



Exposing the dark corners of SAP

4-Years of Threat Intelligence data analyzed

Speaker: Yvan Genuer











of the Global 2000 use SAP of the world's transaction revenue

of F500 Oil & Gas

https://www.sap.com/about/company.html#fast-facts





https://warcraft3.blizzard.com


















╬





2020 - 2023 (4 Years)



2020 - 2023 (4 Years)

Varied across the open - deep - dark web



2020 - 2023 (4 Years)

Varied across the open - deep - dark web

Criminal Forums
Chat Sites


Ransomware Incidents
Ransomware Group Sites and Chat



The Rise of Interest on SAP










Guardiane

Posted on January 05, 2024 at 20:51:21 UTC

like making the exploit poc

Posted on January 05, 2024 at 20:51:42 UTC or like wdym work on it?



/грозу для

Posted on January 05, 2024 at 20:56:23 UTC

Yeah im just analyzing the PoC. Seeing what sort of HTTP request needs to be made to exploit the vuln.

Looks like its just a request that resembles

`echo "print(\"GET /sap/public/bc/ur/Login/assets/corbu/sap_logo.png HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8443\\
Agent: Chrome\|r\InContent-Length: 82646\\r\InConnection: keep-alive\\r\\n\\r\\n\")
print(\"A\"*82642, end=\"\")
print(\" r\\n\\r\\nGET /sap/public/ping HTTP/1.1\|r|InHost: 127.0.0.1:8443\\r\\n\\r\\n\")" | gzip | base64`



сть которую продают чёрные хакеры, а удаляют белые [Открытые Редиректы]

Guar

Jan 5, 2024

Открытые Закрытые Редиректы

Эта статья о уязвимости, которую продают чёрные хакеры, а удаляют белые. Почему? Потому что она нам бесполезна. Как в она не принимается платформами безопасности, так как требует взаимодействия пользователя, или, как мы товорим, "фишинг открытый редирект для компании X, и компания X достаточно большая для наличия уязвимостей, очевидно, мне пришлось от исследовать, и пока этого достаточно. В любом случае, этот парень подал мне идею поиска открытых редиректов в организац легкий способ) способы нахождения уязвимости.

Открытый Редирект

Открытый Редирект - это уязвимость, возникающая, когда веб-приложение манипулируется для перенаправления пользовате. Уязвимости Открытых Редиректов эксплуатируют доверие пользователя к данному веб-сайту для перенаправления пользова ade to exploit the vuln. есть доверенная ссылка, "xss.is/?redirectUrl=xss[.]bz" - в данном примере, которой является xss.is, и когда пользователь нажим является результатом неправильной проверки / отсутствия фильтрации при обработке URL, предоставленных пользователем переадресации, хакеры могут заменить его на свой злонамеренный URL.

Ситуация в нашем мире

Уязвимости Открытых Редиректов часто игнорируются, хотя они представляют значительную угрозу из-за их косвенной приро\\r\\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8443\\ программы раскрытия уязвимостей обращают внимание на прямые методы атаки (SQL/XSS и т.д.), а не на уязвимости, такие к т.д.) подвергаются взлому простыми фишинговыми атаками.

Как работает открытый редирект?


TOTOTOTOT 01010101101 11000101010

/грозу для

\\r\\n\")" | gzip | base64



сть которую продают чёрные хакеры, а удаляют белые [Открытые Редиректы] Guar Jan 5, 2024 Открытые Закрытые Редиректы



Anonymous (None)

Posted on May 12, 2021 at 19:17:44 UTC

Server: 192.168.228.25 Instance: 00 ID: CTP SAP Router: /H/saprouter

n2 User: SC

5 Pass: Business 5 Do it

является результатом неправильной проверки / отсутствия фильтрации при обработке URL, предоставленных пользователем переадресации, хакеры могут заменить его на свой злонамеренный URL.

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\\r\\n\")" | gzip | base64`




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Зап 5, 2024

Открытые Закрытые Редиректы

Эта статья о укавимости, котолую порлают чёрные хакеры, а удаляют белые. Почему? Потому что она нам бесполезна. Как вы



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Pass: B

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
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является результ переадресации х

Ситуация в на

Уязвимости Откра программы раскры подвергаются вз//

Как работает

Trigona Ransomware Blog

Created By: Trigona

URL: http://trigonax2zb3fw34rbaap4cqep76zofxs53zakrdgcxzq6xzt24l5lqd.onion/leak/3649f5c9

First Observed On October 01, 2023

Last Observed On October 05, 2023

Trigona on Oct 01, 2023 12:47:34



Do it

TUT

110

1010


1930

I is a leading global post-sales service support partner for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) across various industries, founded in 1982. Company offers services supporting OEM customers through depot repairs, field services, supply-chain logistics, and other professional services.

By acquiring this company's confidential data (including in full SAP data), you will get access to valuable information that can help you grow your business. You will learn about the company's strategies, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. You will also discover the needs, pain points, motivations and behaviors of its customers. You will be able to use this information to create better products and services, target the right prospects, craft compelling sales pitches and close more deals.



SAP exploits or vulnerabilities





Good and easy to understand indicator



Good and easy to understand indicator

What threat actors speak about is not for fun...




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What threat actors speak about is not for fun...

... it is for profit




SAP exploits or vulnerabilities





What happened in 2021?





Posted on July 15, 2020 at 00:00:00 UTC

Hi,

just been published:

CVE-2020-6287

https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/105861/hacki

Anyone up to work with this?

RECON

print(f"Something wrong with setServer exit(1)

if args.list:

getAllAgentsPretty()

Источник: https://github.com/chipik/SAP_EEM_CVE-2020-6207


SOLMAN RCE

Posted on February 03, 2021 at 12:02:00 UTC


@reaver : did you try it? because i can't get success with this.



SAP exploits or vulnerabilities







TG2003: Elephant Beetle UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION January 2022 Contributors: Amnon Kushnir, Noam Lifshitz, Yoav Mazor, Oren Bidermar Boaz Wasserman, Itay Shahat and Arie Zilberstein.

SYGN/A

https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/elephant-beetle-an-organized-financial-theft-operation/https://onapsis.com/blog/elephant-beetle-older-unpatched-sap-vulnerabilities-are-still-threat/






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SAP exploits or vulnerabilities





Public exploits



Public exploits

FIN13 set a precedent



Public exploits

FIN13 set a precedent

Threat actors realized that SAP target could have great ROI



Which companies / agencies already run SAP?

The have great ROI



Who are interested by SAP





Name	Particularity
FIN13	Financial companies target
FIN7	Financial companies target

#BHEU @BlackHatEvents




Name	Particularity
FIN13	Financial companies target
FIN7	Financial companies target
Cobalt Spider	Point Of Sales target



Name Particularity

FIN13


Financial companies target





Name	Particularity			
FIN13	Financial companies target			
FIN7	Financial companies target			
Cobalt Spider	Point Of Sales target			
APT10	Mainly known for espionage			





Добрового времени суток, дамы и господа!

Буду краток. Удалось получить доступ к 4 сетям разных компаний через CVE-2020-6287 и CVE-2020-6207, погуглив удалось узнать, что одна из них вроде сеть ресторанов, а другая телефонная компания. Две других установить не удалось. Соотвественно имею доступ через админку Netweaver, а так же могу добавлять свои скрипты через CVE-2020-6207. Так вот вопрос, что с этим делать? Продать? А за сколько? Шифровать? А чем? Возможно мои вопросы покажутся глупыми, но прошу строго не судить т.к с сетками работаю впервые.



"Good day, ladies and gentlemen!

I'll be brief. We managed to gain access to 4 networks of different companies through CVE-2020-6287 [RECON] and CVE-2020-6207 [SAP Solution Manager missing authentication], after googling I found out that one of them was like a restaurant chain, and the other was a telephone company[...] What to do about it? Sell? How much? Encrypt? [...]"



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FIN7	Financial companies target			
Cobalt Spider	Point Of Sales target			
APT10	Mainly know for espionage			
Script Kiddies	Various threats			





What can we learn from this result?

APT10 Mainly know for espionage

Script Kiddies Various threats









Name	Particularity				
FIN13	Financial companies target				
FIN7	Financial companies target				
Cobalt Spider	Point Of Sales target				
cause of what SAP processes \$\$					











Highlight wide range of SAP components

1 11 17	i manda companies target		
Cobalt Spider	Point Of Sales target		
APT10	Mainly know for espionage		
Script Kiddies	Various threats		



• SAP Catalog Content Management ()

SAP Cloud for Customer (C4C)

Major units [edit]	SAP Cost Center Accounting (CCA)	SAP Master Data Management (MDM)	SAP for Media (ISM)
riajor anno [can]	SAP Convergent Charging (CC)	SAP Plant Maintenance (PM)	SAP for Telecommunications (IST)
SAP S/4HANA (Enterprise Resource Planning on-premise and cloud)	SAP Converged Cloud	SAP Production Planning (PP)	SAP for Healthcare (ISH)
SAP Business ByDesign (SME Cloud Enterprise Resource Planning)	SAP Data Warehouse Cloud (DWC)	SAP Product Lifecycle Costing (PLC)	SAP Banking (SAP Banking)
SAP Business One (B1 on HANA) (Small enterprise Enterprise Resource	SAP Design Studio	 SAP Profitability and Cost Management (PCM) 	SAP for Insurance (SAP for Insurance)
SAP CRM (Customer Relationship Management) (legacy product)	SAP PRD2(P2)	SAP Project System (PS)	SAP Financial Services Network (FSN) SAP Shipping Services Network (SSN)
SAP ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) (legacy product, see S/4HAN/	SAP Enterprise Buyer Professional (EBP)	SAP Rapid Deployment Solutions (RDS)	 SAP Shipping Services Network (SSN) Engineering Construction & Operations (EC&O)
SAP PLM (Product Lifecycle Management) (legacy product)	SAP Enterprise Learning	SAP Service and Asset Management	SAP IS Airlines & Defense
SAP SCM (Supply Chain Management) (legacy product)	SAP Portal (EP)	SAP Supply Network Collaboration (SNC)	SAP for Discrete Industries and Mill Products (IS DIMP)
	SAP Exchange Infrastructure (XI) (From release 7.0 onwards, SAP XI has by	SAP Solutions for mobile business	•
SAP SRM (Supplier Relationship Management) (legacy product)	SAP Extended Warehouse Management (EWM)	SAP Sales and Distribution (SD)	Software for small and midsize enterprises [edit]
Business software [edit]	SAP FICO	SAP Solution Composer	SAP Business One (Small enterprise ERP 6.2, 6.5, 2004, 2005, 2007, 8.8x, 9.X)
Dusiliess software [edit]	SAP BPC (Business Planning and Consolidation, formerly OutlookSoft)	SAP Strategic Enterprise Management (SEM) SAP Total Base Misseries (Serves (TRMS))	SAP Business ByDesign (SME Cloud ERP)
SAP Advanced Data Migration (ADP)	SAP GRC (Governance, Risk and Compliance)	SAP Test Data Migration Server (TDMS) SAP Testings and Event Means report (TEM)	
SAP Advanced Planner and Optimizer	SAP EHSM (Environment Health & Safety Management)	SAP Training and Event Management (TEM) SAP Transportation Management (TM)	Platforms and frameworks [edit]
SAP Analytics Cloud (SAC)	Enterprise Central Component (ECC)	SAP NetWeaver Application Server (Web AS)	- SAP Cloud Platform (Its brand name is removed $^{[2]}$ in January 2021 in favor of S
SAP Advanced Business Application Programming (ABAP)	SAP ERP	SAP xApps	SAP Enterprise Services Architecture
SAP Apparel and Footwear Solution (AFS)	SAP HANA (formerly known as High-performance Analytics Appliance)	SAP Sales Cloud (previously: CallidusCloud)	SAP NetWeaver Platform
SAP Business Information Warehouse (BW)	SAP Human Resource Management Systems (HRMS)	SAP Supply Chain Performance Management (SCPM)	SAP NetWeaver Portal (formerly SAP Enterprise Portal)
SAP Business ByDesign (ByD)	SAP SuccessFactors	SAP Supply Chain Management (SCM)	SAP NetWeaver BI (formerly SAP NetWeaver BW- "BW" is still used to describe approachts).
SAP Business Explorer (Bex)	SAP Information Design Tool (IDT)	SAP Sustainability Performance Management (SUPM)	components) • SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer
SAP BusinessObjects Lumira	SAP Integrated Business Planning (IBP)	SAP S/4HANA	SAP Auto-ID Infrastructure
SAP BusinessObjects Web Intelligence (Webi)	SAP Internet Transaction Server (ITS)	SAP Master Data Governance (MDG)	SAP Composite Application Framework
SAP Business One	SAP Incentive and Commission Management (ICM)	SAP S/4HANA Cloud	1.143
SAP Business Partner Screening	SAP IT Operations Analytics (ITOA) ^[1]	Industry coftware	
	SAP Jam	Industry software [edit]	
SAP Business Intelligence (BI) SAP Business Worldfow	SAP Knowledge Warehouse (KW)	SAP for Retail	
SAP Business Workflow	SAP Manufacturing	SAP for Utilities (ISU)	
- SAD Catalog Content Management ()			

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_SAP_products

SAP Marketing Cloud

SAP Materials Management (MM)

Information Classification: General #BHEU @BlackHatEvents

SAP for Public Sector (IS PSCD)

• SAP for Oil & Gas (IS Oil & Gas)



Groups are very heterogeneous



Groups are very heterogeneous

SAP target is not reserved individually to Hacktivist Nation State Criminal



Groups are very heterogeneous

SAP target is not reserved individually to Hacktivist
Nation State
Criminal

SAP is so huge, that it has interest for all groups



Price inflation





Posted on August 09, 2020 at 03:26:00 UTC

Предлагаю exploit для горизонтального перемещения в системах SAP (никогда ранее не реализовался в такой функциональности)

- необходим предварительный доступ к серверу, используется для перемещения на другие ресурсы экосистемы SAP. базовая теория описана тут https://www.cert-devoteam.fr/en/the-security-of-sap-secure-storage/

SAP Secure Storage to find credentials, elevate privileges and eventually compromise another SAP System behind the first target.

- +Namespace key(s).
- +Developer Key.
- +Object Key.
- +Hardware key. ABAP hardware key.
- +Gaparatas MAC Address for the Massage Server ADAD/IAV/A

25,000 USD



Target: SAP NetWeaver

Bounty: Up to \$50,000

Start Date: 26 August 2020

End Date: 30 September 2020

We are looking for pre-authentication RCEs or authentication bypass exploits affecting recent versions of SAP NetWeaver. The exploit should allow either remote code execution or authentication bypass, work with default installations and should not require any authentication or user interaction.

50,000 USD



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End Date: 30 September 2020

50,000 USD





HOME

BOUNTIES

Exploit Acquisition Program

PLM and EPR

- **SAP (RCE)**: 250k USD
- Siemens Teamcenter (RCE): 250k USD
- Oracle ERP (RCE): 200k USD


250,000 USD





Found a vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver?

Submit your findings today at ssd-disclosure.com/sap-netweaver-... and get the BIG payouts you deserve (§) (§) (§)




10:30 AM · May 26, 2024 · 1,113 Views





Found a vulnerability in SAP NetWeaver?

Submit your findings today at ssd-disclosure.com/sap-netweaver-... and get the BIG payouts you deserve (§) (§) (§)



10:30 AM · May 26, 2024 · 1,113 Views



"Why do you still report your findings to SAP instead of selling them to me!!??"

Around event in 2021



"Why do you still report your findings to SAP instead of selling them to me!!??"

Around event in 2021



What do these prices tell us?



Confident of what they can get back



Confident of what they can get back

Pay more to win time
Finding SAP vulnerabilities... takes time
Creating reliable exploit... takes time



Confident of what they can get back

Pay more to win time
Finding SAP vulnerabilities... takes time
Creating reliable exploit... takes time

Public critical exploits are 4 years old

→Exploit lose their effectiveness

→Seek for "fresh" weapons



Takeaways





SAP Interest is growing... From heterogeneous groups



SAP Interest is growing... From heterogeneous groups

The demand for SAP 0day is growing... Because of ROI



→ Consider SAP applications targeted



→ Consider SAP application targeted

No Odays found

→Mainly public vulnerabilities



CVE	cvss	Exploit	KEV / Active	Ransomware Risk	SAP Security Note
CVE-2010-5326	10.0	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	High	<u>1445998</u>
CVE-2016-2386	9.8	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	High	<u>2101079</u>
CVE-2016-2388	5.3	Public	Yes	Low	<u>2256846</u>
CVE-2016-3976	7.5	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	High	<u>2234971</u>
CVE-2016-9563	6.5	Public	Yes	Low	<u>2296909</u>
CVE-2018-2380	6.6	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	High	<u>2547431</u>
CVE-2020-6207	10.0	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	Medium	<u>2890213</u>
CVE-2020-6287	10.0	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	Medium	<u>2934135</u>
CVE-2021-38163	9.9	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	Medium	<u>3084487</u>
CVE-2021-33690	9.9	Public	No / ACTIVE	High	<u>3072955</u>
CVE-2021-42063	8.8	Public	No / ACTIVE	Medium	<u>3102769</u>
CVE-2022-22536	10.0	Public	Yes / ACTIVE	Medium	<u>3123396</u>

#BHEU @BlackHatEvents



→ Consider SAP application targeted

No Odays found

→ Mainly public vulnerabilities

→Patch them all !



→ Consider SAP application targeted

No Odays found

- → Mainly public vulnerabilities
 - →Patch them all!

Not only internet exposed vulnerabilities



→ Consider SAP application targeted

No Odays found

- → Mainly public vulnerabilities
 - →Patch them all!

Not only internet exposed vulnerabilities

- →SAP systems are widely connected
 - →Manage SAP security globally



→ Consider SAP application targeted

No Odays found

- → Mainly public vulnerabilities
 - →Patch them all!

Not only internet exposed vulnerabilities

- →SAP systems are widely connected
 - →Manage SAP security globally



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