DIVIDE ET IMPERA: MEMORY RANGER RUNS DRIVERS IN ISOLATED KERNEL SPACES

Igor Korkin, Ph.D

WHOAMI

- MEPhI Alumni, PhD in Cyber Security, published 23 papers
- Area of interest is Windows Kernel security:
  - Memory Forensics
  - Rootkits Detection
  - Bare-Metal Hypervisors
- Fan of academic cross-disciplinary research - igorkorkin.blogspot.com
- Love traveling and powerlifting -  igor.korkin

AGENDA

- Attacking the kernel-mode memory
- Existing protection: Windows built-in security and research projects
- MemoryRanger hypervisor: idea, details, demos

ATTACKS ON KERNEL MODE MEMORY





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

TWO HOUSES WITH PRIVATE ART COLLECTIONS

Hi all! I am a hacker-attacker!
I will inspect these houses to
steal and damage painting!

DEMO: THE ATTACK



DEMO: THE ATTACK

The online version is here –
https://www.youtube.com/embed/HNxc-tjy3QA?vq=hd1080

TWO HOUSES WITH PRIVATE ART COLLECTIONS

Yo Ho Ho!
The both collections are mine!

THE ATTACK HAS NOT BEEN PREVENTED



BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

Memory protection projects	Malware attacks on					
	Code of OS & third-party drivers		OS data: internal structures		Data of third-party drivers	
	Read	Write	Read	Write	Read	Write
Windows Security	-	BSOD 0xBE by Device Guard	-	BSOD 0x109 by PatchGuard	-	-
PrivGuard	-	-	-	+	-	-
LAKEED	+	+	+	+	-	-
LKMG	-	+	+	+	+	+
rR^X	+	+	-	-	-	-
AllMemPro	-	-	+	+	+	+
Memory Ranger	+	+	+	+	+	+

IDEA OF DRIVERS EXECUTION ISOLATION

Now all drivers share the same memory space



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

Let’s execute these two drivers into separate memory enclosures





PROCESSING MEMORY ACCESS: EPT FEATURE



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

INSIDE EPT PAGING STRUCTURES. EPT PFN



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

INSIDE EPT PAGING STRUCTURES. EPT BITS





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

APPLYING EPT FOR DRIVERS ISOLATION



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

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

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

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

THREE HOUSES WITH PRIVATE ART COLLECTIONS

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Stars by
Wassily Kandinsky

Girl with Balloon
by Banksy

No.5 by
Jackson Pollock

Oh no!
I can
steal
nothing!

DEMO: THE ATTACK PREVENTION



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

MEMORY RANGER: PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE

Kernel-mode drivers	Drivers Code			
				
	✓			
		✓		
			✓	
				✓
OS kernel	✓	✓	✓	✓

MEMORY RANGER: PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE

Kernel-mode drivers	Drivers Code				Allocated Memory Data			
								EPROCESS structures
	✓				✓			
		✓				✓		
			✓				✓	
				✓				
OS kernel	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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								EPROCESS structures
	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗
	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
OS kernel	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

MEMORY RANGER ARCHITECTURE: THREE PARTS



* by Satoshi Tanda, @standa_t, https://github.com/tandasat

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

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

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

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

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MEMORY RANGER DISPATCHER (SIMPLIFIED)

```
switch (exit_reason){
        case (execute_violation):
                change_ept();
                break;
        case (read_violation|| write_violation):
                if (access_legal()==false){
                        set_pte(pfn, read|write, fake_page);
                        set_monitor_trap_flag();
                        break;
                }
        case (monitor_trap_flag):
                set_pte(pfn, no_access, original_page);
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HOW TO PROTECT YOUR DATA IN MEMORY?

1. Callback - creating a list of protected objects
   - Add objects' addresses & sizes to the list
   - Restrict memory access for objects memory via EPT

2. EPT dispatcher – processing EPT violations for this data
   - type_of_access – read or write
   - guest_ip is the 'source address'
   - fault_va is the 'destination address'
   - Temporary allow access to the data using MTF
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MEMORY RANGER BENCHMARKS: MEMORY ACCESS TIME



* AllMemPro details - http://bit.ly/AllMemPro

BLACK HAT SOUND BYTES OR CONCLUSION

- Kernel-mode memory is out of control

- MemoryRanger isolates drivers execution by
  using a specific EPT structure for each driver

- MemoryRanger seems to prevent Spectre and Meltdown CPU attacks:
  research is ongoing

Dīvide et Imperā*

from Latin divide and rule

* Cartledge, P. (2013). Sparta and Lakonia: A regional history 1300-362 BC. Routledge.

Thank you!

Igor Korkin igor.korkin@gmail.com

All the details & my CV are here igorkorkin.blogspot.com