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Evils in the Sparse Texture Memory: Exploit Kernel Based on Undefined Behaviors of Graphic APIs

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Google



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Agenda

- Part 1
 - Android GPU Security Review
 - Graphics Stack and PowerVR Driver
 - More places to find bugs
 - Evils in the Sparse Texture Memory
 - Root Exploit Demonstration
- Part 2
 - Finding vulnerabilities and exploits
 - Android Partner Vulnerability Initiative




Image by $\text{DALL}{\cdot}\text{E}$

All vulnerabilities mentioned in this talk were already publicly disclosed and patches were available by the affected vendor.



Android GPU Security: Current State



State of GPU Security on Android

• Significant {0,1,n}day attacks targeting GPU drivers

CVE-2022-22706, a vulnerability in Mali GPU Kernel Driver fixed by ARM in January 2022 and marked								
as being used	CVE-2023-4211 Known To Be Under Targeted Attack							
for this vulner								
	security update, Qualcomm is warning of three zero-day vulnerabilities in its GPU and Compute DSP drivers that hackers limited, targeted are actively exploiting in attacks.							
	points to there bThe American semiconductor company was told by Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) and Projectusers.Zero teams that CVE-2023-33106, CVE-2023-33107, CVE-2022-22071, and CVE-2023- 33063 may be under limited, targeted exploitation.							
	Qualcomm says it has released security updates that address the issues in its Adreno GPU and Compute DSP drivers, and impacted OEMs were also notified.							



State of GPU Security on Android

- GPU Security is still vastly under-researched
 Complicated, Proprietary, New features...
- Project Zero blog "Mind the Gap"
- Major Android GPUs:
 - ARM: Mali GPU
 - Qualcomm: Adreno GPU
 - Imagination Technologies: PowerVR GPU
 Imagination



PowerVR GPU by ImgTec

- Apple's former GPU maker
- Popular on budget-friendly phone, tablet & TV
 Samsung A12, RedMi 9a/10a, Moto Pure G, Fire TV

Apple Replacing PowerVR With In-House GPU

It means future Apple devices will no longer user PowerVR GPUs, ending a long relationship with Imagination Technologies.





Imagination in Mobile

Imagination's PowerVR GPU is the original tile-based deferred rending architecture, designed to deliver the ultimate in performance density and power efficiency. Our GPU technology paved the way for the smartphone-based mobile gaming revolution. Today, backed by our thriving ecosystem, over 35% of smartphones feature PowerVR, which continues to deliver everything our customers need as we push the boundaries for graphics and compute.



PowerVR GPU by ImgTec

Most shipped smartphone in 2021

Rank	Model Name	Company	Million Units	ASP (\$)	
1	Galaxy A12	Samsung	51.8	160	PowerVR
2	Whene 52	Apple	45.7	4511	
3	Whene 13	Apppile	34.9	9452	
4	Whene 11	Assails	11.4	1004	
5	Redmi 9A	Xiaomi	26.8	78	Here PowerVR
6	Whene 12 Pro Mise	Appple	26.1	3,291	
7	Whene 13 Pro Mise	Agggite	24.3	1,004	
8	Whene 52 Pro	Appple			
9	Whene 13 Per	Apparity	15.4	1,234	
10	Galaxy A02	Samsung	18.3	138	HowerVR
Source:	Omdia Smartphone Mod	el Market Tracker 4Q21	96.9 M	© 2022 Omdia	



PowerVR GPU Security

- Limited research before 2022
- More research kicks off in 2022
 - Google Android Security Team
 - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/apvi
 - Google Project Zero

	ID 👻	Status 🔻	Restrict -	Reported -	Vendor 👻	Product -	Finder 👻	Summary + Labels 👻
☆	2494	Fixed		2023-Jun-22	Imagination	PowerVR	jannh	PowerVR: several bugs in PowerVR GPU driver memory management CCProjectZeroMembers
	2465	Fixed		2023-Jul-3	Imagination	PowerVR	jannh	PowerVR: two more LPE security bugs CCProjectZeroMembers


• More engagement with external security researchers



Android Graphic Stack & PowerVR Driver Introduction




Android Graphic Stack Overview





OpenGL Impl: ImgTec & MediaTek






Logging & Instrumentation framework

Spoiler alert: logs contain kernel pointers



OpenGL Impl: ImgTec & MediaTek




Information Classification: General



PVR Driver: PMR & MMU Context


- Physical Memory Resource (PMR)
 Manage allocated physical pages
- GPU MMU Management
 - MMU Context Object
 - GPU Memory Heap
 - GPU Memory Reservation







PVR Driver: Map CPU pages





Thoughts about finding more bugs



Thoughts: how to find more bugs

• Difficulties

• Too many bridge APIs, some of them are arcane

• Thoughts


• Instrument / Reverse vendor graphic libraries

```
tracer.cpp:167 uiSize = {0x190000}
tracer.cpp:169 uiChunkSize = {0x1000}
tracer.cpp:171 ui32NumPhysChunks = \{0x0\}
tracer.cpp:173 ui32NumVirtChunks = {0x190}
tracer.cpp:175 pui32MappingTable = \{0xb400007213629e00\}
tracer.cpp:177 ui32Log2PageSize = {0xc}
tracer.cpp:179 uiFlags = \{0x40331\}
tracer.cpp:181 ui32AnnotationLength = {0x12}
tracer.cpp:183 puiAnnotation = {0x7ffdc964a8}
tracer.cpp:185 ui32PID = {0x68f0}
tracer.cpp:187 ui32PDumpFlags = \{0x0\}
tracer.cpp:197 puiAnnotation = {SCBUF:VERTEX DATA}
tracer.cpp:209 Printing pui32MappingTable
tracer.cpp:228 hPMR created = 0x5f
tracer.cpp:260 PVRSRV_BRIDGE_MM bridge group! func id = {21}
tracer.cpp:260 PVRSRV BRIDGE MM bridge group! func id = {19}
tracer.cpp:101 MMAP Analyzer: addr = \{0x0\}, len = \{0x190000\}, prot = \{0x3\}, flags = \{0x1\}, fd = \{0x6\}, offset = \{0x5f000\}
tracer.cpp:116 mmap address = 0x72053ff000
```



Instrument & Fuzz Graphic APIs

- Instrument on a real 3D app by *PLT function hook*
- Lightweight fuzzing: mutate parameters, scramble memory...





Reading OpenGL / Vulkan APIs

• Any complaints about GPU driver kernel crash when using certain OpenGL / Vulkan APIs?

		BLOGS 🗕	GROUPS 🗕	SUPPORT FORUMS 👻	<u>Help</u>	Sign In
AMD Community > Comm	nunities > <u>Developers</u> >	<u>OpenGL & Vulkan</u>	> OpenGL ARB_spars	e_texture (Driver crash, texture i		<u>Options</u> •

03-06-2019 05:27 PM

OpenGLARB_sparse_texture (Driver crash, texture issues)

Currently we (PCSX2 Team) are trying to implement Sparse Texture support and seem to have stumbled on to several issues on AMD cards which are not present at all on Nvidia (tested by several people).

Major issue: Garbage textures on amd cards whenever sparse is enabled.

Major issue: As of 19.3.1 enabling Sparse also causes a driver crash on amd cards, this wasn't an issue on the previous driver 19.2.3 where it just caused garbage textures, driver 19.2.1 or 19.2.2 just caused an entire black screen window. So far 19.2.3 seems to behave the best out of the bunch that were tested.



Undefined Behaviors in Graphic APIs (GL_EXT_sparse_texture)



OpenGL: Sparse Texture API

- GL_EXT_sparse_texture
 Proposed in 2013 by Nvidia
- Most GPU vendors support it nowadays

New Procedures and Functions

Name

EXT_sparse_texture

Name Strings

GL_EXT_sparse_texture

Contributors

Dominik Witczak, Mobica Contributors to ARB_sparse_texture

Xi Chen, NVIDIA

Contact

Daniel Koch, NVIDIA Corporation (dkoch 'at' nvidia.com)

Notice

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Status

Complete.

Version


Last Modified Date: 27/0 Revision: 3

27/03/2015 3



OpenGL: Sparse Texture API

- Why Sparse texture API?
- Create a resource that is larger than physical memory
 but only has a small portion of that resource actually backed by physical memory.




https://github.com/gpuweb/gpuweb/issues/455



Low Level Implementation

• Graphic API: Invoke kernel APIs






Undefined Behavior in OpenGL Document

- If the value of commit is FALSE, then the texture pages contained in the region are made **de-committed**. Their <u>physical</u> store is de-allocated, and their contents again become undefined.
- Reads from such regions (*uncommitted*) produce undefined data, but otherwise have no adverse effect.
- Atomic operations with return values on **uncommitted regions** will complete normally, but **the returned value will be undefined** and the result of the ... will be discarded.
- Writes to such regions are ignored. The GL may attempt to write to uncommitted regions but the effect of doing so will be benign.



- Step 1: Allocate Sparse texture memory
 - O glTexPageCommitmentEXT(..., /*commit=*/GL_TRUE);




GPU Virtual Memory




• Step 2: Initialize Textures







- Step 2: Initialize Textures
 - O glTexSubImage3D(..., /*ptr=*/image_ptr);






- Final step: Destroy the sparse texture
 - o glTexPageCommitmentEXT(..., /*commit=*/GL_FALSE);
- Look secure!
 - Not possible to remap the sparse texture on GPU to CPU because it's already destroyed



Additional Mapping by ourselves


• Accessing "undefined memory" from CPU





Issues in Implementing Sparse Texture

- Problem 1: object read / write OOB
- Problem 2: ref issues




GPU Virtual Memory



Issues in Implementing Sparse Texture


• Problem 3: GPU start VA passed from userspace



GPU Virtual Memory



Issues in Implementing Sparse Texture






Corrupting GPU Page Tables

- GPU Heap memory layout
- PowerVR has FANCY page tables
 - Supports different page size: 4K, 16K, 64K, 256K, 1M, 2M

Name = General SVM, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = 400000, uiHeapLength = 7fffc00000
Name = Vulkan capture replay buffer, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = bfc0000000, uiHeapLength = 40000000
Name = General, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = 800000000, uiHeapLength = 3fc000000
Name = RonHdr BRN63142. sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = dbf0000000, uiHeapLength = 100000000
Name = General NON-4K, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = c00000000, uiHeapLength = 100000000
Name = VisTest, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = dc0000000, uiHeapLength = 100000000
Name = VisTest, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = dc0000000, uiHeapLength = 100000
PDS Code and Data, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = da0000000, uiHeapLength = 100000000
Name = USC Code, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = e00000000, uiHeapLength = 100000000
Name = TQ3DParameters, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = e40000000, uiHeapLength = 400000000
Name = TDM TPU YUV Coeffs, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = e1c0000000, uiHeapLength = 1ef0000
Name = FwMain, sDevVAddrBase.uiAddr = e1c1ff0000, uiHeapLength = 10000



Corrupting GPU Page Tables





The feature was there "forever"...

- The buggy sparse feature was introduced a decade ago
- Some of our other findings also exist a decade ago.




Replying to @ProjectZeroBugs

RIP the feature that was there forever and nobody wanted to report :)

7:56 PM · Sep 19, 2022 · TweetDeck



Rooting Device








Exploit Page Use-after-free

- Graphic APIs + one mmap
- Various Ways to Root devices
 - Attacking page tables (<u>KSMA</u> / <u>GPU MMU</u>)

GPU Virtual Pages

Freed Physical Pages CPU

CPU Virtual Pages




OpenCL R/W

00000f00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	11	20	f5	f2	1
00000f10	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000f20	00	00	00	00	06	07	2a	00	73	65	6c	69	6e	75	78	75	*.selinuxu
00000f30	3a	6f	62	6a	65	63	74	5f	72	3a	70	72	69	76	61	70	<pre>:object_r:privap</pre>
00000f40	70	5f	64	61	74	61	5f	66	69	6c	65	3a	73	30	3a	63	p_data_file:s0:c
00000f50	35	31	32	2c	63	37	36	38	00	00	00	00	09	01	1c	00	[512, c768
00000f60	63	01	7f	04	00	51	4e	65	e5	e6	c8	fe	e6	28	ad	51	[cQNe(.Q]
00000f70	ba	18	cb	ba	cb	d4	13	62	aa	83	58	7b	e3	00	00	00	bX{
00000f80	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000f90	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000fa0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	[
00000fb0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	[
00000fc0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000fd0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000fe0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	21	14	00	00	21	14	00	00	[
00000ff0	01	00	00	00	a8	04	b1	0b	1f	c1	са	35	3a	32	02	00	5:2
00000000	f9	41	0c	05	b9	27	00	00	b9	27	00	00	02	00	00	00	.A
00000010	a0	0d	00	00	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000020	ae	84	14	62	00	00	00	00	2d	de	ed	61	00	00	00	00	ba
00000030	2d	de	ed	61	00	00	00	00	4c	61	7a	24	0c	53	53	1d	aLaz\$.SS.
00000040	0c	53	53	1d	0d	bf	dc	са	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.SS
00000050	00	10	00	00	b1	0d	00	00	10	00	00	00	c3	81	3e	63	>c
00000060	b1	cf	43	7b	62	87	9e	de	d8	f3	4e	6e	00	00	00	00	C{b



Exploit Page Use-after-free

- Control page table
- Nullify all kernel mitigations
















Finding other peoples' exploits










<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package install -r -d -t /data/]</pre>	local/tmp/app-debug.apk\n", v2, 10);
exec(
"/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION\n",
v2,	
1);	and and a service in ACCECC FINE LOCATION -IL - 2 4).
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION\n", v2, 1);
exec(and and a series for ACCECC DACKODOLDUD LOCATION -U
"/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION\n",
v2,	
1);	and main completion CAMEDAVAL (2) 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.CAMERA\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS\n", v2, 1);
exec(andraid parmission PROCESS OUTCOINS CALLS a
"/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS\n",
v2, 1);	
exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO\n", v2, 1);
exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS\n", v2, 1);
exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.READ_CALENDAR\n", v2, 1);
exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG\n", v2, 1);
exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.	android.permission.READ_CONTACTS\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.READ_SMS\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.SEND_SMS\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.SYSTEM ALERT_WINDOW\n", v2, 1);
<pre>exec("/system/bin/cmd package grant com.</pre>	android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR\n", v2, 1);



```
1 rule NP_AMRootingSignals_EasyRoot {
    meta:
 2
 3
       desc = "EasyRoot exploit binary"
       rs1 = "020abf8c687168abae9f4d202ba644d5c9eebafd39442ec28b95c55b459e8a37"
 4
 5
    strings:
       $a = "easyroot"
 6
 7
       $b = "get root failed..."
       $c = "get root success..."
 8
 9
    condition:
       uint16(0) == 0x457f and all of them
10
11 }
```



```
int length = system property get("ro.build.fingerprint", fingerprint);
printf("%s\n", fingerprint);
if (!strcmp(fingerprint, "google/oriole/oriole:12/SD1A.210817.037/7862242:user/release-keys")) {
 do bad thing with params(a, b, c);
 return;
if (!strcmp(fingerprint, "google/oriole/oriole:12/SQ1D.220105.007/8030436:user/release-keys")) {
 do bad thing with params(d, e, f);
 return;
if (!strcmp(fingerprint, "google/oriole/oriole:12/SQ1D.220205.004/8151327:user/release-keys")) {
 do bad thing with params(g, h, i);
 return;
if (!strcmp(fingerprint, "google/oriole/oriole:12/SQ3A.220705.003/8671607:user/release-keys")) {
 do bad thing with params(j, k, l);
 return;
etc
```





Report Findings (arm32 binary) -----String Obfuscation Section Start-----Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `mount -o remount,rw /system` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'cat ' Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `rm -r ` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'rm Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `chmod 0777 ` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `chmod 0644 ` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `chown root:root ` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'chown root.root Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `chcon Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0 ` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'u:object_r:zygote_exec:s0 Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/sdcard/.google/` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'com.android.google.cdcore.db' Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/system/etc/.uatyes` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string '/data/dalvik-cache/arm Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'system@framework@boot-thirdcd.oat' Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'tmpfiles/' Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/local/tmp/` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'asbymol' Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `bdlomsd` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'jkpatch' Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `watch_dog` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string 'cash' Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string ` -ai Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string ' +ai Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/dalvik-cache/arm/system@framework@boot-bridacco.oat` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot-bridacdo.oat` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/dalvik-cache/arm/system@framework@boot.oat` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.oat` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/dalvik-cache/arm/system@framework@boot-acco.oat` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot-acdo.oat` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/system/lib/binder.so` Function `sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string `/system/lib64/binder.so` Function `sub_0x3e13e64` decrypts string `/system/lib/libmedia_jni.so` Function 'sub_0x3e13e64' decrypts string '/system/lib64/libmedia_jni.so'




Stopping exploitation





- ARM Memory Tagging Extension
- First handset with MTE on the market
- Secure development practices
 - Rust in Linux and Android
 - OEM Portal restricted access
 - https://docs.partner.android.com/security/oem-edu/driver-developers
- Detecting impossible conditions







"N-days function like O-days on Android" -Maddie Stone, Security Researcher, Threat Analysis Group (TAG)



Android Partner Vulnerability Initiative APVI



3P Vulns - Findings

- 80+ disclosed APVI OEM vulnerabilities
 - 1300+ GPSRP vulns
 - 1600+ SoC vulns
- Filed ~30 bugs in 2023 by Android Security Team
 - 5 Disclosed Page UAF
 - Other Page Corruptions: map2anywhere, map2oobpages...

bugs.chromium.org/p/apvi Moving to issuetracker in 2024



Closing the Gap

- **Developers** help OEMs implement & improve security processes
 - Decrease time from ingestion to patch
 - Reinforce policies with technical measures

• Researchers

GPU security is still under-researched

• More to come...

blackhat

Thank You