Biometric Authentication Under Threat: Liveness Detection Hacking
Who Are We?

- Tencent
  - The largest social media and entertainment company in China
- Tencent Security Xuanwu Lab
  - Applied and real world security research
- About us

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Outline

• Preliminary and Previous Studies
• Hardware-level Video/Audio Injection
• Insecure Recognition Scene Exploiting
• Mitigation
• Conclusion
Preliminary

• What is biometric authentication?
  • Biometric Feature
    • Face, Voice, Fingerprint, Iris, Palmprint etc.
  • Areas of applications
    • Device unlock
    • Password recover
    • App login
    • Real-name authentication

• A typical biometric authentication process
Preliminary

• What is liveness detection?
  • Definition
    Verify if the biometric being captured is an actual measurement from the authorized live person

• Existed methodology
  • Imitative medium recognition
    texture analysis, optical flow, playback reverberation, etc.
  • Interactive action check
    nod / shake head, open mouth, blink, speak words, etc.
  • Specific Hardware
    Face ID, ToF, NIR, etc.
Preliminary

• What is Face ID attention detection?

Face ID confirms attention by detecting the direction of your gaze, then uses neural networks for matching and anti-spoofing so you can unlock your phone with a glance.
Previous Studies

• Previous studies mainly focused on how to generate fake video/audio, but bypassing the liveness detection algorithm is necessary in the real attack

• Bypassing Face ID by 3D mask requires victim’s 3D info and is proven hard to reproduce
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Why do hardware-level video/audio injection?

• Avoid information loss during biometric secondary acquisition and playback
  • HSL space color loss
  • focus blur
  • playback reverberation effect

• Hide the attack medium characteristics
  • Texture
  • optical flow
  • frequency response distortion

• Be completely software-insensitive
  • Against emulators detection
  • Against anti-hook
Video/Audio Injection Requirements

• Low Latency
  • Excessive delay will cause recognition failure

• Good Compatibility
  • Compatible with different Apps like native sensor

• Real Time Fake Data Import
  • Fake videos/audio stream can be generated and imported in real time

• Transparent
  • Can’t easily be recognized by emulators detection or anti-hook
Video Injection Example

- Using Toshiba TC358749XBG chip to make a hardware module that can convert HDMI stream to MIPI CSI stream.

- Connecting the above module to an Android development board (RK3399) to form a complete video injection attack device.

- Using the above device, we can disguise the HDMI output of a PC as a video stream captured by native camera.

Video Injection Workflow:

1. Authentication Device
2. CSI Cable
3. CSI stream
4. HDMI to CSI Module
5. HDMI stream
6. PC
7. generate fake video
8. nod head, shake head, open mouth, blink...

PC

HDMI to CSI Module

CSI stream

Authentication Device

 CSI Cable

generate fake video

nod head, shake head, open mouth, blink ...

Video Injection Workflow
Video Injection Example

Video injection device based on TC358749XBG
Audio Injection Example

- Most voiceprint authentication systems accept authorized voice from the microphone cable
- Create a hardware module that converts the audio stream into a microphone stream
- Convert the audio stream from the sound card of PC into microphone stream and directly inject malicious voice into the authentication device

Audio Injection Workflow:
- Authentication Device
- Mic Cable
- Microphone stream
- Audio to Mic Module
- Audio stream
- PC
- Random numbers or text
- Generate fake audio
Audio Injection Example

Audio injection device based on analog circuits and sound card.
What if attacker can't physically contact the victim's equipment?
Why do device fingerprint spoofing?

• Biometric authentication is disabled on a new device by default
  • Binding account with device fingerprint
    • IMEI, MAC address, Android ID, etc.
    • Customized ID based hardware info

• Device Fingerprint Spoofing
  • Step1: Reverse engineering on the algorithm of customized device fingerprint
  • Step2: Steal device info from victim’s device (eg. install a malicious app)
  • Step3: Cheat the server that we are using biometric authentication on an authorized device
Threat Model

- Device fingerprint spoofing to enable biometric authentication
- Hardware-level Injection to bypass liveness detection
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Why do insecure recognition scene exploiting

Tradeoff between user experience and security under specific scenes

- Weak light environment (Facial)
- Sunshine environment (Facial)
- Glasses scene (Facial)
- Noisy environment (Voice)
- Accents and dialects scene (Voice)
- Unsharp fingerprint (Fingerprint)
- ...

Attacker can induce liveness detection algorithm to walk into an insecure branch by creating above specific scene!
A case of insecure recognition scene exploiting

A funny scenario from the hit CTF-themed TV series “Go Go Squid!”
How to bypass the attention detection mechanism of Face ID?

Challenges:
• Can't wake up the sleeping victim
• 3D eyes are difficult to forge
• Low cost & high success rate

Preliminary ideas:
• Try to touch the victim as little as possible
• Find ways to replace 3D eyes with 2D eyes
• Try to simulate the state of eyes looking directly at phone
We found the following facts:

- Face ID allows users to unlock while **wearing glasses**
- Face ID no longer extract 3D info from the eye area when recognized glasses
- The abstraction of the eye is a black area with a white point in the center in the glasses scene

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Identity glasses?  
<table>
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<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Match 3D eyes</td>
<td>Match 2D eyes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

vulnerable branch
In the dark environment, the abstraction of the eye is a **black area with a white point in the center**.
When unlocking phone, eyes must look forward so **the white spot is in the center of the black area**.
The Prototype of “X-glasses”

Features:
• Low cost
• High success rate
• Practical
• Less than two minutes
• Suitable for any victim
Settings

Face ID & Passcode

USE FACE ID FOR:

- iPhone Unlock
- iTunes & App Store
- Apple Pay
- Password AutoFill

Other Apps

2 Apps

Set Up an Alternate Appearance

In addition to continuously learning how you look, Face ID can recognize an alternate appearance.

Reset Face ID

ATTENTION

Require Attention for Face ID

TrueDepth camera will provide an additional level of security by verifying that you are looking at iPhone before unlocking. Some sunglasses may block attention detection.

Attention Aware Features
Demo
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Mitigation: for hardware-layer injection & device ID spoofing

- Add identity authentication for native camera
- Forbidden to accept authenticated voice from the microphone cable
- Increase the weight of video/audio synthesis detection
- Design a device binding mechanism to against device fingerprint spoofing
Mitigation: for X-glasses attack

Step 1: Texture Analysis for 2D picture
- Texture Classifier
- Accept
- Reject
- FAIL

Step 2: Depth Analysis for 3D info
- Depth Distinguish
- Depth Comparison
- Accept
- Reject
- PASS

Combine texture features with depth information to against X-glasses attack
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Conclusion

• We proposed a universal methodology for bypassing liveness detection
  • Injecting fake video/audio stream by evil hardware to hide attack media
  • Creating specific recognition scene to trigger the defect of liveness detection algorithm

• We found a new threat to app login or password recovery based on biometric authentication by hardware-level injection and device fingerprint spoofing

• We reversed the attention detection mechanism of Face ID and bypass it with X-glasses at ultra-low cost and high success rate
Thanks
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