

All Your GNN Models And Data Belong To Me^{*}

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Azzedine Benameur (Spot by NetApp)



The Age of Machine Learning



GitHub
Copilot



OpenAI GPT-3




Image/Text/Video/Audio

Graph


Graphs Are Everywhere

Graphs are **combinatorial structures**, have arbitrary sizes, and contain multi-modal information


Social Networks




Molecules



Knowledge Graphs




User-Item Graphs



Graph Applications Are Everywhere

Graph-based applications pervasively exist in our everyday life

Social Networks




Demographic Inference

Age group of Bob

Link Prediction


Do you (Alice) know Bob?

Molecules




Toxicity Prediction

Knowledge Graphs



Knowledge Mining

User-Item Graphs




Recommendation


We found an item you may be interested!

Graph Neural Network (GNN)


- Traditional neural networks are designed for grids (e.g., images) or sequences (e.g., text)
 - CNNs for images
 - RNNs for sequences



Graph Neural Network (GNN)




Graph Neural Network (GNN)



Node Embeddings



- Mean pooling
- Max pooling



Graph Embedding




- Graph Classification
- Graph Matching
- Graph Visualization



Toxicity Prediction

Graph Neural Network (GNN)



Insights

Graph ML at Twitter

By **Michael Bronstein**

Wednesday, 2 September 2020 [Twitter](#) [Facebook](#) [LinkedIn](#) [Share](#)

WHAT IS IT?

Neo4j Graph Data Science

Neo4j Graph Data Science is a connected data analytics and machine learning platform that helps you understand the connections in big data to answer critical questions and improve predictions.

[Read 5 Graph Data Science Basics](#)

Introducing Amazon SageMaker Support for Deep Graph Library (DGL): Build and Train Graph Neural Networks

Posted On: Dec 3, 2019

Amazon SageMaker support for the [Deep Graph Library \(DGL\)](#) is now available. With DGL, you can improve the prediction accuracy of recommendation, fraud detection, and drug discovery systems using Graph Neural Networks (GNNs).

[how it works](#) [about us](#) [request early access](#)

From siloed tasks to an enterprise graph.

Conventional enterprise AI treats every predictive task separately in a silo. However, enterprise data represents a rich, interconnected web of business relationships, interactions, customers, transactions, and more. By leveraging the connectedness of enterprise data, Kumo enables a technical leap-frog in AI.


Graph

The Age of Machine Learning

Bloomberg

AI Poisoning Is the Next Big Risk in Cybersecurity

25 Apr · Opinion



IEEE Spectrum

How Adversarial Attacks Could Destabilize Military AI Systems



The Age of Adversarial Machine Learning

Air Force Magazine

Does AI Present a New Attack Surface for Adversaries?

29 Sept 2021



WIRED

Even Artificial Neural Networks Can Have Exploitable 'Backdoors'



Overview^{*}

Security

Graph

GNN

Model extraction attack

Privacy

Link re-identification attack

Property inference attack

Subgraph inference attack


^{*}All attacks discussed in this talk are simulated in the lab environment.

Link Re-Identification Attack

| | Graph | GNN |
|----------|-------------------------------|---|
| Security | | |
| Privacy | Link re-identification attack | Identify if two nodes are connected in the <u>training data</u> |


Link Re-Identification Attack (Scenario 1)

Scenario




GNN model:
Node classification

Attacker's **capability**:
1. posteriors of nodes (from training data) obtained from the target model



Link Re-Identification Attack (Scenario 2)

Scenario




GNN model:
Node classification


Attacker's **capability**:

1. posteriors of nodes (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. have a shadow dataset

Link Re-Identification Attack (Scenario 2)




Link Re-Identification Attack (Scenario 2)



| Metrics | Definition |
|-------------|---|
| Cosine | $1 - \frac{f(u) \cdot f(v)}{\ f(u)\ _2 \ f(v)\ _2}$ |
| Euclidean | $\ f(u) - f(v)\ _2$ |
| Correlation | $1 - \frac{(f(u) - \bar{f}(u)) \cdot (f(v) - \bar{f}(v))}{\ f(u) - \bar{f}(u)\ _2 \ f(v) - \bar{f}(v)\ _2}$ |
| Chebyshev | $\max_i f_i(u) - f_i(v) $ |
| Braycurtis | $\frac{\sum f_i(u) - f_i(v) }{\sum f_i(u) + f_i(v) }$ |
| Manhattan | $\sum_i f_i(u) - f_i(v) $ |
| Canberra | $\sum_i \frac{ f_i(u) - f_i(v) }{ f_i(u) + f_i(v) }$ |
| Sqeclidean | $\ f(u) - f(v)\ _2^2$ |

| Operator | Definition | Operator | Definition |
|----------|-----------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| Average | $\frac{f_i(u) + f_i(v)}{2}$ | Weighted-L1 | $ f_i(u) - f_i(v) $ |
| Hadamard | $f_i(u) \cdot f_i(v)$ | Weighted-L2 | $ f_i(u) - f_i(v) ^2$ |

Link Re-Identification Attack (Scenario 2)



Link Re-Identification Attack (Scenario 2)

AUC


| Target Dataset | Shadow Dataset | | | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| | AIDS | COX2 | DHFR | ENZYMES | PROTEINS_full | Citeseer | Cora | Pubmed |
| AIDS | - | 0.720 ± 0.009 | 0.690 ± 0.005 | 0.730 ± 0.010 | 0.720 ± 0.005 | 0.689 ± 0.019 | 0.650 ± 0.025 | 0.667 ± 0.014 |
| COX2 | 0.755 ± 0.032 | - | 0.831 ± 0.005 | 0.739 ± 0.116 | 0.832 ± 0.009 | 0.762 ± 0.009 | 0.773 ± 0.008 | 0.722 ± 0.024 |
| DHFR | 0.689 ± 0.004 | 0.771 ± 0.004 | - | 0.577 ± 0.044 | 0.701 ± 0.010 | 0.736 ± 0.005 | 0.740 ± 0.003 | 0.663 ± 0.010 |
| ENZYMES | 0.747 ± 0.014 | 0.695 ± 0.023 | 0.514 ± 0.041 | - | 0.691 ± 0.030 | 0.680 ± 0.012 | 0.663 ± 0.009 | 0.637 ± 0.018 |
| PROTEINS_full | 0.775 ± 0.020 | 0.821 ± 0.016 | 0.528 ± 0.038 | 0.822 ± 0.020 | - | 0.823 ± 0.004 | 0.809 ± 0.015 | 0.809 ± 0.013 |
| Citeseer | 0.801 ± 0.040 | 0.920 ± 0.006 | 0.842 ± 0.036 | 0.846 ± 0.042 | 0.848 ± 0.015 | - | 0.965 ± 0.001 | 0.942 ± 0.003 |
| Cora | 0.791 ± 0.019 | 0.884 ± 0.005 | 0.811 ± 0.024 | 0.804 ± 0.048 | 0.869 ± 0.012 | 0.942 ± 0.001 | - | 0.917 ± 0.002 |
| Pubmed | 0.705 ± 0.039 | 0.796 ± 0.007 | 0.704 ± 0.042 | 0.708 ± 0.067 | 0.752 ± 0.014 | 0.883 ± 0.006 | 0.885 ± 0.005 | - |

Property/Subgraph Inference Attack

| | Graph | GNN |
|----------|---|---|
| Security | | |
| Privacy | <p>Property inference attack</p> <p>Subgraph inference attack</p> | <p>Infer basic graph properties of a graph via its graph embedding</p> <p>Infer if a certain subgraph exists in a graph via its graph embedding</p> |


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Graph Neural Network (GNN)



Node Embeddings



- Mean pooling
- Max pooling



Graph Embedding




- Graph Classification
- Graph Matching
- Graph Visualization



Toxicity Prediction

Property Inference Attack

Scenario






GNN model:
Graph classification

Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model

Private Graph




<0.12, 0.19, 0.3, ..., 0.06>

<0.01, 0.08, 0.12, ..., 0.72>


...

<0.11, 0.09, 0.1, ..., 0.07>



Property Inference Attack


Scenario



GNN model:
Graph classification


Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model



Property Inference Attack

Scenario




GNN model:
Graph classification

Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model

Remote access

Auxiliary graphs




Graph Embeddings

$\langle 0.12, 0.19, 0.3, \dots, 0.06 \rangle$

$\langle 0.01, 0.08, 0.12, \dots, 0.72 \rangle$





Attack Model



Estimated

Ground Truth


Cross-entropy loss



Local environment

Property Inference Attack

Scenario



GNN model:
Graph classification

Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model


Graph Embeddings

Attack Model

Estimated




<0.11, 0.09, 0.1, ..., 0.07>



This is a graph with ~4 nodes

Property Inference Attack


Scenario



GNN model:
Graph classification


Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model



Subgraph Inference Attack


Scenario




GNN model:
Graph classification

Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model




Subgraph Inference Attack



Subgraph Inference Attack

Scenario



GNN model:
Graph classification


Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model




Graph Embeddings

Attack Model



Subgraph Inference Attack

Scenario



GNN model:
Graph classification

Attacker's **capability**:

1. Embeddings of graphs (from training data) obtained from the target model
2. Can query the GNN model

AUC

| Dataset | 0.8 | | | 0.6 | | | 0.4 | | | 0.2 | | |
|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|
| | Concat | EDist | EDiff |
| DD | 0.53 ± 0.01 | 0.81 ± 0.06 | 0.88 ± 0.01 | 0.51 ± 0.01 | 0.79 ± 0.04 | 0.87 ± 0.01 | 0.52 ± 0.01 | 0.79 ± 0.02 | 0.85 ± 0.01 | 0.50 ± 0.02 | 0.71 ± 0.08 | 0.80 ± 0.00 |
| ENZYMES | 0.49 ± 0.02 | 0.63 ± 0.10 | 0.88 ± 0.03 | 0.52 ± 0.03 | 0.71 ± 0.10 | 0.88 ± 0.03 | 0.54 ± 0.02 | 0.56 ± 0.07 | 0.86 ± 0.01 | 0.48 ± 0.02 | 0.53 ± 0.03 | 0.78 ± 0.01 |
| AIDS | 0.51 ± 0.01 | 0.53 ± 0.04 | 0.78 ± 0.04 | 0.55 ± 0.01 | 0.51 ± 0.02 | 0.76 ± 0.05 | 0.54 ± 0.01 | 0.51 ± 0.03 | 0.73 ± 0.06 | 0.56 ± 0.02 | 0.50 ± 0.00 | 0.76 ± 0.05 |
| NCI1 | 0.51 ± 0.00 | 0.51 ± 0.02 | 0.70 ± 0.06 | 0.49 ± 0.02 | 0.52 ± 0.01 | 0.67 ± 0.06 | 0.50 ± 0.01 | 0.51 ± 0.01 | 0.64 ± 0.03 | 0.49 ± 0.01 | 0.51 ± 0.01 | 0.64 ± 0.00 |
| OVCAR-8H | 0.54 ± 0.01 | 0.63 ± 0.12 | 0.89 ± 0.02 | 0.50 ± 0.04 | 0.69 ± 0.09 | 0.88 ± 0.02 | 0.51 ± 0.03 | 0.74 ± 0.02 | 0.84 ± 0.01 | 0.54 ± 0.01 | 0.60 ± 0.13 | 0.82 ± 0.02 |




Graph embeddings



Subgraph embeddings

Analysis

Training Graph



Link re-identification attack



Training graph's node posterior scores




Property inference attack



Training graph's graph embeddings

Analysis

Training Graph



Link re-identification attack



Training graph's node posterior scores

Property inference attack





Training graph's graph embeddings

Takeaways (1)

- **Secure** your infrastructure
- **Audit** your GNN-based machine learning pipeline

What Is Next?



Training Graph




Prediction

Embedding

t-SNE Projection




Overview^{*}




^{*}All attacks discussed in this talk are simulated in the lab environment.

Model Stealing Attack



Model Stealing Attack



Model Stealing Attack

Security Boundary




GNN model:
Node classification


Attacker's **capability**:

1. Can query the GNN model via publicly accessible API


Model Stealing Attack




Model Stealing Attack




Model Stealing Attack




Model Stealing Attack



Model Stealing Attack




Model Stealing Attack




$$\hat{\mathbf{H}}_Q = \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{X}_Q, \mathbf{A}_Q)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_R = \frac{1}{n_Q} \|\hat{\mathbf{H}}_Q - \mathbf{R}\|_2$$




2 Learn Surrogate Model


Model Stealing Attack



$$\mathcal{L}_P = -\frac{1}{n_Q} \sum_{v \in G_Q} \sum_{i \in |C_Q|} c_i \log[O(\mathbf{h}_v)_i]$$




Model Stealing Attack



conduct the attack without knowing the target model's architecture

Model Stealing Attack



Type I Attack (Pubmed)

| Surrogate Model | Target Model | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | GIN | GAT | SAGE |
| GIN | 0.838 (-0.057) | 0.753 (-0.141) | 0.776 (-0.130) |
| GAT | 0.852 (-0.042) | 0.786 (-0.108) | 0.847 (-0.059) |
| SAGE | 0.823 (-0.072) | 0.743 (-0.152) | 0.844 (-0.062) |

t-SNE


| Surrogate Model | Target Model | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | GIN | GAT | SAGE |
| GIN | 0.875 (-0.049) | 0.868 (-0.036) | 0.876 (-0.033) |
| GAT | 0.862 (-0.061) | 0.862 (-0.043) | 0.863 (-0.045) |
| SAGE | 0.875 (-0.049) | 0.869 (-0.035) | 0.871 (-0.038) |

prediction posterior

| Surrogate Model | Target Model | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | GIN | GAT | SAGE |
| GIN | 0.883 (-0.040) | 0.877 (-0.028) | 0.884 (-0.024) |
| GAT | 0.848 (-0.076) | 0.869 (-0.035) | 0.854 (-0.044) |
| SAGE | 0.877 (-0.046) | 0.875 (-0.029) | 0.831 (-0.028) |


embedding

Model Stealing Attack



2 dimensional t-SNE projection can be the new attack surface

Model Stealing Attack



Type I Attack (Pubmed)

| | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Surrogate Model | GIN | 0.838 (-0.057) | 0.753 (-0.141) | 0.776 (-0.130) |
| | GAT | 0.852 (-0.042) | 0.786 (-0.108) | 0.847 (-0.059) |
| | SAGE | 0.823 (-0.072) | 0.743 (-0.152) | 0.844 (-0.062) |
| | | GIN | GAT | SAGE |

GAT
Target Model
t-SNE

| | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Surrogate Model | GIN | 0.875 (-0.049) | 0.868 (-0.036) | 0.876 (-0.033) |
| | GAT | 0.862 (-0.061) | 0.862 (-0.043) | 0.863 (-0.045) |
| | SAGE | 0.875 (-0.049) | 0.869 (-0.035) | 0.871 (-0.038) |
| | | GIN | GAT | SAGE |

Target Model
prediction posterior

| | | | | |
|-----------------|------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Surrogate Model | GIN | 0.883 (-0.040) | 0.877 (-0.028) | 0.884 (-0.024) |
| | GAT | 0.848 (-0.076) | 0.869 (-0.035) | 0.864 (-0.044) |
| | SAGE | 0.877 (-0.046) | 0.875 (-0.029) | 0.881 (-0.028) |
| | | GIN | GAT | SAGE |

Target Model
embedding

Takeaways (2)

- Secure your infrastructure
- Audit your GNN-based machine learning pipeline
- **Monitor** your model logs for anomalies
- **Evaluate the security and privacy posture** of your Graph Neural Network (GNN) models

Code

- **Link re-identification attack**

https://github.com/xinleihe/link_stealing_attack

- **Property/Subgraph inference attack**

<https://github.com/Zhangzhk0819/GNN-Embedding-Leaks>

- **Model stealing attack**

<https://github.com/xinleihe/GNNStealing>

Thank You

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