

Cross-Contract Ricochet Attacks & Off-Chain-On-Chain Manipulation of NFT Collections

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Research Portal

NFT Collection	Volume (ETH)	Mkt Cap (ETH)	Avg Price (ETH)	Floor (ETH)	Floor %
CryptoPunks	756,066	1,025,413	26	66	1.00
Bored Ape Yacht Club	724,125	961,382	22	70	1.00
Otherdeed for Otherside	478,965	309,221	3.54	1.2	1.00
Mutant Ape Yacht Club	501,956	293,815	9.59	14	1.00
CloneX	226,531	211,769	6.09	8.35	1.00
Chromie Squiggle Art Blocks Cur...	55,709	167,042	3.47	14	1.00
Azuki	276,488	137,437	7.84	10	1.00
Fidenza Art Blocks Curated	51,928	131,205	24	95	1.00
Ringers Art Blocks Curated	28,135	96,388	16	65	1.00
Moonbirds	201,583	91,244	10	8.09	1.00
Doodles	150,495	85,815	4.85	6.69	1.00
VeeFriends	69,519	80,751	5.1	5.75	1.00
Meebits	143,245	75,672	3.75	2.88	1.00
BoredApeKennelClub	103,795	75,469	3.49	6.79	1.00
Sandbox LAND	32,876	74,324	2.31	1.05	1.00
Autoglyphs	19,548	66,560	21	350	1.00

perspective



0

∞ — is — (nothing)

...with a twist*.

0

dingaling
@dingalingts

2/ Let's start with how it works. LooksRare recently allocated 250,000 LOOKS to be paid out daily to incentivise people to list their NFTs.

That's around \$375,000. A day. Free. To list NFTs.

Listing Rewards Now Live

List NFTs Get Paid

LOOKSRARE

docs.looksrare.org
LooksRare Listing Rewards: List NFTs, earn LOOKS! | LooksRare Docs
LooksRare Listing Rewards: List NFTs, earn LOOKS!

8:36 AM · May 6, 2022 · Twitter Web App

LooksRare @LooksRare

Listing Rewards V2 will go live at 9AM UTC tomorrow.

In V2, the closer your listing is to the floor, the more points you get!

For example, listing $\leq 1.1x$ floor price will give you a massive 10x points boost!

Full details here: [docs.looksrare.org/about/rewards/...](https://docs.looksrare.org/about/rewards/)

LOOKSRARE Listing Rewards V2 Update

11:26 AM · May 4, 2022 · Twitter Web App

166 Retweets 72 Quote Tweets 813 Likes

dangerous game

Search

List NFTs & Earn LOOKS!

Bored Ape Yacht Club

OxBC4C...f13D

The Bored Ape Yacht Club is a unique digital collectibles living doubles as your Yacht Club members only benefits. [Less](#)

10K 6.4K 100K 69

Items Owners Total Vol Floor +8.20%

Make a Collection Offer

$\$375,000 * 365 = \$136,875,000 / \text{year}$

PS: The "floor" is *everything*

0: when the Floor goes to zero


off-chain

0: 'stuck' listing for \$0 no one can buy

```
568      ;
569
570      // Verify the signer is not address(0)
571      require(makerOrder.signer != address(0), "Order: Invalid sig
572
573      // Verify the amount is not 0
574      require(makerOrder.amount > 0, "Order: Amount cannot be 0");
575
576      // Verify the validity of the signature
```

on-chain

 Error
execution reverted: Order: Amount cannot be 0



implications - ‘stuck’ listing for \$0 no one can buy


- floor price goes to zero.
- the “floor” is **everything**:
 - prices of most collections are influenced by the floor price, i.e., the cheapest listing.
 - Other applications (ex: NFT lending DAOs) rely on OpenSea and LooksRare floor data for liquidation decisions.
 - *the longer the floor stays ~@0, the higher the probability the entire market-cap of the collection goes to zero.*
- therefore, a ‘stuck’ i.e., ‘unpurchaseable’ listing at \$0 can be abused to:
 - scare collection holders who will want to exit at lower and lower prices.
 - purchase at prices close to 0.
 - after marketplace fixes the vulnerability, prices likely to rise again.
 - sell back for profit once the panic subsides.
- looksrare’s $\$375,000 * 365 = \$136,875,000$ /year program stops issuing rewards (weighted towards large market-cap collections responsible for majority of the volume)
- reported to looksrare july 11, 2022, fixed on or before july 15,2022.

external researchers shouldn't have to explain your business dynamics to your incident response team.*


*: takeaway.

let's do that again

set on-chain nonce to 99999



The image shows the MetaMask interface. At the top, there is a header with the text "DEPLOY & RUN TRANSACTIONS" and a green checkmark icon. Below the header, there are several icons: a gear, a document, a magnifying glass, a search icon, and a double arrow. The main content area is titled "NO COMPILED CONTRACTS". A button labeled "At Address" is followed by the address "x1AA777972073Ff66DCFDeD85749bDD555C0665dA". Below this, a section titled "Transactions recorded" shows a count of 4 transactions, with an information icon (i) next to it. A section titled "Deployed Contracts" lists "DOMAIN_SEP..." and "WETH". A red arrow points from the "cancelAllOrdersForSender" button to the "minNonce: 99999" input field. The "cancelAllOrdersForSender" button is orange, and the "minNonce" field is gray. To the right of the "minNonce" field is a "transact" button with a clipboard icon. Other buttons visible include "cancelMultiple...", "currencyMana...", and "executionMan...".



The screenshot shows a browser window with a MetaMask extension notification and a code editor. The code editor displays the ABI (Application Binary Interface) for the `LooksRareExchange` contract, specifically the `functions` section. The ABI includes various functions like `cancelAllOrders`, `cancelMultipleOrders`, and `royaltyPayer`.

The MetaMask extension notification is titled "Extension: (MetaMask) - MetaMask Notific..." and is set to the "Rinkeby Test Network". It shows "Account 8" and "0x1AA...65dA". The message in the notification says: "New address detected! Click here to add to your address book." Below the notification are tabs for "DETAILS", "DATA", and "HEX", with "HEX" selected. The "Parameters:" section shows an array of objects, and the "HEX DATA: 36 BYTES" section shows the hex value `0xcbd2ec65000000000000000000000000000000001869f`. There is also a checkbox for "Copy raw transaction data". At the bottom are "Reject" and "Confirm" buttons.

```
1  [{"inputs": [{"internalType": "address", "name": "_currencyManager", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "_executionManager", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "_royaltyPayer", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "_WETH", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "_protocolFeeRecipient", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "constructor"}, {""anonymous": false, "inputs": [{"internalType": "address", "name": "user", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "uint256", "name": "newMinOrderSize", "type": "uint256"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "CancelAllOrders", "type": "event"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "user", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "uint256[]", "name": "orderHashes", "type": "uint256[]"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "CancelMultipleOrders", "type": "event"}, {""indexed": true, "internalType": "address", "name": "NewCurrencyManager", "type": "event"}, {""indexed": true, "internalType": "address", "name": "NewExecutionManager", "type": "event"}, {""indexed": true, "internalType": "address", "name": "NewProtocolFeeRecipient", "type": "event"}, {""inputs": [{"internalType": "address", "name": "NewRoyaltyFeeRecipient", "type": "address"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "NewTransferSetter", "type": "address"}, {""inputs": [{"internalType": "address", "name": "OwnershipTransfer", "type": "event"}, {"internalType": "address", "name": "RoyaltyPayer", "type": "address"}, {""indexed": false, "internalType": "bytes32", "name": "RoyaltyPayment", "type": "bytes32"}, {""indexed": false, "internalType": "uint256", "name": "royaltyFee", "type": "uint256"}, {""indexed": true, "internalType": "address", "name": "currency", "type": "address"}, {""indexed": false, "internalType": "address", "name": "currency", "type": "address"}]}]
```

let's do that again

List for Sale

#5
Moonbirds lol
Global Floor ⚡ 11

Sale Type Fixed Price Auction

Sale Price
0.0001 ETH


99% lower than floor price

Validity 30 days

Reserve for a specific buyer

Fees Creator Royalties: 0.0% LooksRare: 2%

Cancel List item




reported to looksrare july 16, 2022, fixed ~july-august 2022

all your engineers must be fluent with and rotate between on-chain and off-chain development. no silos.*

*: takeaway.

0x: stealing \$ using NFTs from a contract that has nothing to do with NFTs (cross-contract)



“The 0x protocol is, at its core, a set of secure smart contracts that facilitate the peer-to-peer exchange of Ethereum-based assets. The protocol serves as an open standard and common building block for any developer needing exchange functionality”*.

*: <https://docs.0x.org/introduction/introduction-to-0x>

0x: stealing \$ using NFTs from a contract that has nothing to do with NFTs
(cross-contract)

```
address zeroEx = 0xDef1C0ded9bec7F1a1670819833240f027b25EfF; //0x

function _changedToProtecttheNegligent(bytes memory _quote) internal {

    (bool valid, bytes memory payload) = zeroEx.call(_quote);

    if (!valid) {
        if (payload.length == 0) revert();
        assembly {
            revert(add(32, payload), mload(payload))
        }
    }
}
```

what could go wrong?

0x: stealing \$ using NFTs from a contract that has nothing to do with NFTs
(cross-contract)

```
function _changedToProtecttheNegligent(bytes memory _quote) internal {
```

this parameter (provided by arbitrary callers) is expecting payloads like:

0xd9627aa4... selector for sellToUniswap(address[],uint256,uint256,bool)

0x6af479b2... selector for sellTokenForTokenToUniswapV3(bytes,uint256,uint256,address)

and these functions are supported by the 0x protocol/contract.

but so is this one:

0xbee349d... selector for buyERC721(...)

0x: stealing \$ using NFTs from a contract that has nothing to do with NFTs (cross-contract)

```
function _changedToProtecttheNegligent(bytes memory _quote) internal {
```

an attacker can provide such a payload to make the contract buy a fake NFT for whatever amount is in the contract (only a couple million):

amount you want to steal from the contract

0x

the onus is on the marketplace to make sure their off-chain mechanism doesn't sign arbitrary listing payloads:

```
function presignAndGenerateNFTOrderPayload(
    address money,
    uint256 amount,
    address nft_contract,
    uint256 tokenid
) internal returns (bytes memory payload) {
    bool retval;
    LibNFT.Fee[] memory fees = new LibNFT.Fee[](1);
    fees[0].recipient = address(this);
    fees[0].amount = amount;

    LibNFT.Property[] memory properties = new LibNFT.Property[](0);

    LibNFT.ERC721Order memory order;

    order.direction = LibNFT.TradeDirection.BUY_NFT;
    order.maker = address(this);
    order.taker = address(0);
    order.expiry = block.timestamp + 1;
    order.nonce = nonce++;
    order.erc20Token = money;
    order.erc20TokenAmount = 0;
    order.fees = fees;
    order.erc721Token = nft_contract;
    order.erc721TokenId = tokenid;
    order.erc721TokenProperties = properties;

    LibNFT.Signature memory signature;
    signature.signatureType = LibNFT.SignatureType.PRESIGNED;
    bytes memory callback;
```

- a few marketplaces using 0x accepted off-chain listings with arbitrary parameters.
- this led to various situations where attackers could make offers to lucrative collections in a manner that would steal the NFTs, and the sellers got \$0.
- insult to injury: victim didn't even get to keep the worthless LOLtokens.

0x: demo / attacker walks away with stolen NFT + fake LOLtoker

off-chain list, off-chain delete == on-chain screwed

in other words: they (& random bots) have your signature

yeah, right 😂

next generation of rug pulls and exploits: decentralized loan marketplaces / daos.*