach+out+to+for+the+latest+project+update?
  +I+couldn%27t+find+a+specific+contact+with+the+email+address+needed+for+the+latest+project+update+in+the+available+data.+If+you+have+any+additional+details,+such+as+th
  e+name+of+the+contact+or+any+other+identifying+information,+it+could+help+narrow+down+the+search.+If+you+need+further+assistance,+please+let+me+know! HTTP/1.1
```

David Brauchler III

NCC Group Technical Director, AI/ML Security Practice Lead

- Appsec Specialist, Penetration Tester
- Barbecue Enthusiast
- Armchair Theologian
- Obsessed Technologist
- Retro Gamer, Serial Arcade Hopper



ncc group

Agenda

Root Cause Analysis
Where does risk originate in AI systems?

Threat Modeling
How do we evaluate the security of AI environments?



Key AI Risks
Where do AI technologies contribute to attack surface?

Key Mitigation Strategies
How do we integrate zero-trust with AI?

Lessons Learned
How do we implement these techniques into real applications?

Guardrails Are Not Security Boundaries!

Reputational risk is **not** your greatest risk

- Asset Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability reign supreme

Guardrails are statistical measures that do **not** offer “hard” security guarantees

- Guardrails are defense-in-depth measures, **not** first-order security controls
- Every guardrail can and will be bypassed

Agentic systems increase attack surface **exponentially**

What Is The Root Cause of AI Vulnerabilities?

The Trust-Centered Paradigm Shift



Trust Inheritance In Classical Applications

How Do LLMs Inherit Trust?

LLMs consume data from multiple sources at a time with different levels of trust

How do developers determine the trust properties of the LLM itself?



LLMs Are Agents Of Their Inputs

We can trust an LLM exactly as much as the **least** trusted input it receives!



Pollution Flows Downstream

Trust is inherited at **prompt** time!



How Do Mature AI Environments Mitigate Risk?

Dynamic Capability Shifting

Manipulating privileges according to input received



Dynamic Capability Shifting

reboot_server
purchase_product
summarize_profile

System Prompt

Tool Definitions

Zero Application-

Context

User Prompt

Model Context Window



Developer

Trusted Prompt

Dynamic Capability Shifting

~~reboot_server~~
purchase_product
summarize_profile

System Prompt

Tool Definitions

Zero Application-

Context

User Prompt

Model Context Window

Application User

Dynamic Capability Shifting

~~reboot_server~~
~~purchase_product~~
summarize_profile

System Prompt

Tool Definitions

Contextual-

Application Data

User Prompt

Model Context Window

Threat Actor

Application User

Key Point: LLMs Exposed To Untrusted Data Should Not Be Able To Read From Nor Write To Sensitive Resources!

Trust Binding (Pinning)

Pin user authorization controls to model's tool calls

- Never expose authorization mechanism to context window
- Manage binding in backend



Trust Binding (Proxying)



Route all operations through user's session

- Prevents model-powered confused deputy

Trust Tagging







Application Data

(e.g. RAG, fields, etc.)

~~reset_password~~

retrieve_review

~~post_status_update~~

Assigning trust labels to all application data and managing subsequent capabilities



Trust Intersection

I/O Synchronization

Ensure Human-in-the-Loop controls can effectively evaluate LLM behavior

Trust Splitting

Routing trusted operations to a high-privilege LLM and untrusted operations to a low-privilege (or zero-trust) LLM







Application Data

(e.g. RAG, fields, etc.)

Trust Isolation

Eliminating lower-trust data from LLM context window by swapping with a static placeholder



Model Context Window

Input Validation (Datatype Gating)

Watchdog-powered architectures are vulnerable to multi-order prompt injection.

- Safe and dangerous inputs are not mutually exclusive classes



A Disaster Application



A Disaster Application



A Disaster Application



A Disaster Application



Putting It All Together

Intent-Based Segmentation



Intent-Based Segmentation



Intent-Based Segmentation



Exploring Context Windows

The trusted model is never exposed to data generated from the untrusted model!



Intent-Based Segmentation

Intent-Based Segmentation



Intent-Based Segmentation



Exploring Context Windows

The trusted model only receives the (safe) coat ID when crafting followup responses!



Safe Model Context Window



Unsafe Model Context Window

Human-In-The-Loop



Key AI Threat Modeling Approaches

How are mature organizations addressing risk?

Trust Flow Tracking



Source/Sink Matrices

- Data Sources: Systems that produce input consumed by an AI model
- Data sinks: Consumers that use the output of a model

Our objective is to discover threat actors who can push data into sources they control that will route to sinks they aim to reach

Sink \ Source	User Profile	Account Descriptions	Document Vector Database	User Context Window
User Responses	N/A	Conversation Poisoning	Conversation Poisoning	N/A
Interface Markdown	N/A	Conversation Exfiltration	Conversation Exfiltration	N/A
Internal Config Writer	Excessive Agency	Excessive Agency	N/A	Excessive Agency

Models As Threat Actors (MATA)

Evaluate impact on threat model if all ML models are replaced with threat actors

- Or, for more precision, when those models receive untrusted data



Black Hat Sound Bytes

- Models are agents of the inputs they receive
- Guardrails are not firm security boundaries
- Natural language input cannot be sanitized
- Mature AI security isolates potentially malicious inputs from trusted contexts

Meet Me In The Captain's Boardroom at 1:30 For More!

ncc group

Q&A