# Next-Gen DFIR Mass Exploits & Supplier Compromise



#### Who Are We?



**Sherri Davidoff** 

Founder & CEO, LMG Security
"Alien" from "Breaking & Entering"
MIT EE/CS, GCFA, GPEN







**Matt Durrin** 

IR Lead
Research & Development
Evil, sometimes.





#### Kaseya Mass 0-Day Ransomware Attacks

#### 'Shut down everything': Global ransomware attack takes a small Maryland town offline

Leonardtown, Md., lost access to its computer systems Friday, falling victim to a massive

#### Hackers demand \$70 million to end biggest ransomware attack on record

JULY 6, 20

**CVE-2021-30116: Multiple Zero-**Day Vulnerabilities in Kaseya VSA **Exploited to Distribute REvil** Ransomware



atnam Narang | Cyber Expo



- 0-Day exploit discovered in the Kaseya VSA on-premise system
- Remote monitoring & mgmt system
- Revil ransomware gang/affiliate
- ~1,500 Organizations held for ransom
  - (Over 1,000,000 individual devices encrypted, according to REvil)
- Payment options available:
  - \$70 Million for a master decryptor
  - \$5 Million for an individual MSP
  - ~\$44k and up for downstream customers





# Supply Chain Attacks vs. Mass 0-Day Exploits

- Supply Chain Attacks = vector is through a 3<sup>rd</sup> party technology supplier
- Mass 0-day Exploit = exploitation of technology after deployment in victim environment

Response is surprisingly similar





#### SolarWinds – A Popular Technology Vendor Is Hacked!

- FireEye Announced a Supply-Chain Malware Infection
  - Dec 13
- SolarWinds "Orion" Network Monitoring Software
- Hacked since <Sept 2019</li>
- Backdoor into customer networks
- <u>18,000 customers</u>





#### Threat Research

Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor

December 13, 2020 | by FireEye



# **How Did Responders Find Out?**

- SolarWinds did not detect the malware
  - Neither did 18,000 other customers
- FireEye (customer)
  - Public notification
  - Offensive security tools stolen
  - 15+ months after original hack
  - 9 months after backdoor rolled out





#### Threat Research

Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor



SolarWinds @ @solarwinds · Dec 13, 2020

SolarWinds asks all customers to upgrade immediately to Orion Platform version 2020.2.1 HF 1 to address a security vulnerability. More information is available at <a href="mailto:slrwnds.com/n7l55">slrwnds.com/n7l55</a>

#### **SolarWinds Security Advisory**

SolarWinds has just been made aware our systems experienced a highly sophisticated, manual supply chain attack on SolarWinds® Orion® Platform software builds for versions 2019.4 HF 5 through 2020.2.1, released between March 2020 and June 2020. We have been advised this attack was likely conducted by an outside nation state and intended to be a narrow, extremely targeted, and manually executed attack, as opposed to a broad, system-wide attack. We recommend taking the following steps related to your use of the SolarWinds Orion Platform.

1 757


♡ 753

 $\triangle$ 



#### **Monitor Threat Intelligence**

- Identify your key software products & suppliers
- Setup your threat intel sources
  - Vendor alerts & social media
  - Threat intel sources
    - Commercial platforms
    - Security vendors (ie CriticalStack, Crowdstrike)
    - Academia, government, etc.
  - Cybersecurity news
    - Bleeping Computer, ZDNet, WSJ, etc
- Assign responsibility for responding to alerts
- Review & triage
- Feed into response processes
- Practice tabletops etc.
- Make sure your suppliers are doing the same!







#### **Threat Research**

Strengthen your defenses against the adversary by collaborating with our world-class researchers on threat intelligence

0

See how to get notified prior to any Threat Report updates made by CB Threat Analysis Unit here and how to rece TAU-TINs here.

Carbon Black Community > Threat Research > Threat Research Docs > TAU-TIN - SolarWinds SUNBURST

#### TAU-TIN - SolarWinds SUNBURST / Solarigate Incident



#### SolarWinds SUNBURST / Solarigate Incident

- Summary
- Customer Protection
  - VMware Carbon Black App Control
  - VMware Carbon Black Cloud Endpoint Standard
  - VMware Carbon Black EDR and Cloud Enterprise EDR
- Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- References
- About TAU-TIN

#### Summary

On 13 December 2020, FireEye, the Department of Homeland Security, and SolarWinds released information on a supply chain compromise known as SUNBURST or Solarigate.

Orion Platform versions 2019.4 HF 5, 2020.2 with no hotfix installed, or with 2020.2 HF 1 are affected by a supply chain attack providing attackers potential access to all credentials managed by or integrated with SolarWinds Orion components.



# **Evaluate Your Risk**

- Affected versions of software
  - May not be immediately known
- Were you running an affected version during the period of compromise?
  - Change management logs
- What should you do if you're not sure?
  - Plan ahead
  - Often, takedown software
  - Can be impactful
- Watch for changes
- Check suppliers, too...

Orion Platform Version	Known Affected by SUNBURST?	Known Vulnerable to SUPERNOVA?	Affected by Digital Certificate Revocation	Recommended Action
2020.2.1 HF 2	NO	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.5
2020.2.1 HF 1	NO	YES	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.5
2020.2.1	NO	YES	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.5
2020.2 HF 1	YES	YES	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.5
2020.2	YES	YES	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.5
2019.4.2	NO	NO	NO	No action needed
2019.4 HF 6	NO	NO	YES	Upgrade to 2020.2.5 OR upgrade to 2019.4.2



#### **New! Software Bill of Materials**


# Software Bill of Materials Required by 2021 Cyber Security Executive Order



#### **SolarWinds - Hacked Customers**

#### Attackers can:

- Steal files
- Install new software
- Gather network information
- Reboot systems
- Disable security tools
- & more





# **Preserve Evidence!**

- Remember the risks...
- Potentially full takeover
  - May be a breach!
  - Reputational, legal, financial risks
- Bring in cyber insurer, breach coach, forensics team, etc.
- See CISA Emergency Directive 21-01



This emergency directive requires the following actions:

- Agencies that have the <u>expertise</u> to take the following actions immediately must do so before proceeding to Action 2. Agencies without this capability shall proceed to Action 2.
  - a. Forensically image system memory and/or host operating systems hosting all instances of SolarWinds Orion versions 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 HF1]. Analyze for new user or service accounts, privileged or otherwise.
  - b. Analyze stored network traffic for <u>indications of compromise</u>, including new external DNS domains to which a small number of agency hosts (e.g., SolarWinds systems) have had connections.





## **Contain the Damage**

- Act quickly— with little or no information
- Government advisories can help...
- Standard options:
  - Yank the network/power
  - System-wide password reset
- Impacts:
  - Operational impacts
  - Help desk calls
  - Network visibility is limited
  - Evidence might be destroyed

"Affected agencies shall immediately disconnect or power down SolarWinds Orion products...
Until such time as CISA directs affected entities to rebuild the Windows operating system and reinstall the SolarWinds software package..."
"DHS ED 21-01



## Pulling the Plug on SolarWinds Might Not Save You...

- TEARDROP Memory-only dropper
- RAINDROP Installed later; used to deliver Cobalt Strike
- Cobalt Strike BEACON
  - Legit pentesting software
  - Customized



"Nearly 60% of PowerShell exploits employ Cobalt Strike, and some 12% of attacks use a combination of Cobalt Strike and Microsoft Windows tools PowerShell and PsExec."



- We used Carbon Black!
- Finding Cobalt Strike beacons:


#### powershell.exe

CMD powershell -nop -w hidden -encode

dcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHcALQ BPAGIAagBIAGMAdAAgAEkATwAuA

E0AZQBtAG8AcgB5AFMAdAByAG...

Run by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM





#### **Beware of False Positives**

Cobalt Strike Beacon Payload

powershell -nop -w hidden encodedcommand JABzADOATgBlAHcALQBPAG
IAagBlAGMAdAAgAEkATwAuAEOAZQBtAG8Acg
B5AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtACgALABbAEMAbwBu
AHYAZQByAHQAXQA6ADoARgByAG8AbQBCA
GEAcwBlADYANABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACIA
SAAOAHMASQBBAEEAQQBBAEEAQQBBAEEAQ
QBLADEAWABhADIAKwBpADYAaABiACsAWABI
ADgARgBIADUAcQBvAHEAYgBVAG8AMQB1AHI
AcwBUAEQASQBnAEYAMQBHAGcAQwBuAGo
AdABiAGgAcQBFAFYANA...

#### Ansible Command

powershell -nop -w hidden EncodedCommand AG4AZwAoACIASAAOAHM
ASQBBAEEAQQBBAEEAQQBBAEEAQQBLADEA
WABhADIAKwBpADYAaABiACsAWABIADgARgB
IADUAcQBvAHEAYgBVAG8AMQB1AHIAcwBUA
EQASQBnAEYAMQBHAGcAQwBuAGoAdABiAG
gAcQBFAFYANAJABzADOATgBIAHcALQBPAGIAa
gBIAGMAdAAgAEkATwAuAEOAZQBtAG8AcgB5
AFMAdAByAGUAYQBtACgALABbAEMAbwBuA
HYAZQByAHQAXQA6ADoARgByAG8AbQBCAGE
AcwBIADYANABTAHQAcgBp...



#### **Obtaining IoCs**

- Hacked customers (ie FireEye, Microsoft)
- Gov agencies (ie CISA)
- The vendor
- Security firms/researchers
- Threat hunting/intel software
  - le Carbon Black
- MISP open-source threat intel
  - https://www.misp-project.org/
- Popular formats:
  - Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)
  - YARA


Carbon Black	Carbon Black Community	This is a watchlist containing Carbon Black community produced detection queries. These queries have been publically posted to the Carbon Black User eXchange site in the Detection Exchange group.
Carbon Black	US Cybercom Malware Alert	This watchlist highlights when the Cyber National Mission Force publishes malware samples
Carbon Black	AMSI Threat Intelligence	Threat detections leveraging VMware CarbonBlack AMSI integration
Carbon Black	ATT&CK Framework	This watchlist is a list of ATT&CK Framework queries designed to aid practitioners with threat hunting. Hits on



#### **Nation-State Attack**

- Russia
- Aka NOBELIUM
- Aka Cozy Bear
- Aka APT 29

Microsoft: Over 1,000 developers contributed to SolarWinds hack



SolarWinds attack hit 100 companies and took months of planning, says White House

The White House warns SolarWinds attack was more than espionage because the private sector targets could lead to follow-up attacks.




By Liam Tung | February 18, 2021 -- 12:34 GMT (04:34 PST) | Topic: Security



#### Difficult to Obtain IoCs

- Sunburst malware is designed to evade detection
- 12-14 day sleep timer
- Verifies specific DLL name
- Randomly delays execution of later phases
- Multiple domain checks
- Security/analysis software checks





#### **Decoy Traffic**

```
dq offset aHttpsCodeJquer
                        ; DATA XREF: main_false_requesting+A9to
                        ; "https://code.jquery.com/"
dq 18h
dq offset aHttpsPlayGoogl ; "https://play.google.com/log?"
dq 1Ch
dq offset aHttpsFontsGsta; "https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/font.woff2"
dq 26h
dq offset aHttpsCdnGoogle ; "https://cdn.google.com/"
dq 17h
dq offset aHttpsWwwGstati ; "https://www.gstatic.com/images/?"
dq 20h
dq offset aHttpsSslGstati ; "https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v3/icons"
dq 23h
dq offset aHttpsOnetechco_6 ; "https://onetechcompany.com/style.css"
dq 24h
dq offset aHttpsOnetechco_7 ; "https://onetechcompany.com/script.js"
dq 24h
dq offset aHttpsOnetechco_0 ; "https://onetechcompany.com/icon.ico"
dq 23h
dq offset aHttpsOnetechco_1 ; "https://onetechcompany.com/icon.png"
dq 23h
dq offset aHttpsOnetechco_2 ; "https://onetechcompany.com/scripts/jque"...
dq 2Ch
dq offset aHttpsOnetechco_3 ; "https://onetechcompany.com/scripts/boot"...
do 2Fh
```





# **Apply Emergency Patches/Software Updates**

- May not exist
- May not work
- May break things
- Expect multiple updates
- Do you want to be an early adopter?
  - Decide in advance
  - Tabletops/response plan

2019.2 HF 4 (released February 5, 2021)

2019.4.2 (released February 2, 2021)

2020.2.4 (released January 25, 2021)

2019.2 Secu

2018.4 Secu

2018.2 Secu





# **Plan for Elevated Risks**

- For you and affected suppliers/technology
- Hackers may have extensive data
  - Employee emails
  - Internal data
  - Passwords, keys & more
- APTs & additional malware
- Software source code & vuln details
- MSP customer lists
- Remember: suppliers may not have detected/announced all hacks





# **Responding to Supply Chain Attacks**

- 1. Monitor threat intelligence
- 2. Evaluate the risk
- 3. Preserve forensic evidence
- 4. Contain the damage
- Hunt for threats
- 6. Apply emergency patches/updates
- 7. Plan for elevated risks






# **Exchange Zero-Day Vuln is Publicly Announced!**





#### What Can the Hackers do?

- Gain full administrator control of the exchange server
- Steal email
- Steal credentials
- Install more malware
- Infect other computers on the network







#### **How Do You Find Out?**



- Jan 5, 2021: DEVCORE alerts Microsoft of a newly identified RCE exploit
- Jan 8, 2021: Microsoft confirms the findings
- Jan 27, 2021: Security firm Dubex reports active exploitation of Exchange Shared w key in the wild
- Feb 23, 2021: Micro partners code with MAPP partners
- Feb 26, 2021: Attacks explode into full mass scann and exploitation

- Mar 2, 2021: Microsoft releases patches for 4 discovered vulnerabilities
- Mar 3, 2021: Tens of thousands Exchange servers are compromised prior
- nass exploitation of Exchange serve too late!

  'Visory' of the late! Mar 5, 2021: Brian Krebs reports of
- advisory about the exploit



Too late!

# How Did the Exchange Server Exploit Leak?

Microsoft Investigating; Devcore Pen Testers Say They're in the Clear

Jeremy Kirk ( jeremy\_kir



The exploit in later Feb looks like the same, the exploited path is similar (/ecp/<single char>.js) and the webshell password is "orange" (I hardcoded in the exploit...)



## Three Can Keep a Secret

## • But Can Eighty-Two?

"The Microsoft Active Protections
Program (MAPP) is a program for
security software providers that gives
them early access to vulnerability
information so that they can provide
updated protections to customers faster.

"Members of MAPP receive security vulnerability information from the <u>Microsoft Security Response</u>

<u>Center</u> in advance of Microsoft's <u>monthly security undate</u>

They can use this info

Microsoft N

MSRC

Report an issue v

Customer guidance v

# Microsoft Active Protections Program



"The MAPP program is used successfully ahead of every Update Tuesday cycle," Microsoft says. "If it turns out that a MAPP partner was the source of a leak, they would face consequences for breaking the terms of participation in the program."



#### **Hackers Target Source Code & Bug Info**

- Break into bug tracking DBs
- Analyze stolen source code
- Tech firms & researchers
- No notification laws
- Few contractual obligations

Microsoft Offers Details on Hack of Vulnerability

By Robert McMillan

Researchers

North Korean APT Group Appa attacks

Akshaya Asokan ( asokan akshaya)

#### Microsoft Kept Secret That Its Bug-Tracking Database Was Hacked In 2013

m October 17, 2017 & Mohit Kumar





Mozilla: data stolen from hacked bug database was used to attack Firefox

A privileged user's account was compromised at least as early as September 2014.

MEGAN GEUSS - 9/4/2015, 5:04 PM





## Running On-Prem Exchange? You're Affected

- ANY public facing Exchange server is potentially compromised
- All email data and user data is at risk
- The vulnerable code had been in place for over 10 years
  - That's 2011, kids

#### The versions affected are:

- Microsoft Exchange Server 2013
- Microsoft Exchange Server 2016
- Microsoft Exchange Server 2019

Microsoft Exchange Server 2010 is being updated for Defense in Depth purposes.



## **Mass-Seeding Event**

- Scanning and seeding appear automated
- Any vulnerable organization may already have malicious web shells installed
- Scanning and attacks are ongoing
- Very aggressive adversaries







#### **Forensic Preservation**

- Forensically image all Solarwinds Exchange servers
- Obtain volatile memory
- Preserve network/IIS logs
- Very important because of BEC/data breach concerns
- Check for unauthorized access
- Determine risk of email access/acquisition

#### The Microsoft Exchange Hack and the Great Email Robbery

By Nicholas Weaver Tuesday, March 9, 2021, 4:17 PM

# **European Banking Authority hit by Microsoft Exchange hack**

3 days ago














#### **Contain the Damage**

- Act yesterday!
  - Or at least today
- CISA & Microsoft guidance for "ProxyLogon" remediation
- Standard options:
  - Yank the network/power
  - Domain-wide password reset
    - Attacker use of procdump to capture pwds
- Impacts:
  - Operational impacts
  - Help desk calls
  - Email is down
  - Evidence might be destroyed





# **Hunt for Threats**

- Microsoft & CISA published IoCs right away
- Example: Financial services firm
- We used Carbon Black for overall network
- Targeted analysis of IIS logs
  - Exchange-specific activities
- Known Hafnium behavior
  - Identified hundreds of attempts to exploit the vuln on the server
  - Some were successful, others not





#### **Indictors of Compromise**

- Eight-character .aspx files in c:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet\_client\system\_we b\
- Web shells present on the server
- Encoded PowerShell activity
- Challenges:
  - Lots of false positives
  - Too many loCs!







#### The IoCs Keep Changing!

Microsoft Exchange Server attacks: 'They're being hacked faster than we can count', says security company







#### **Network Recon Using Encoded Powershell**

- Encoded string example:
- GET /aspnet\_client/supp0rt.aspx 552623bfb61e74baaaf03ef4506c 7fcf=dmFyIHA9U3lzdGVtLkRpYW dub3N0aWNzLlByb2Nlc3MuR2V 0UHJvY...

Translates to:

```
var p=System.Diagnostics.Process.GetProcesses();
var str="";for(vari=0;i<p.Length;i++)
{str+=p[i].ProcessName+":"+p[i].Id+"\r\n";} \
str=Convert.ToBase64String(System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.
GetBytes(str));
str="oamoisjmdo"+str+"sodknousfnfdklj";
Response.Write(str);</pre>
```



#### **Detecting Post-Exploit Behavior – Legit Toolkits**

- Collection 7zip Archiving Outlook Data Files Detected
- Persistence Potential Web Shell Behavior Detected
- Defense Evasion Up sual Location of OWAAUTH.dll
- Execution Psexec Detected
- Defense Evasion Renamed Psexec Process Detected
- Masquerading MinRar Renamed Process
- Credential A Seess Credential Dumping via Sysinternals Procdump Detected
- Credential Access Credential Theft Detected via API Execution





### Microsoft Detection & Remediation Scripts

- Microsoft had time to prepare
  - Unlike SolarWinds
- March 6 release
- Test-ProxyLogon
  - Checks for vuln & known IoCs
- Exchange On-Premise Mitigation Tool (EOMT)
- Automates remediation
- But!
- Can destroy evidence

```
This new Microsoft tool checks Exchange Servers for ProxyLogon hacks
By Lawrence Abrams
                                                         March 6, 2021 02:04 PM
       # Checks for signs of exploit from CVE-2021-26855, 26858, 26857, and 27065.
       # Examples
       # Check the local Exchange server only and save the report:
       # .\Test-ProxyLogon.ps1 -OutPath $home\desktop\logs
       # Check all Exchange servers and save the reports:
       # Get-ExchangeServer | .\Test-ProxyLogon.ps1 -OutPath $home\desktop\logs
       # Check all Exchange servers, but only display the results, don't save them:
       # Get-ExchangeServer | .\Test-ProxyLogon.ps1
Microsoft
       [CmdletBinding()]
       param (
           [Parameter(ValueFromPipeline = $true, ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName = $true)]
           [string[]]
           $ComputerName = $env:COMPUTERNAME
```





#### **Apply Emergency Patches/Updates**

- Ready on March 2 (day of public announcement)
- Not everybody was ready to patch
- If you didn't, you were likely hacked
  - Quite possibly already hacked, anyway

#### Released: March 2021 Exchange Server Security Updates

The\_Exchange\_Team

Published 03-02-2021 01:08 PM

Note: this post is getting frequent updates; please keep checking back. Last update: 3/19/2021

Microsoft has released a set of out of band security updates for vulnerabilities for the following versions of Exchange Server:

- Exchange Server 2013
- Exchange Server 2016
- Exchange Server 2019

Security updates are available for the following specific versions of Exchange:

**IMPORTANT:** If manually installing security updates, you *must* install .msp from elevated command prompt (see Known Issues in update KB articles)

Because we are aware of active exploits of related vulnerabilities in the wild (limited targeted attacks), our recommendation is to install these updates immediately to protect against these attacks.

. NEW! Security Updates for older Cumulative Updates of Exchange Server (the list is now finalized)

Because we are aware of active exploits of related vulnerabilities in the wild (limited targeted attacks), our recommendation is to *install these updates immediately* to protect against these attacks.



# **///**

# Law Enforcement Intervention

- FBI court-authorized to hack in and remove web shells
- "Attempting to provide notice"
- Pros and Cons
- Reduce risk of hackers/ransomware
- Can destroy evidence
- Confuse investigators
- Potential operational impacts
- Will it happen again?



The FBI has been deleting backdoors placed by cyberespionage group Hafnium on Microsoft Exchange servers. The court order allowing them

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Tuesday, April 13, 2021

Justice Department Announces Court-Authorized Effort to Disrupt Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities

Action Copied and Removed Web Shells that Provided Backdoor Access to Servers, but Additional Steps may be Required to Patch Exchange Server Software and to Expel Hackers from the Victims' Networks.

Note: A full copy of the unsealed court documents can be viewed here.

WASHINGTON – The Justice Department today announced a court-authorized operation to copy and remove malicious web shells from hundreds of vulnerable computers in the United States running on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server software used to provide enterprise-level e-mail service.






- Email theft can be very impactful
- Financial fraud
- Targeted follow-on attacks
- Stolen credentials
- Pivoting into network undetected
- Additional malware





## Back to the Recent Kaseya Ransomware Attacks...


- Fourth of July weekend
  - Coincidence? Unlikely
  - "Forensics Friday" @LMG
- Locked up w ransomware
- Who's on call for your organization?
- Are your MSPs monitoring threat intelligence?
- How quickly do MSPs notify their customers?





#### Vulnerability Timeline

- Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD)
- Discovered at least 7 vulns
  - + 2200 vulnerable systems
- April 6 Disclosed to Kaseya
- 90-day disclosure agreement
- April 10 & May 8 4 vulns patched
- Impending release of 3 vulns & patches
- Hackers strike just before release!
  - Suspicious timing
- Hack before the patch an old problem





#### **Supplier Communication Challenges**

- What should you expect for communications from your suppliers?
- 2019 MSP hit by Revil
- Over 100 dental office impacted
- REvil/Sodinokibi ransomware delivered using MSP remote management tools
- \$700k demanded for a master decryptor
- MSP refused payment
- Tight-lipped & did not want to share info
- Refused to provide log data


#### Colorado MSP Attack Compromises Supported Dental Offices

December 10, 2019 By Emil Hozan





### You Can't Trust Just Anybody





#### **Containment**



We are in the process of investigating the root cause of the incident with an abundance of caution but we recommend that you IMMEDIATELY shutdown your VSA server until you receive further notice from us.

It's critical that you do this immediately because one of the first things the attacker does

is shutoff administrative access to the VSA.

July 3, 2021

# 'Turn off your heart': Kaseya VSA ransomware hits MSPs in a vital organ

Joe Uchill



#### Patch Problems

- Apply emergency patches/updates
- Patches SO not ready in time
- If they were, would you deploy them?
- What is your MSP's policy?
- Risks either way
- What do you do when patches aren't ready, or YOU aren't ready?
- What if there's another vuln?

# Kaseya delays patch fixing zeroday attack as issues hit SaaS rollout

Fahmid

We are in the process of resetting the timelines for VSA SaaS and VSA On-Premises deployment. We apologize for the delay and changes to the plans as we work through this fluid situation.



July 7, 2021

Kaseya offers pre-patch instructions for on-prem VSA customers

Joe Uchill



## This Will Happen Again

- Hackers want the most ROI
- Target widely-used software
- Leverage technology service providers
- Breaches lead to more breaches





### **Adapt Your DFIR Processes!**

- 1. Monitor Threat Intelligence
- 2. Evaluate your risk
- 3. Conduct forensic preservation
- 4. Contain the damage
- Hunt for Threats
- Apply emergency patches/updates
- 7. Plan for elevated risks





#### **Questions?**

- Sherri Davidoff & Matt Durrin
- info@LMGsecurity.com
- **MGSecurity** 
  - Find us on Linked in







