



black hat[®]

USA 2021

AUGUST 4-5, 2021

BRIEFINGS

Anatomy of Native IIS Malware

Zuzana Hromcova | Malware Researcher, ESET



black hat[®]

USA 2021

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BRIEFINGS

Anatomy of Native IIS Malware

*C++
libraries*

*Internet
Information
Services*




**How popular
is IIS software?**

4-7%
**of websites use
IIS server***

4-7%

of websites use IIS server*

*Netcraft: May 2021 Web Server Survey



| Developer | April 2021 | Percent | May 2021 | Percent |
|-----------|-------------|---------|-------------|---------|
| nginx | 432,167,302 | 35.65% | 440,997,336 | 36.19% |
| Apache | 313,948,741 | 25.90% | 314,774,492 | 25.83% |
| OpenResty | 81,935,391 | 6.76% | 73,839,970 | 6.06% |
| Microsoft | 67,182,740 | 5.54% | 60,265,118 | 4.95% |

4-7%
**of websites use
IIS server***

*W3Techs: Usage statistics of web servers

[Technologies](#) > Web Servers

Usage statistics of web servers


This diagram shows the percentages of websites using various web servers. See [technologies overview](#) for explanations on the methodologies used in the surveys. Our reports are updated daily.

Request an extensive web servers market report.

[Learn more](#)

How to read the diagram:

Nginx is used by 34% of all the websites whose web server we know.



Microsoft Exchange email servers with

Outlook → **OWA**
on the web

Microsoft Exchange email servers with

OWA

Shodan result for public servers with OWA running Microsoft Exchange 2013 or 2016
(query for the IIS banner X-AspNet-Version and Outlook in the title):

TOTAL RESULTS

203,744

TOP COUNTRIES



| | |
|----------------|--------|
| United States | 48,776 |
| Germany | 42,877 |
| United Kingdom | 12,264 |
| Netherlands | 8,514 |
| France | 8,391 |



Government institutions

in three countries in Southeast Asia



A major telecom company

in Cambodia




Private companies

in Canada, USA, South Korea and others

IIS backdoors


spreading via ProxyLogon





Government espionage

Infiltrating government mailboxes



SEO fraud

Crime schemes to manipulate SERP



Compromised websites

IIS malware serving malicious content & adware



Targeting e-commerce


Stealing credentials & credit card information



C&C traffic routing

Compromised IIS server as a malicious proxy

Known malicious IIS modules:



The Curious Case of the Malicious IIS Module

🕒 December 09, 2013 👤 Josh Grunzweig



Recently, we've seen a few instances of a malicious DLL that is installed as an IIS module making its rounds in forensic cases. This module is of particular concern as it is currently undetectable by almost all anti-virus products. The malware is used by attackers to target sensitive information in POST requests, and has mechanisms in place for data exfiltration. Encryption is circumvented as the malware extracts this data from IIS itself. This was seen targeting credit card data on e-commerce sites, however, it could also be used to steal logins, or any other sensitive information sent to a compromised IIS instance. *Please note that this is not related in any way to the recent 'Pony' malware that was reported. Pony targets the end-users, while this malware goes after the web servers.*


ISN

IIS v7.0

2007

2013

Known malicious IIS modules:



RGDoor

IIS v7.0

2007

ISN

2013

2018

Known malicious IIS modules:

IIS v7.0

2007

ISN

2013

Native malware

2018

2019

安全脉搏
SECPLINE

万万没想到，我还是没辜负客户的期待

脉博文库 安识科技 2019-09-29 7,591

我叫王阿明 今天是我来安识的第432天，在今天前我共完成了158次大大小小的安全应急，本以为凭借着我这两世经纬之才，心中宏阔安全架构雄图，小小的应急响应对我这老司机来说毫无压力。

但1个小时后我的脸色特别难看，抓不住任何线索的迷茫才让人神伤，若今天解决不了客户网站被篡改的问题，说不定分分钟被老板扫地出门。不说了不说了，客户在等着我尽快恢复业务，老板说了应急响应最重要的是沟通，其次是技术，再次是交付。

一、先谈谈攻击者留下来的症状（这也是客户满眼期待要求消除的）：

Known malicious IIS modules:



IIS v7.0

RGDoor

Managed malware

Native malware

2007

2013


2018

2019

2020

ISN

Known malicious IIS modules:




Known malicious IIS modules:



The background is a dark teal color with a subtle, glowing grid pattern. The grid lines are more prominent in the upper right quadrant, creating a sense of depth and movement. There are also some faint, wavy lines and small white specks scattered throughout the background, giving it a futuristic or digital feel.

Our research



Our research

Malicious **native** IIS modules (C++ libraries)

80+ unique samples from our telemetry and VirusTotal

14 malware families (10 never documented)

Victim information from our telemetry and internet-wide scans

Detailed information and analyses in the white paper

Malicious native IIS modules

Architecture

Reversing

TTPs

Defense




Malicious native IIS modules
Architecture

Internet Information Services (IIS)

- Microsoft web server software
- Modular architecture (since v7.0)
- IIS services configured to run at each system start (*World Wide Web Publishing Service, Windows Process Activation Service or Application Host Helper Services*)
- IIS Worker Process (**w3wp.exe**)
 - Handles inbound requests
 - Loads all IIS modules configured in `%windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\ApplicationHost.config`

Request-processing pipeline


HTTP request



HTTP response

Events

generate notifications



Event handlers

handle notifications

Class inheriting from `CHttpModule`:

```
; const HttpModule::`vftable'  
??_7HttpModule@@6B@ dd offset OnBeginRequest  
dd offset OnPostBeginRequest  
dd offset OnAuthenticateRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthenticateRequest  
dd offset OnAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPostAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnPostReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnUpdateRequestCache
```

Events

generate notifications

Begin Request Processing

Authentication

Authorization

Cache Resolution

Handler Mapping

Handler Pre-execution

Handler Execution

Release State

Update Cache

Update Log

End Request Processing

```
; const HttpModule::`vftable'  
??_7HttpModule@@6B@ dd offset OnBeginRequest  
dd offset OnPostBeginRequest  
dd offset OnAuthenticateRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthenticateRequest  
dd offset OnAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPostAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnPostReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnLogRequest  
dd offset OnPostLogRequest  
dd offset OnEndRequest  
dd offset OnPostEndRequest  
dd offset OnSendResponse  
dd offset OnMapPath
```


Module classes implement event handlers

Class inheriting from `CGlobalModule`:

```
; const CMyGlobalModule::`vftable'  
??_7CMyGlobalModule@@6B@ dq offset OnGlobalStopListening  
                                ; DATA XREF: DNameNode  
                                ; Terminate+5↑o  
dq offset OnGlobalCacheCleanup  
dq offset OnGlobalCacheOperation  
dq offset OnGlobalHealthCheck  
dq offset OnGlobalConfigurationChange  
dq offset OnGlobalFileChange  
dq offset OnGlobalPreBeginRequest  
dq offset OnGlobalApplicationStart  
dq offset OnGlobalApplicationResolveModules  
dq offset OnGlobalApplicationStop  
dq offset OnGlobalRSCAQuery  
dq offset OnGlobalTraceEvent  
dq offset OnGlobalCustomNotification  
dq offset Terminate  
dq offset OnGlobalThreadCleanup  
dq offset OnGlobalApplicationPreload  
dq offset OnSuspendProcess
```

Class inheriting from `CHttpModule`:

```
; const HttpModule::`vftable'  
??_7HttpModule@@6B@ dd offset OnBeginRequest  
                                ; DATA XREF: sub_7454A310+19↑o  
                                ; sub_7454A360+9↑o  
dd offset OnPostBeginRequest  
dd offset OnAuthenticateRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthenticateRequest  
dd offset OnAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPostAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnPostReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnLogRequest  
dd offset OnPostLogRequest  
dd offset OnEndRequest  
dd offset OnPostEndRequest  
dd offset OnSendResponse  
dd offset OnMapPath  
dd offset OnReadEntity  
dd offset OnCustomRequestNotification  
dd offset OnAsyncCompletion  
dd offset Dispose
```

Module classes implement event handlers

Class inheriting from `CGlobalModule`:

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dd offset OnPostResolveRequestCache  
dd offset OnMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostMapRequestHandler  
dd offset OnAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPostAcquireRequestState  
dd offset OnPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnPostReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnLogRequest  
dd offset OnPostLogRequest  
dd offset OnEndRequest  
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Module classes implement event handlers

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dd offset OnPostBeginRequest  
dd offset OnAuthenticateRequest  
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dd offset OnAuthorizeRequest  
dd offset OnPostAuthorizeRequest  
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dd offset OnPostPreExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnPostExecuteRequestHandler  
dd offset OnReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnPostReleaseRequestState  
dd offset OnUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnPostUpdateRequestCache  
dd offset OnLogRequest  
dd offset OnPostLogRequest  
dd offset OnEndRequest  
dd offset OnPostEndRequest  
dd offset OnSendResponse  
dd offset OnMapPath  
dd offset OnReadEntity  
dd offset OnCustomRequestNotification  
dd offset OnAsyncCompletion  
dd offset Dispose
```

RegisterModule

DLL export / module entrypoint

1. Creates instances of the core classes

```
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 ; Exported entry 1. RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 public RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 RegisterModule proc near
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 push    rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F17D2 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F17D6 mov     ecx, 8 ; Size
.text:000007FEFB1F17DB mov     rcx, rdx
.text:000007FEFB1F17DE call    MyHttpModuleFactory_ctor
.text:000007FEFB1F17E3 lea    rcx, ??_7CMyHttpModuleFactory@@6B@ ; const CMyHttpModuleFactory::~`vftable'
.text:000007FEFB1F17EA mov     cs:practory, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17F1 xor     r9d, r9d
.text:000007FEFB1F17F4 mov     r8d, RQ_SEND_RESPONSE
.text:000007FEFB1F17FA mov     rdx, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17FD mov     [rax], rcx
.text:000007FEFB1F1800 mov     rcx, rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F1803 mov     r10, [rbx]
.text:000007FEFB1F1806 add     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F180A pop     rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F180B jmp     [r10+IHttpModuleRegistrationInfoVtbl.SetRequestNotifications]
.text:000007FEFB1F180B RegisterModule endp
.text:000007FEFB1F180B
```

RegisterModule

DLL export / module entrypoint

1. Creates instances of the core classes
2. Registers module for server events

```
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 ; Exported entry 1. RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 public RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 RegisterModule proc near
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.text:000007FEFB1F17DB mov     rbx, rdx
.text:000007FEFB1F17DE call    MyHttpModuleFactory_ctor
.text:000007FEFB1F17E3 lea    rcx, ??_7CMyHttpModuleFactory@@6B@ ; const CMyHttpModuleFactory::`vftable'
.text:000007FEFB1F17EA mov     cs:pFactory, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17F1 xor     r9d, r9d
.text:000007FEFB1F17F4 mov     r8d, RQ_SEND_RESPONSE
.text:000007FEFB1F17FA mov     rdx, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17FD mov     [rax], rcx
.text:000007FEFB1F1800 mov     rcx, rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F1803 mov     r10, [rbx]
.text:000007FEFB1F1806 add     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F180A nop
.text:000007FEFB1F180E jmp     [r10+IHttpModuleRegistrationInfoVtbl.SetRequestNotifications]
.text:000007FEFB1F180E RegisterModule endp
.text:000007FEFB1F180B
```

RegisterModule

DLL export / module entrypoint

1. Creates instances of the core classes
2. Registers module for server events
3. Sets priority for the module

```
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 ; Exported entry 1. RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 public RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 RegisterModule proc near
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 push    rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F17D2 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F17D6 mov     ecx, 8 ; Size
.text:000007FEFB1F17DB mov     rbx, rdx
.text:000007FEFB1F17DE call    MyHttpModuleFactory_ctor
.text:000007FEFB1F17E3 lea    rcx, ??_7CMyHttpModuleFactory@@6B@ ; const CMyHttpModuleFactory::`vftable'
.text:000007FEFB1F17EA mov     cs:pFactory, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17F1 xor     r9d, r9d
.text:000007FEFB1F17F4 mov     r8d, RQ_SEND_RESPONSE
.text:000007FEFB1F17FA mov     rdx, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17FD mov     [rax], rcx
.text:000007FEFB1F1800 mov     rcx, rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F1803 mov     r10, [rbx]
.text:000007FEFB1F1806 add     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F180A pop     rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F180B jmp     [r10+IHttpModuleRegistrationInfoVtbl.SetRequestNotifications]
.text:000007FEFB1F180B RegisterModule endp
.text:000007FEFB1F180B
```

Malicious native IIS modules

~~Reverse-engineering~~

1 Import relevant interfaces (implemented in `iiscore.dll`):

`IHttpContext`, `IHttpModuleRegistrationInfo`, `IHttpRequest`,
`IHttpResponse`, `IPreBeginRequestProvider`...


```
1 int __cdecl sendResponse(const char *a1, int cHttpContext)
2 {
3     IHttpResponse **cHttpResponse1; // eax
4     IHttpResponse **cHttpResponse2; // esi
5     IHttpResponse *cHttpResponse3; // edx
6     int hResult1; // eax
7     int hResult2; // edi
8     HTTP_DATA_CHUNK httpDataChunks; // [esp+4h] [ebp-40h] BYREF
9
10    cHttpResponse1 = (*(cHttpContext + offsetof(IHttpContext2Vtbl, GetResponse)))(cHttpContext);
11    cHttpResponse2 = cHttpResponse1;
12    if ( !cHttpResponse1 )
13        return 1;
14    cHttpResponse3 = *cHttpResponse1;
15    httpDataChunks.DataChunkType = HttpDataChunkFromMemory;
16    (cHttpResponse3->Clear)(cHttpResponse1);
17    ((*cHttpResponse2)->SetHeader)(cHttpResponse2, HttpHeaderContentType, "text/plain", 10, 1);
18    httpDataChunks.FromFileHandle.ByteRange.StartingOffset.LowPart = a1;
19    httpDataChunks.FromMemory.BufferLength = strlen(a1);
20    hResult1 = ((*cHttpResponse2)->WriteEntityChunks)(cHttpResponse2, &httpDataChunks, 1, 0, 1, &cHttpContext, 0);
21    hResult2 = hResult1;
22    if ( hResult1 < 0 )
23        ((*cHttpResponse2)->SetStatus)(cHttpResponse2, 500, "Server Error", 0, hResult1, 0, 0);
24    return hResult2;
25 }
```


2 Start with RegisterModule export

- Which handlers are implemented?
- Initialization?

```
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 ; Exported entry 1. RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 public RegisterModule
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 RegisterModule proc near
.text:000007FEFB1F17D0 push    rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F17D2 sub     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F17D6 mov     ecx, 8 ; Size
.text:000007FEFB1F17DB mov     rbx, rdx
.text:000007FEFB1F17DE call   MyHttpModuleFactory_ctor
.text:000007FEFB1F17E3 lea    rcx, ??_7CMyHttpModuleFactory@@6B@ ; const CMyHttpModuleFactory::`vftable'
.text:000007FEFB1F17EA mov     cs:pFactory, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17F1 xor     r0d, r0d
.text:000007FEFB1F17F4 mov     r8d, RQ_SEND_RESPONSE
.text:000007FEFB1F17FA mov     rax, rax
.text:000007FEFB1F17FD mov     [rax], rcx
.text:000007FEFB1F1800 mov     rcx, rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F1803 mov     r10, [rbx]
.text:000007FEFB1F1806 add     rsp, 20h
.text:000007FEFB1F180A pop     rbx
.text:000007FEFB1F180B jmp     [r10+IHttpModuleRegistrationInfoVtbl.SetRequestNotifications]
.text:000007FEFB1F180B RegisterModule endp
.text:000007FEFB1F180B
```

 See Group 9 in the paper



3 Identify implemented handlers

```

.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0 OnSendResponse proc near
.text:00000000001417A0 sub     rsp, 28h
.text:00000000001417A4 lea   rcx, OutputString ; "This module subscribed to event "
.text:00000000001417AB call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417B1 lea   rcx, aChttpmoduleOns ; "CHttpModule::OnSendResponse"
.text:00000000001417B8 call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417BE lea   rcx, aButDidNotOverr ; " but did not override the method in its"...
.text:00000000001417C5 call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417CB call  cs:DebugBreak
.text:00000000001417D1 xor   eax, eax
.text:00000000001417D3 add   rsp, 28h
.text:00000000001417D7 retn
.text:00000000001417D7 OnSendResponse endp
.text:00000000001417D7

```

 See Group 7 in the paper

```

; const HttpModule::`vftable'
??_7HttpModule@@@6B@ dd offset OnBeginRequest ; DATA XREF: sub_7454A310+19fo
; sub_7454A360+9fo
dd offset sub_74549CD0
dd offset sub_74549D00
dd offset sub_74549D30
dd offset sub_74549D60
dd offset sub_74549D90
dd offset sub_74549DC0
dd offset sub_74549DF0
dd offset sub_74549E20
dd offset sub_74549E50
dd offset sub_74549E80
dd offset sub_74549EB0
dd offset sub_74549EE0
dd offset sub_74549F10
dd offset sub_74549F40
dd offset sub_74549F70
dd offset sub_74549FA0
dd offset sub_74549FD0
dd offset sub_7454A000
dd offset sub_7454A030
dd offset OnLogRequest ; malicious handler
dd offset sub_7454A060
dd offset OnEndRequest ; malicious handler
dd offset sub_7454A0F0
dd offset sub_7454A120
dd offset sub_7454A150
dd offset sub_7454A180
dd offset sub_7454A1B0
dd offset sub_7454A1E0
dd offset sub_7454A210
dd offset sub_7454A360
dd offset ??_R4HttpModuleFactory@@@6B@ ; const HttpModuleFactr
; const HttpModuleFactory::`vftable'

```

3 Identify implemented handlers

```

.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0 OnSendResponse proc near
.text:00000000001417A0 sub     rsp, 28h
.text:00000000001417A4 lea   rcx, OutputString ; "This module subscribed to event "
.text:00000000001417AB call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417B1 lea   rcx, aChttpmoduleOns ; "CHttpModule::OnSendResponse"
.text:00000000001417B8 call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417BE lea   rcx, aButDidNotOverr ; " but did not override the method in its"...
.text:00000000001417C5 call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417CB call  cs:DebugBreak
.text:00000000001417D1 xor    eax, eax
.text:00000000001417D3 add    rsp, 28h
.text:00000000001417D7 retn
.text:00000000001417D7 OnSendResponse endp
.text:00000000001417D7

```

 See Group 12 in the paper

```

; const CF5XFFHttpModule::`vftable'
??_7CF5XFFHttpModule@@6B@ dq offset OnBeginRequest malicious handler
; DATA XREF: sub_180005900+Afo
; sub_1800059C0+4Dfo
dq offset sub_180005DF0
dq offset sub_180005AF0
dq offset sub_180005D70
dq offset sub_180005B30
dq offset sub_180005DB0
dq offset sub_1800060F0
dq offset sub_180005FB0
dq offset sub_180005CF0
dq offset sub_180005FF0
dq offset OnAcquireRequestState benign handler
dq offset sub_180005D30
dq offset sub_180006030
dq offset sub_180005F30
dq offset sub_180005C30
dq offset sub_180005E70
dq offset sub_1800060B0
dq offset sub_180005F70
dq offset sub_180006170
dq offset sub_180005FF0
dq offset sub_180005C70
dq offset sub_180005EB0
dq offset sub_180005BF0
dq offset sub_180005E30
dq offset OnSendResponse benign handler
dq offset sub_180005CB0
dq offset sub_180006070
dq offset sub_180005BB0
dq offset sub_180005AB0
dq offset sub_1800059A0
dq offset sub_180005900

```

3 Identify implemented handlers

```

.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0
.text:00000000001417A0 OnSendResponse proc near
.text:00000000001417A0 sub     rsp, 28h
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.text:00000000001417C5 call  cs:OutputDebugStringA
.text:00000000001417CB call  cs:DebugBreak
.text:00000000001417D1 xor   eax, eax
.text:00000000001417D3 add   rsp, 28h
.text:00000000001417D7 retn
.text:00000000001417D7 OnSendResponse endp
.text:00000000001417D7

```

 See Group 12 in the paper

```

; const CF5XFFHttpModule::`vftable'
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dq offset sub_1800060F0
dq offset sub_180005FB0
dq offset sub_180005CF0
dq offset sub_180005FF0
dq offset OnAcquireRequestState benign handler
dq offset sub_180005D30
dq offset sub_180006030
dq offset sub_180005F30
dq offset sub_180005C30
dq offset sub_180005E70
dq offset sub_1800060B0
dq offset sub_180005F70
dq offset sub_180006170
dq offset sub_180005FF0
dq offset sub_180005C70
dq offset sub_180005EB0
dq offset sub_180005BF0
dq offset sub_180005E30
dq offset OnSendResponse benign handler
dq offset sub_180005CB0
dq offset sub_180006070
dq offset sub_180005BB0
dq offset sub_180005AB0
dq offset sub_1800059A0
dq offset sub_180005900

```

4 Refer to the [Native-Code API Reference](#) for the analysis




Malicious native IIS modules

Understanding the TTPs

1 IIS backdoors

execute backdoor commands on IIS server



Backdoor commands


- Get system information
- Upload/download files
- Execute files or shell commands
- Create reverse shell
- Create/list/move/rename/delete files and folders
- Map local drives to remote drives
- Exfiltrate collected data

Attacker HTTP requests

- A custom HTTP header present
- An embedded password in the URL, request body, headers (hardcoded password or password hash in the malware)
- A specific format of URL or request body
- A more complex condition


Attacker HTTP request example

i See Group 7 in the paper



2 IIS infostealers


intercept traffic and steal data from legitimate visitors



DEMO


3 IIS injectors

serve malicious content to legitimate visitors



4 IIS proxies

relay traffic between a compromised host and the C&C server



5 SEO fraud

deceive search engine crawlers

- Manipulates content served to **search engine crawlers** to boost SEO for selected websites
- Legitimate user requests are ignored by the malware
- Techniques used:
 - Keyword stuffing
 - Injecting a list of backlinks
 - Redirecting the crawlers (turning the compromised website into a doorway page)
- This is **not** Black Hat SEO
 - A third-party website benefits from the manipulation, not the one serving the manipulated content (this is likely sold as a service)
 - C&C communication to obtain configuration data
 - Other malicious modes present (e.g. backdoor, proxy)

Known IIS malware families

 See the paper for detailed analyses

| Malware family | Backdoor | Info stealer | Proxy | SEO fraud | Injector |
|----------------|----------|--------------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Group 1 | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Group 2 | ✓ | | | | |
| Group 3 | ✓ | | | | |
| Group 4 | ✓ | | | | |
| Group 5 | | ✓ | | | |
| Group 6 | | ✓ | | | |
| Group 7 | ✓ | | | | |
| Group 8 | ✓ | | | | |
| Group 9 | | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Group 10 | | | | ✓ | |
| Group 11 | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Group 12A | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Group 12B | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Group 12C | | | | ✓ | |
| Group 13 | ✓ | | | ✓ | |
| Group 14 | | | | ✓ | ✓ |

Malicious native IIS modules

Detection, mitigation and remediation

Detecting compromised servers



**Inspect installed
modules**

Connections

DESKTOP-HB0OLCI Home

Filter: [Go] [Share]

IIS

- Authentic...
- Compression
- Default Document
- Logging
- MIME Types
- Modules**

Management

- Configurat... Editor
- Feature Delegation
- Shared Configurat...

Connections

DESKTOP-HB0OLCI (DESKTOP)

- Application Pools
- Sites

Modules

Use this feature to configure the native and managed code modules that process requests made to the Web server.

Group by: No Grouping

| Name | Code | Module Type | Entry Type |
|-----------------------------|---|---------------|--------------|
| AnonymousAuthenticationM... | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\authanon.dll | Native | Local |
| CustomErrorModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\custerr.dll | Native | Local |
| DefaultDocumentModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\defdoc.dll | Native | Local |
| DirectoryListingModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\dirlist.dll | Native | Local |
| HttpCacheModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\cachhttp.dll | Native | Local |
| HttpLoggingModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\loghttp.dll | Native | Local |
| IIS Backdoor | C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\httpapxd.dll | Native | Local |
| ProtocolSupportModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\protsup.dll | Native | Local |
| RequestFilteringModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\modrqflt.dll | Native | Local |
| StaticCompressionModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\compstat.dll | Native | Local |
| StaticFileModule | %windir%\System32\inetsrv\static.dll | Native | Local |

Detecting compromised servers



Check IIS logs

the default location is
`%SystemDrive%\inetpub
\logs\LogFiles`



Inspect installed modules

via IIS Manager, AppCmd.exe
or inspect the configuration file
`%windir%\system32\inetsrv\
config\ApplicationHost.config`




Scan for known malware families

use IoCs and YARA rules listed
on our [GitHub repository](#)

DEMO

Mitigation (of compromise vectors)



Prevent server exploitation

- keep your OS up-to-date
- limit services exposed to the internet
- use strong passwords and 2FA for dedicated administrative accounts



Prevent installing malicious (e.g., trojanized) modules

- only install modules from trusted sources
- consider using an endpoint security solution

The background is a dark teal color with a subtle, glowing digital grid pattern. The grid lines are composed of small dots and are slightly blurred, creating a sense of depth and movement. The overall aesthetic is modern and technological.


Conclusion

Black Hat Sound Bytes

Anatomy of Native IIS Malware

1

**IIS malware:
cybercrime AND
cyberespionage tool**
we documented 14 families (10 new);
consider them in your threat model



**Get the full
white paper:**
for a comprehensive guide
on detecting, analyzing and
understanding IIS malware

3

**Use the IoCs and
YARA rules for
detection:**
get them from
the ESETresearch GitHub
[https://github.com/eset/malware-
ioc/tree/master/badiis](https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/badiis)



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**Thanks
for watching!**

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@ESETresearch

