# black hat

DECEMBER 9-10 BRIEFINGS

## Binlyper **Type Confusion Detection** for C++ Binaries

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## About us



#### Dongju Kim

- Graduate Student at SANE Lab., School of Cybersecurity, Korea University -
- Research Interests: Static Binary Analysis and Software Vulnerability Analysis -



- Seungjoo (Gabriel) Kim (Corresponding Author)
  - Professor at School of Cybersecurity, Korea University -
  - Member of Presidential Committee on the 4th Industrial Revolution \_
  - Black Hat Asia Review Board Member -
  - Research Interests: Security-Privacy by Design, Threat-Risk Modeling, -Formal Verification, Security Assessment & Authorization (such as Common Criteria, CMVP, SSE-CMM, RMF A&A), Blockchain & Crypto Engineering

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## Agenda

- Introduction & Motivation
- Source-level codes vs Binary-level codes
- Our goal
- Challenges & Ideas
- Our approach
- Demo
- Future work & Limitation
- Conclusion





### **Introduction & Motivation**

What is the type confusion bug? -



B \*b = new B;// upcasting (safe) A \*a = static\_cast<A\*>(b); C \* c = static cast < C > (a);// undefined-behavior  $c \rightarrow c = 0;$ 

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24 25

26



// downcasting to incompatible type (unsafe)



### **Introduction & Motivation**



(Image reference: 'Trends, challenges, and strategic shifts in the software vulnerability mitigation landscape' of BlueHat IL 2019)

Type confusion bug is one of the powerful bug types that is used for exploit development -





## **Introduction & Motivation**

- Sanitizer supports: -
  - Better detection of triggered software bug during runtime
  - Information about detected bugs -
- Two areas of sanitizer: **source-level** and **binary-level**
- However, current binary-level sanitizers have not focused on detecting type confusion bugs -



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- We'll talk about the difference between source-level codes and binary-level codes
- We'll cover the source-level codes first -



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- High-level information is available
  - Class names, member variables, methods, hierarchy ...
  - Variable names, size, position ...
- Easy to edit code reliably



7	<pre>int main() {</pre>
8	ClassName cls;
9	
10	// ADDITIONAL CODE1
11	<pre>cls.hello();</pre>
12	// ADDITIONAL CODE1
13	}





- Sanitizers 'edit' the codes to add a bug-checking routine
  - Also high-level information is available
- Bug-checking routine catches bugs more accurately and earlier
- Researches
  - AddressSanitizer, ThreadSanitizer
  - UBSan, CAVER, TypeSan, HexType

- ...





- Sanitizers 'edit' the codes to add a bug-checking routine
  - Also high-level information is available
- Bug-checking routine catches bugs more accurately and earlier
- Researches

. . .

- AddressSanitizer, ThreadSanitizer

- UBSan, CAVER, TypeSan, HexType

Specially designed to detect type confusion bugs





- UBSan
  - Detector for undefined behavior detector
  - Supports many checks
    - -fsanitize=implicit-conversion
    - -fsanitize=integer
    - -fsanitize=vptr
    - ...
  - -fsanitize=vptr supports type confusion detection
    - Cannot handle non-polymorphic class types
    - Incompatible with -fno-rtti

strea	ambu	י_f⊾	view	<b>.</b> h:	:43	:7:	rur	ntime	e er	ror	•: (	lowr	าต
type	e '_	gr	nu_o	cxx:	::s1	tdia	o_fi	ilebu	uf≺o	har	`, <sup>_</sup>	std:	::
00	00	08	0f	00	10	63	00	00	00	08	Øf	00	1



#### ast of address 0x7ffe4eeb26b8 char\_traits<char> >' 0 63 00 00 00 08 0f 00



- CAVER, TypeSan, HexType
  - Insert verification code around typecasting operation
  - Type compatibility verification
  - 'Actual object type' <-> 'Destination type of typecasting'



(Image reference: presentation of HexType)





- High-level information is heavily used in source-level approaches
- How about binary-level?
  - There is no high-level information :(
  - Hard to modify the code
- Therefore, almost binary-level sanitizers do not rely on high-level information -
  - It highly reduces the coverage/usability of sanitizers
  - Recent research, RetroWrite, try to infer and use high-level information





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- Researches
  - GFlags
  - ApplicationVerifier
  - Electric Fence
  - RetroWrite
  - ...



- General idea: Catch heap allocation/deallocation
- Detects heap out-of-bounds access and use-after-free



#### **GUARD PAGE**



- Researches
  - GFlags
  - **ApplicationVerifier**
  - **Electric Fence**
  - **RetroWrite**

. . .



(Image reference: presentation of RetroWrite)

- RetroWrite supports binary-level asan
- Reassembleable Assembly + Instrumentation



#### Instrumented Binary



## Our goal

- Binary-level approach for detecting type confusion bugs
  - Detect type confusion bug at runtime
  - Provide information about the triggered bug
- We target Itanium C++ ABI
  - Generally used in Linux g++, clang++
- RTTI information may be helpful, but we do not use it

	Virtual fund
-0x10	Offset-to-to
-0x08	Pointer to F
0x00	Pointer to f
0x08	Pointer to f
0x10	Pointer to f



#### ction table op RTTI Information function 1

function 2

function 3



## Challenges

- Why we cannot easily detect type confusion bug at binary-level?
- Three major challenges
  - Vanished Type Casting Operators
  - Missing Class Information
  - Unknown Runtime Type Information





## **Challenge 1 - Vanished Type Casting Operators**

11	A *a = foo();			
12	B *h·	11	call	<u>foo()</u>
12	5 5,	12	mov	qword ptr [
11	// type casting	13	mov	rax, qword
14	// cype cascing = cascing	14	mov	qword ptr [
10	D = Static Casto Z(a),			

Compiled by x86-64 clang 10.0.0

- There is a typecasting operation in line 15
- But typecasting operation doesn't exist at binary
  - Except dynamic\_cast<>
- Where should we perform type verification?



rbp - 8], rax ptr [rbp - 8] rbp - 16], rax



## **Challenge 2 - Missing Class Information**

- Verification code checks the type compatibility
  - 'Actual object type' <-> 'Destination type of typecasting'
- For this, class relationship information(class hierarchy) is needed
  - it doesn't exist on binary :(







### **Challenge 3 - Unknown Runtime Type Information**

```
class A {
 1
     public:
 2
 3
         long counter;
     };
 4
                                                void IncreaseCounter(A *a) {
                                           15
 5
                                           16
                                                     a->counter++;
     class B: public A {
 6
                                           17
                                                 }
     public:
 7
                                           18
         long year;
 8
                                                void NextChar(C* c) {
                                           19
     };
 9
                                           20
                                                     c \rightarrow str ++;
10
                                           21
     class C {
11
     public:
12
         char *str;
13
    };
14
```

- What assembly codes are generated from *IncreaseCounter()* and *NextChar()*? -
  - Are they the same or different?





### **Challenge 3 - Unknown Runtime Type Information**

				11	NextChar(C*):	
1	class A {			12	push	rbp
2	public:			13	mov	rbp, rsp
2	long counter:			14	mov	qword ptr [rbp
	Tong councer,			15	mov	rax, qword ptr
4	};			16	mov	rcx, qword ptr
5		15	void IncreaseCounter(A *a) {	17	add	rcx, 1
6	class B: public A {	16	a->counter++;	18	mov	qword ptr [rax]
7	nublic:	17	3	19	рор	rbp
/	public:	17	1	20	ret	
8	long year;	18		1	IncreaseCounte	r(A*):
9	};	19	<pre>void NextChar(C* c) {</pre>	2	push	rbp
10		20	c->str++;	3	mov	rbp, rsp
11	class C {	21	}	4	mov	qword ptr [rbp
4.2	with land	21	J	5	mov	rax, qword ptr
12	public:			6	mov	rcx, qword ptr
13	char *str;			7	add	rcx, 1
14	};			8	mov	qword ptr [rax
				9	рор	rbp
				10	ret	

- What assembly codes are generated from *IncreaseCounter()* and *NextChar()* 
  - => Both are same (Tested on clang++ x86-64 6 ~ 10, g++ 6 ~ 10)



- 8], rdi [rbp - 8] [rax]

], rcx

) - 8], rdi [rbp - 8] [rax]

<], rcx



### **Challenge 3 - Unknown Runtime Type Information**

<ul> <li>IncreaseCounter() and NextChar()</li> </ul>		
	push	rbp
<ul> <li>Different type of arguments</li> </ul>	mov	rbp, rsp
	mov	qword pt
<ul> <li>Different type of accessed member variable</li> </ul>	mov	rax, qwo
	mov	rcx, qwo
but produce the same result	add	rcx, 1
	mov	qword pt
	рор	rbp
- It means that we don't know which object will be handled t	DV <sup>ret</sup>	
specific assembly snippets in runtime	f	or A? o



p tr [rbp - 8], rdi ord ptr [rbp - 8] ord ptr [rax]

tr [rax], rcx

or for B?



### Ideas

- Here are some ideas to overcome challenges and detect type confusion bugs
  - Class information is recoverable
  - Assembly representation doesn't be shared
  - Class Object is composed of several areas
  - Type confusion bug is triggered once an area does not exist





### Idea 1 - Class information is recoverable

- Compiled C++ binaries have no high-level information
  - Class identifier(name), Class hierarchy ...
- But we can still infer class identifier and hierarchy
  - From indirect information
    - Constructor/Destructor chain, VFT ...
- Previous researches
  - DeClassifier
  - MARX
  - VCI
  - OOAnalyzer

B::B() [base object constructor]: 12 13 push rbp rbp, rsp 14 mov rsp, 16 15 sub qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi 16 mov rax, gword ptr [rbp - 8] 17 mov rcx, rax 18 mov rdi, rcx 19 mov qword ptr [rbp - 16], rax # 8-byte Spill 20 mov A::A() [base\_object\_constructor] 21 call rax, offset vtable\_for\_B 22 movabs 23 add rax, 16 rcx, gword ptr [rbp - 16] # 8-byte Reload 24 mov qword ptr [rcx], rax 25 mov





### Idea 2 - Assembly representation doesn't be shared

- Different source codes don't share the same assembly code
  ... even though both can be expressed in the same assembly code
- Certain assembly code will not operate on other types
  - It is not shared for several types

1	IncreaseCounter	r(A*):
2	push	rbp
3	mov	rbp, rsp
4	mov	qword pt
5	mov	rax, qwo
6	mov	rcx, qwo
7	add	rcx, 1
8	mov	qword pt
9	рор	rbp
10	ret	
11	NextChar(C*):	
12	push	rbp
13	mov	rbp, rsp
14	mov	qword pt
15	mov	rax, qwo
16	mov	rcx, qwo
17	add	rcx, 1
18	mov	qword pt
19	рор	rbp
20	ret	



```
otr [rbp - 8], rdi
word ptr [rbp - 8]
word ptr [rax]
```

```
otr [rax], rcx
```

```
otr [rbp - 8], rdi
word ptr [rbp - 8]
word ptr [rax]
```

```
otr [rax], rcx
```



- Derived(Child) class inherit member fields from their parents
  - Parent classes inherit member fields from their parents too
- We'll use the *'area'* term to indicate *unique member fields of each class*
- Parent class area
  - Member fields which derived class inherits
- Own area
  - Member fields which derived class defines itself (doesn't exist in parents)
- Own area is located after the Parent class area
  - In Itanium ABI, but other ABIs may be the same





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#### Parent class area

#### Own area











#### Parent class area

#### Own area









#### Parent class area

#### Own area



1	class A {		
2	public:		
3	<pre>int var_a;</pre>	16	<pre>void func_a(B* b) {</pre>
4	};	17	<pre>// Access an area of class A</pre>
5		18	b->var_a = 0xaaaaaaaa;
6	class B: public A {	19	}
7	public:	20	5
8	<pre>int var_b;</pre>	20	
9	};	21	void func_b(B* b) {
10		22	<pre>// Access an area of class B</pre>
11	<pre>class C: public A {</pre>	23	b->var_b = 0xbbbbbbbb;
12	public:	24	}
13	<pre>int var_c;</pre>		2
14	};		

- Both *func\_a()* and *func\_b()* receive *B*\* type argument
  - But access different area



		1	class A {
		2	public:
		3	<pre>int var_a;</pre>
		4	};
16	<pre>void func_a(B* b) {</pre>	5	
17	// Access an area of class A	6	<pre>class B: public A {</pre>
18	b-≻var_a = 0xaaaaaaaa;	7	public:
19	}	8	int var b;
20	void func h(P* h) (	9	};
21	// Access an area of class B	10	
23	b->var b = 0xbbbbbbbb;	11	<pre>class C: public A {</pre>
24	}	12	public:
	-	13	<pre>int var_c;</pre>
		14	};

- Line 30 and 34, Typecasting (A/C to B) occurred -
- but it isn't actually a problem -
  - access to existing area(A)

int main() { 26 27 A a; 28 B b; 29 C c; 30 31 32 33 34 func\_b((B\*)(&c)); // Problem 35 36 return 0; 37 Figure 1

#### func\_a((B\*)(&a)); // No problem func\_b((B\*)(&a)); // Problem func\_a((B\*)(&b)); // No problem func\_b((B\*)(&b)); // No problem func\_a((B\*)(&c)); // No problem



		1	class A {
		2	public:
		3	<pre>int var_a;</pre>
		4	};
16	<pre>void func_a(B* b) {</pre>	5	
17	// Access an area of class A	6	class B: public A {
18	b->var_a = 0xaaaaaaaa;	7	public:
19	}	8	<pre>int var_b;</pre>
20		9	};
21	Void Tunc_D( $B^{*}$ D) {	10	
22	$h \rightarrow var b = 0xbbbbbbbb;$	11	<pre>class C: public A {</pre>
24	}	12	public:
	-	13	<pre>int var_c;</pre>
		14	};

- Line 31 and 35, Typecasting (A/C to B) occurred -
- It is a problem -
  - access to the non-existing area(B)

26	<pre>int main() {</pre>
27	A a;
28	B b;
29	C c;
30	<pre>func_a((B*)(&amp;a</pre>
31	<pre>func_b((B*)(&amp;a</pre>
32	func_a((B*)(&b
33	func_b((B*)(&b
34	<pre>func_a((B*)(&amp;d</pre>
35	<pre>func_b((B*)(&amp;c</pre>
36	return 0;
37	}

#### a)); // No problem a)); // Problem b)); // No problem b)); // No problem c)); // No problem c)); // Problem



- Area-based approach
- Assembly codes require valid(matched) areas to operate properly
- Type confusion bug occurs once the required area doesn't exist in the actual object
  - we're able to detect type confusion bug by checking the existence of the required area

		16	void func_a(B* b
_	Why do we use the concept of the area?	17	// Access an
	The de the dee the senespt of the dreat	18	b->var_a = (
	<ul> <li>Area can tell the condition that an interacted object must have</li> </ul>	19	}
		20	
	- Compatibility: itself and its child types	21	<pre>void func_b(B* l</pre>
	- Area is accumulated during inheritance	22	// Access an
		23	b->var_b = (
		24	}



b) { n area of class A 0xaaaaaaaaa;

b) { n area of class B 0xbbbbbbbb;



- Area-based approach
- Assembly codes require valid(matched) areas to operate properly
- Type confusion bug occurs once the required area doesn't exist in the actual object
  - we're able to detect type confusion bug by checking the existence of the required area
- Important things we have to know to detect bug:
  - Which area does the assembly code needs(accesses)?
  - **Does the actual object have that area?**

= required area



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## **Our approach**





#### Verification



## **Our approach**





#### Verification


- This step is to inference/recover class information from binary
  - **Class identifier**
  - **Class hierarchy**
- It's another huge research area itself
  - There are many existing researches for restoring class information
  - VCI, MARX, DeClassifier, OOAnalyzer...
- Best situation: Use published tools and BinTyper just uses recovered class information



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Oops

allow\_non\_pe: boolean

The OOAnalyzer tool only really supports Windows 32-bit executables produced by Microsoft Visual Studio. While requirement for these input executables to be in the Portable Executable (PE) file format, there is in practice a stro the supported files and the PE file format. Due to confusion about OOAnalyzer not really supporting executables

### **OOAnalyzer**

user@ubuntu:~/marx\_pdfium\_test\$ cat pdfium\_test.hierarchy | wc -l

### MARX





- Manually implements some of its ideas
  - Use VFT as a unique class identifier
  - VFT detection
  - Constructor/Destructor analysis
  - VFT Overwrite analysis
    - \* VFT: Virtual function table
- Not a perfect implementation but it works -
  - It's enough to prove our ideas







Sample of recovered class identifiers and hierarchies -

	149799120,	151023368,	149358192,	153556584,	153547152,	154696112,	154801992,	153000496,
	154857600,	152211448,	149620496,	149816976,	150307096,	149494696,	152159056,	149915288,
	151301064,	149256672,	154031616,	149327392,	149456568,	154332768,	153791248,	149416136,
	150576008,	149185328,	149587672,	149332120,	150564848,	149718752,	150039504,	149287384,
	151025360,	150584656,	149451344,	149325560,	149290224,	149800216,	150308608,	152950400,
	149686040,	150338144,	149540528,	150764776,	152288264,	149915424,	149799216,	149464656,
ĺ	149632184,	151445072,	150008624,	149358400,	149662688,	149804896,	149807696,	149194568,
11								

7899	"1521640
7900	"0":
7901	"368
7902	},
7903	"1506301
7904	"0":
7905	},
7906	"1521237
7907	"0":
7908	"32"
7909	},
7910	"1520145
7911	"0":
7912	},
7913	"1492106
7914	"0":
7915	},

Figure 2

Figure 1



L<mark>6"∶</mark> { 152105576, : 149444536

76": { 149268656

12": { 152124328, 152117104

60": { 149290944

16": { 149210528



### **Our approach**





#### Verification



- <u>'area'</u> : unique member fields of each class
- The Area Layout provides internal area structure
  - Where each area of the object starts/ends
- BinTyper performs static analysis to obtain Area Layout of classes
  - Based on recovered information about the class identifier and hierarchy



#### Area Layout of C

{identifier: 0xAAAA,
 offset: 0x00,
 size:0x08},
{identifier: 0xBBBBB,
 offset: 0x08,
 size:0x08},
{identifier: 0xCCCC,
 offset: 0x10,
 size:0x08} ]



**Example of Area Layout** 





{identifier: 0xAAAA, offset: 0x00, size:0x08}, {identifier: 0xBBBB, offset: 0x08, size:0x08}, {identifier: 0xCCCC, offset: 0x10, size:0x08} ]

#### Figure 3



- The Area Layout is the list of the following pairs: [identifier, (own) area starts, area ends]
  - area ends = area starts + area size
- The size of class gradually increases through inheritance
  - [Derived class size] = [Parent area size] + [Own area size]
- Area size: calculating the difference
  - [Own area size] = [Derived class size] [Parent area size]
- Area starts:
  - Own area(area of derived class) is located behind the parent area
  - Area starts := [Parent area size]

Area Layout of C



#### {identifier: 0xAAAA, offset: 0x00, size:0x08}, {identifier: 0xBBBB, offset: 0x08, size:0x08}, {identifier: 0xCCCC, offset: 0x10, size:0x08} ]



- The next question is: How to get the (derived) class size by static analysis?
- In the case of an object located in the heap:
  - The new() operator directly indicates the size of the object -----
- In the case of an object located in the stack/global: -
  - There is no direct clue indicating the size of the object -



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- Assembly representation of code accessing class member variable
  - QWORD / DWORD / WORD / BYTE PTR [class-ptr + offset-to-member]
    - class-ptr indicates start address of an object -
    - offset-to-member indicates offset that mapped for target member variable -
- Analyze the maximum possible *offset-to-member* value for each class identifier
  - From the virtual-methods and constructor/destructors of identifier
- BinTyper uses that value as object size
  - Maximum offset-to-member + Access unit size



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- A similar approach was performed previously in DeClassifier -
  - They analyze object size to infer class hierarchy
- Limitation: The analyzed object size may be incorrect -
  - It may be smaller than the actual object size
  - This can lead to false positives in analysis









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### **Our approach**





#### Verification



- The Runtime type information is unknown
  - Challenge 3 Unknown Runtime Type Information
  - It's hard to statically determine whether type(area) will be passed

-	Approach –	Applying t	he dynamic	analysis to	obtain area	information
---	------------	------------	------------	-------------	-------------	-------------

- Obtained(Recorded) type information is used for verification later

rbp

rbp, rsp



```
qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi
rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]
rcx, qword ptr [rax]
rcx, 1
qword ptr [rax], rcx
rbp
```





### Area Layout Information



push	rbp
mov	rbp, rsp
mov	qword ptr [rb
mov	rax, qword pt
mov	rcx, qword pt
add	rcx, 1
mov	qword ptr [ra
рор	rbp
ret	



op - 8], rdi tr [rbp - 8] tr [rax]

ax], rcx



mov

mov

add

mov

pop

ret

# **Runtime Area Analysis**

### **Area Layout Information**

ckhat



#### RDI := Object of class C push rbp rbp, rsp mov mov

qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] rcx, qword ptr [rax] rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx rbp





### **Area Layout Information**

ckhat



#### RDI := Object of class C rbp rbp, rsp qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] rcx, qword ptr [rax] add rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx mov rbp pop ret



push mov mov mov mov





### Area Layout Information

ckhat



### RDI := Object of class C

push mov mov mov add mov pop ret

rbp
rbp, rsp
qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi
rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]
rcx, qword ptr [rax]
rcx, 1
qword ptr [rax], rcx
rbp





### Area Layout Information



### RDI := Object of class C

push rbp mov rbp mov qwo mov rax mov rcx add rcx mov qwo pop rbp ret

rbp
rbp, rsp
qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi
rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]
rcx, qword ptr [rax]
rcx, 1
qword ptr [rax], rcx
rbp





### **Area Layout Information**



### RDI := Object of class C

push rbp rbp, rsp qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] rcx, qword ptr [rax] rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx rbp



mov

mov

mov

mov

add

mov

pop

ret



mov

mov

mov

mov

add

mov

pop

ret

# **Runtime Area Analysis**

### **Area Layout Information**

<u>ckhat</u>



### push rbp rbp, rsp qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx rbp



#### RDI := Object of class C

rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: Area A



### **Area Layout Information**

ckhat



#### push rbp rbp, rsp mov qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] mov mov rcx, 1 add qword ptr [rax], rcx mov rbp pop ret



#### RDI := Object of class C

rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: Area A



### **Area Layout Information**



#### push rbp rbp, rsp mov qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] mov mov

rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx rbp

add

mov

pop

ret

### RDI := Object of class C





rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: Area A



ret

# **Runtime Area Analysis**

### **Area Layout Information**



#### push rbp rbp, rsp mov qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] mov mov add rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], mov rbp **Runtime information:** pop Area A





### RDI := Object of class C

rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: Area A rcx



### **Area Layout Information**



#### RDI := Object of class C push rbp rbp, rsp mov qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] mov rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: mov add rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx mov rbp **Runtime information:** pop Area A ret



Area A



### **Area Layout Information**



### RDI := Object of class C

push rbp rbp, rsp qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: Area A rcx, 1 qword ptr [rax], rcx rbp **Runtime information:** Area A



mov

mov

mov

mov

add

mov

pop

ret



ekhat



Idea 2 - Assembly representation doesn't be shared



rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information: Area A

rcx



- The coverage is a challenge
  - This step is performed by dynamic analysis
  - Only covered(executed) instruction is analyzed
- Benign seed corpus
  - A set of input files which the binary processes
    - Which doesn't trigger any type confusion bugs -
  - Used to increase the coverage of Runtime Area Analysis
  - User should maintain benign seed corpus and re-use it









### **Our approach**





#### Verification



- Recorded information contains many duplicates -
  - ... for verification usage
- Example -

push	rbp
mov	rbp, rsp
mov	qword ptr [rbp -
mov	rax, qword ptr [r
mov	rcx, qword ptr [r
add	rcx, 1
mov	qword ptr [rax],
рор	rbp Runtime info
ret	Area A





#### 8], rdi rbp - 8] **rax**] Runtime information: Area A

- rcx
- ormation:





push	rbp
mov	rbp, rsp
mov	qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi
mov	rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]
mov	<pre>rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information:</pre>
add	rcx, 1 Area A
mov	qword ptr [rax], rcx
рор	rbp Runtime information:
ret	Area A





push	rbp
mov	rbp, rsp
mov	qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi
mov	rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]
mov	rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime information:
add	rcx, 1 Area A
mov	qword ptr [rax], rcx
рор	rbp Duplicated checks
ret	•





mov rbp, rsp	
move award at a labor 01 adi	
mov dwora ptr. [rop - 8], rai	
mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]	
mov rcx, qword ptr [rax] Runtime informatic	on:
add rcx, 1 Area A	
mov qword ptr [rax], rcx	
pop rbp	
ret	

### It is enough for verification





-	Simple optimization rules:		
	- Same basic block		
	- Same area		
	- Same register		
	<ul> <li> reduce 30% of duplicates in our test</li> </ul>		

- More advanced optimization may be possible
  - Symbolic execution

-

. . .

- (Post)-dominator analysis

push	rbp
mov	rbp, rsp
mov	qword ptr [rbp -
mov	rax, qword ptr [r
mov	rcx, qword ptr [r
add	rcx, 1
mov	qword ptr [rax],
рор	rbp Runtime info
ret	Area A



8], rdi rbp - 8] rax] Runtime information: Area A

rcx

ormation:



### **Our approach**





#### Verification



# Verification

- Execute the binary with verification
- Compare accessed area information with recorded runtime area information





### Verification

### Area Layout Information



bush	rbp
10V	rbp, rsp
iov	qword ptr [rbp - 8], rdi
10V	rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8]
10V	rcx, qword ptr [rax + 8] Rec
add	rcx, 1 Ar
10V	qword ptr [rax + 8], rcx
рор	rbp
ret	



corded Runtime information: rea B


### Area Layout Information



### RDI := Object of class C

push	rbp	•	
mov	rbp, rsp		
mov	qword ptr [rbp	- 8], rdi	
mov	rax, qword ptr	[rbp - 8]	
mov	rcx, qword ptr	[rax + 8]	Re
add	rcx, 1		Α
mov	qword ptr [rax	+ 8], rcx	
рор	rbp		
ret			



ecorded Runtime information: Area B



### Area Layout Information



### RDI := Object of class C

push	rbp		
mov	rbp, rsp		
mov	qword ptr [rbp	- 8], rdi	
mov	rax, qword ptr	[rbp - 8]	
mov	rcx, qword ptr	[rax + 8] <sub>F</sub>	٦e
add	rcx, 1		A
mov	qword ptr [rax	+ 8], rcx	
рор	rbp		
ret			



ecorded Runtime information: Area B



### Area Layout Information



### RDI := Object of class C

push	rbp		
mov	rbp, rsp		
mov	qword ptr [rbp	- 8], rdi	
mov	rax, qword ptr	[rbp - 8]	
mov	rcx, qword ptr	[rax + 8] R	le
add	rcx, 1		A
mov	qword ptr [rax	+ 8], rcx	
рор	rbp		
ret			



ecorded Runtime information: Area B



### Area Layout Information



### RDI := Object of class C

push	rbp		
mov	rbp, rsp		
mov	qword ptr [rbp	- 8], rdi	
mov	rax, qword ptr	[rbp - 8]	
mov	rcx, qword ptr	[rax + 8]	Re
add	rcx, 1		Α
mov	qword ptr [rax	+ 8], rcx	
рор	rbp		
ret			



ecorded Runtime information: Area B



### Area Layout Information



### RDI := Object of class C



Area Information Mismatched (B vs C) = Type confusion bug has occurred



Actual Area Information: Area C **Recorded Runtime information:** Area B



- Once a type confusion bug detected, the following information is logged
  - RVA of fault instruction
  - Actual area information
  - Recorded(Required) area information
- Analyst can use this information to perform further analysis





## **About the implementation**

- Static analysis
  - IDA + IDAPython
  - Miasm
- Dynamic analysis
  - Intel Pin











### Demo

- Detection demo for Chromium bug 1043508
  - Type confusion bug in PDFium, the PDF rendering library of Chrome





## Demo









### Demo

Comment 4 by bugdroid on Fri, Jan 24, 2020, 3:15 AM GMT+9 Project	Member	[+] Type conf	usion detected
The following revision refers to this bug: https://pdfium.googlesource.com/pdfium/+/02b6176bd77acf5672f56	f1091ce5e495e5687fc	RVA : 0x00000 Actual access Required area	0000108be84 ed area : 0x000 s : 0x000000000
commit 02b6176bd77acf5672f56f1091ce5e495e5687fc		nequired dred	
Author: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org></tsepez@chromium.org>			
Date: Thu Jan 23 18:15:08 2020	off_1337A38	dq offset n	; DATA XREF: ; CFWL_ListBox
Avoid casting CXFA_FFListBox to CXFA_FFComboBox.		dq offset n da offset n	· -
			_
They are different subclasses of CXFA_FFDropDown.	off_1337468	dq offset n	; DATA XREF: ; CFWL ComboBo
		dq offset n	/ _



00000001337a38 1337468

### CFWL\_ListBox::CFWL\_ListBox x::~CFWL\_ListBox()+Eto

CFWL\_ComboBox::CFWL\_ComboBox ox::~CFWL\_ComboBox()+9to ...



## **Future work & Limitation**

- Our current implementation is based on DBI (Intel Pin)
  - For proof-of-concept: Easy to implement but low performance
    - 10x~. It's impractical for the fuzzing purpose -
  - Performs binary-rewriting for performance and usability
    - Retrowrite: Statically Instrumenting COTS Binaries for Fuzzing and Sanitization" (in IEEE S&P'20) -
- Advanced static analysis for class information recovery / area layout analysis
- **Propagating Runtime Type Information**
- Highly-optimized binaries
  - Optimization make static analysis inaccurate for the inference of class information
  - e.g. Function inlining



**@BLACKHATEVENTS** 



## Conclusion

- The compiled binaries lack high-level information. It makes sanitization difficult -
  - Especially for type confusion bug detection
- Class information can be recovered
  - Based on OOP-related characteristic
- By combining static analysis and dynamic analysis, Runtime type confusion detection is possible



**@BLACKHATEVENTS** 



## **Thanks**

- Q&A

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